Brown v. Ward

• Decision Date: 30 March 1880
• Citation: 53 Md. 376
• Parties: GEORGE S. BROWN v. WILLIAM H. WARD, William A. Fisher and Bernard Carter, Executors of Jane Bay.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

53 Md. 376

GEORGE S. BROWN v. WILLIAM H. WARD, William A. Fisher and Bernard Carter, Executors of Jane Bay.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 30, 1880

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Howard County.

Jane Bay, a resident of Baltimore City, died July 4th, 1876, and certain paper-writings being propounded in the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City as her last will and codicils thereto, a caveat was filed by the appellant, a nephew and one of the heirs-at-law of the deceased. Issues were made up and sent for trial to the Baltimore City Court, from which upon the suggestion of the defendants, the executors, they were removed to the Circuit Court for Howard County, where the trial was had.

The case is further stated in the opinion of the court.

3rd Exception.--At the trial, after the introduction of the testimony set forth in two preceding bills of exceptions of the plaintiff, (which testimony is substantially stated in the opinion,) the plaintiff offered the following thirteen prayers:

1. If the jury find, that Jane Bay was under the influence of any insane delusion or delusions, with respect to the disposition of her property, and that her will, dated the 26th of March 1874, and the codicils thereto, were the direct consequence and offspring of such delusion or delusions, then they should find for the plaintiff upon the second, fifth and eighth issues. And the meaning of an insane delusion, in its legal sense, is the belief in things impossible, or the belief in things possible, but so improbable under the surrounding circumstances, that no man of sound mind could give them credence.

2. If the jury find that Jane Bay was under the influence of any insane delusion or delusions, permanently fixed on her mind at the time the will dated March 26th, 1874, and the codicils thereto in evidence in this case, were executed by her although they should find the said will and codicils were not the direct consequence and offspring of the said delusion or delusions; yet it is a question for the jury to determine whether the intellect of the testatrix was so disordered as to have rendered her at the time of executing the said will and codicils, not of a sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract.

3. If the jury find that Jane Bay labored under insane delusions which affected her mind in the disposal of her property by the will and codicils in evidence, and that, but for the influence of such delusions the said will and codicils would not have been made by her, then they should find for the plaintiff upon the issues as to her testamentary capacity at the time of executing the said writings, although the jury should further believe that the said Jane Bay conducted her ordinary business with shrewdness and apparent discretion, and did not make any exhibitions of insanity to many persons who were brought into contact with her.

4. It is the province of the jury to decide upon the testamentary capacity of Jane Bay, at the time of the execution of the will and codicils which have been offered in evidence, and in so doing it is competent for them to take into consideration the existence in her of an hereditary tendency or predisposition to insanity; that she habitually and constantly labored under insane delusions; the circumstances and associations by which she was surrounded; that she was in infirm health, and before the time of the making of said will exhibited indications of disease of the brain, had a stroke of paralysis within a year afterwards and eventually died of paralysis, if they shall find such facts.

5. If the jury find that Jane Bay labored under a false, unfounded and irrational delusion as to the character of her near relations, and that under the influence and control of the said delusion, she made and executed the will and codicils in question, and was brought to dispose of her property therein, as, if her mind had been free from such delusions, she would not have done, then she was not, at the time of executing the same, of that sound and disposing mind which the law requires.

6. It is the province of the jury to decide upon the testamentary capacity of Jane Bay at the time of the execution of the will and codicils in question, and in doing so it is competent for them to take into consideration, in connection with all the other evidence in the case, an hereditary predisposition to insanity, (if such they shall find to have existed in her,) and the presence in her mind of insane delusions, (if such they shall find,) and if upon all the evidence, they shall find that she was of unsound mind; and that such delusions were habitually and constantly present with her, although they were not, at all times, called into exhibition; and that the said will and codicils were made under the influence of such delusions, and were the direct offspring thereof, then they must find for the plaintiff, upon the second, fifth and eighth issues, although the jury should also find that the said Jane Bay made deeds and leases, and conducted her affairs generally, with acuteness and intelligence, and in all her ordinary business, appeared rational and sane.

7. If the jury find that Jane Bay labored under a causeless and irrational delusion as to the character and motives of her relatives, such as a sane mind would not have entertained, and influenced and controlled by the said delusion, made the will and codicils in question; and that but for said delusion, they would not have been made, then she was not, at the time of making the same, of sound and disposing mind, and their finding should be for the plaintiff upon the said second, fifth and eighth issues.

8. That the verdict of the jury in this case cannot affect the validity of any deeds or contracts alleged to have been made by the deceased at any time, with other persons not parties to this cause.

9. If the jury find that Jane Bay entertained a delusion that the spirit of her deceased brother had sent her a communication from the other world, enjoining upon her to make provision for Jacob H. Weaver, and that said delusion was unreal and false; and shall further find that the will dated March 26th, 1874, was the offspring and direct consequence of said delusion; and that but for such delusion, and her belief in the reality thereof, such a will would not have been made, then the said will is not entitled to stand as the valid will of the said Jane Bay.

10. That if the jury find, at the time of the execution of the will in this cause, the said Jane Bay believed that the spirits of her deceased relatives could and did return from the spirit-land to earth, and that the said spirits, in their natural form, could commune with, counsel and advise her in reference to the affairs of this world and the disposition of her property; and if they further find that these spiritual communications had any influence upon the mind of the deceased in making said will, in disregard of the claims of natural affection, if they shall find such disregard therein, then their verdict must be for the plaintiff upon the second, fifth and eighth issues.

11. If the jury find that Jane Bay believed that she was directed by spirits of the departed to accept Jacob H. Weaver as her spiritual child, and to provide for him as such, in order to develop her for a proper sphere in the future life, and acted on that belief, such belief in law amounted to a delusion, and the will, if it was the result or consequence of such delusion, in any respect, is not the valid will of the said Jane Bay.

12. If the jury find that Jane Bay believed that she was directed by the spirits of her deceased ancestors, to found a home for boys, in order to perpetuate the family name, and her will was the result or consequence of her belief that she had received such direction from such source, then the will should not be allowed to stand as the valid will of said Jane Bay.

13. That if the jury find that before the time of executing the said will and codicils, the mind of the said Jane Bay was disordered and unsound, and that she labored under insane delusions, as defined in the plaintiff's first prayer, and that said mental unsoundness was of a permanent character, then the general presumption of sanity is overcome in her case.

And the defendants offered the following eleven prayers:

1. That the due execution of the will and of the codicils being admitted by the plaintiff, the verdict of the jury must be for the defendants on the first, fourth and seventh issues.

2. That the plaintiff has offered no evidence legally sufficient to show that the will and codicils, or any one of them, were procured by undue influence of any person or persons, and that the verdict of the jury must be for the defendants on the third, sixth and ninth issues.

3. That the presumption of law is that the testatrix, Jane Bay, was of sound mind at the time she executed the will offered in evidence, and that the plaintiff is bound to satisfy the jury that said Jane Bay was not of sound mind at the time she executed said will, otherwise their verdict must be for the defendants on the second issue; and the defendants further pray the court to instruct the jury, that the same rule of law is applicable to the fifth issue, with reference to the first codicil, and to the eighth issue with reference to the second codicil.

4. That if the jury find from the evidence that Jane Bay was, at the time of executing the will offered in evidence, of sound and disposing mind, and capable of making a valid deed or contract, then she had sufficient mental capacity, under the law of Maryland, to enable her to make a valid will, and what is meant by the words "sound and disposing mind, and capable of making a valid deed or contract," in respect to...