Brown v. Wetzel

• Decision Date: 18 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 125 MAP 2016,125 MAP 2016
• Citation: 177 A.3d 200 (Mem)
• Parties: Alton D. BROWN, Appellant v. John E. WETZEL, Appellee
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

177 A.3d 200 (Mem)

Alton D. BROWN, Appellant

v.John E. WETZEL, Appellee

No. 125 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Decided: January 18, 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 18th day of January, 2018, the Order of the Commonwealth is AFFIRMED .

Justice Wecht files a dissenting statement in which Justices Donohue and Dougherty join.

DISSENTING STATEMENT

JUSTICE WECHT

I respectfully dissent.

As a prisoner, Alton D. Brown necessarily has lost those privileges of citizenship that are fundamentally incompatible with his incarceration. Nonetheless, inmates retain certain inalienable rights, including the right to due process and the right to the equal protection of our laws. See Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (noting that prisoners retain "those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration," including the rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of speech and religious expression, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment). One right attending Brown's status as "a legal resident of the United States," 65 P.S. § 67.102, is the statutory right to access public information under Pennsylvania's Right–To–Know Law ("RTKL"), 65 P.S. §§ 67.101 – 67.3104. It is this right that, in the instant case, Brown alleges has been subject to impermissible interference by DOC.¹

Pursuant to a RTKL request, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") granted Brown access to reports containing the results of DEP water inspections at two state correctional facilities. By his own averment, Brown sought this public information "as a part of his ongoing investigation into SCI–Smithfield's drinking water contamination." See Petition for Review, 6/19/2015, ¶ 9. Brown was charged approximately $100.00 to receive the reports from DEP. Id. at ¶ 4. When the package containing the reports arrived in the correctional facility's mail room, DOC employees confiscated and retained it for approximately three weeks. At that point, DOC notified Brown that it had received the package and that "he was required to send it back out of the prison, or it would be destroyed." Id. at ¶ 5. DOC provided no reason for the confiscation.

Having been denied the reports, access to which DEP already had determined that Brown was entitled pursuant to the RTKL, Brown sought redress through DOC's internal grievance process. Brown submitted a grievance in which he alleged that DOC: had violated his rights under the RTKL; had provided no reasons or justifications for the confiscation; and had violated its own policies regarding inmate mail access. DOC denied Brown's grievance, and the initial grievance response was upheld throughout Brown's administrative appeals. Id. at ¶ 8. However, "[n]one of the appeal responses provided any justifications" as to why the "inspection reports constituted contraband" that Brown was not entitled to possess. Id. at ¶ 9.

Left without any other legal recourse, Brown filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction, seeking mandamus relief upon the basis that he was entitled to the DEP reports, which do not fit the definition of contraband under DOC's policies. John E. Wetzel, Secretary of DOC and the named defendant in this matter, filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing that Brown was ineligible for mandamus relief because he had established no clear legal right to access the reports, because, as a prisoner, Brown does not enjoy the same rights as non-incarcerated citizens, and because DOC had a prerogative to employ its discretion in assessing potential security concerns, the exercise of which must be afforded deference by our courts. Wetzel further argued that, due to Brown's status as an "abusive litigator,"² his petition should be dismissed under the PLRA's "three strikes" provision, which permits a court to dismiss "prison conditions litigation" if "the prisoner has previously filed prison conditions litigation and ... three or more of these prior civil actions have been dismissed" for frivolousness, maliciousness, for failure to state a claim, or upon the basis of a valid affirmative defense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f).

The Commonwealth Court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed Brown's petition. See Brown v. Wetzel , 318 M.D. 2015, 2016 WL 4709887 (Pa. Cmwlth. Sept. 9, 2016) (unpublished). Relying upon the general principle that mandamus will not lie to compel a discretionary act, the Commonwealth Court found that "DOC's decision to confiscate records from a current inmate relating to air, water and waste water monitoring of infrastructure at two state correctional facilities clearly relates to an internal security matter within the discretion of DOC." Id. at *3. Because DOC has broad discretion to make such judgments regarding potential security concerns, the Commonwealth Court held that Brown's request for mandamus relief could not prevail.

The court further held that Brown failed to establish a right to possess the records at issue because "[a]n inmate does not have the same right to possess records as a non-incarcerated citizen." Id. The Commonwealth Court relied upon a nonprecedential decision in which it had determined that a prisoner could be denied access to the first names of corrections officers pursuant to one of the RTKL's enumerated exceptions, and had further opined that the prisoner could be denied access to the records even if the exception did not apply. Id. (quoting Stein v. Office of Open Records , 1236 C.D. 2009, 2010 WL 9511502 (Pa. Cmwlth. May 19, 2010) (unpublished)).³ In Stein , the Commonwealth Court had relied upon this Court's decision in Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee , 554 Pa. 317, 721 A.2d 357 (1998), for the proposition that "[i]nmates do not enjoy the same 'panoply of rights' as non-incarcerated citizens."

Stein , 2010 WL 9511502, at *5 (quoting Bronson , 721 A.2d at 359 ). Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court concluded here that Brown had no right to possess the DEP records, without regard to the validity of his request under the RTKL.

The Commonwealth Court concluded as well that mandamus would not lie, because Brown was not without an alternative remedy. Brown's remedy, the court determined, could be obtained through DOC's inmate grievance process. The court stated that "[o]ur courts recognize that DOC's grievance process is constitutionally adequate." Brown , 2016 WL 4709887, at *4 (citing McEachin v. Beard , 319 F.Supp.2d 510 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ; Waters v. Pa. Dep't of Corr. , 97 Pa.Cmwlth. 283, 509 A.2d 430 (1986) ). Because Brown had sought redress through that administrative process, the court concluded that he was unable to pursue mandamus relief in the courts of this Commonwealth.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth Court determined that Brown's petition must be dismissed pursuant to Subsection 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA. The court recognized that the provision applies only to the dismissal of "prison conditions litigation" which, inter alia , "is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2). Because the court determined that Brown had failed to state a claim for mandamus relief, Subsection 6602(e)(2) could be invoked as a basis to dismiss Brown's claim, but only if the instant action constituted "prison conditions litigation." The court recited the PLRA's definition of the term: "[a] civil proceeding arising in whole or in part under Federal or State law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by a government party on the life of an individual confined in prison." Brown , 2016 WL 4709887, at *5 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6601 ). Although Brown's petition did not raise any claims related to the conditions of his confinement or concerning his quality of life, the Commonwealth Court nonetheless concluded that the instant petition constituted "prison conditions litigation." The Commonwealth Court reasoned as follows:

We conclude that this Petition qualifies as "prison conditions litigation" within the statutory definition. [Brown] seeks return of his property confiscated by DOC. Also, he allegedly plans to use the confiscated records to continue his investigation into drinking water contamination at a state correctional facility. Further, he avers improper retaliatory transfer. Because the Petition fails to state a claim for mandamus relief, and thereby violates [Subs]ection 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA, dismissal is required.

Id. (citation omitted).

Finally, the Commonwealth Court rejected Brown's claim that his petition could be filed in both that court's appellate and original jurisdiction. The matter properly was within the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction because it was a proceeding brought against a Commonwealth party—the Secretary of DOC. Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1) ). However, the court already had determined that Brown failed to state a claim for mandamus relief, and that his claim was subject to dismissal under the PLRA. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court sustained Wetzel's preliminary objections and dismissed Brown's petition with prejudice. Brown took a direct appeal to this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 723(a) (providing this Court with jurisdiction over direct appeals "from final orders of the Commonwealth Court entered in any matter which was originally commenced in the Commonwealth Court").

Brown raises five issues for our review.⁴ He argues that mandamus was a viable cause of action under the circumstances, that the RTKL process sufficiently protected DOC's interest in preventing the disclosure of information that could raise security concerns, that the confiscation of the documents deprived him of property interests for purposes of due process, that the instant action does not constitute "prison conditions litigation" within the meaning of the PLRA, and that he should be entitled to seek...