Brown v. Wokocha

• Decision Date: 11 April 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 01-15-00759-CV.,01-15-00759-CV.
• Citation: 526 S.W.3d 504
• Parties: Ada Ukah BROWN, Appellant v. Bright O. WOKOCHA, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

526 S.W.3d 504

Ada Ukah BROWN, Appellant

v.Bright O. WOKOCHA, Appellee

NO. 01-15-00759-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued April 11, 2017

Rehearing Overruled June 13, 2017

James O. Okorafor, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Ijeoma I. Opara, The Opara Law Firm, PLLC, Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Huddle.

OPINION

Rebeca Huddle, Justice

This appeal concerns the division of property between divorcing spouses. In three issues, Ada Ukah Brown argues that the trial court erred by (1) awarding Bright O. Wokocha a disproportionate share of the marital estate, (2) mischaracterizing some of Brown's separate property as community property, and (3) failing to award attorney's fees to James O. Okorafor, who represented third-party defendants in the trial court, including Brown's three daughters from a previous marriage and various business entities. We affirm.

Background

Brown and Wokocha married in April 2004. They separated in September 2011, and Brown filed for divorce in August 2013. Wokocha countersued in October 2013, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims against Brown and several business entities. He subsequently amended his petition to include claims for fraudulent transfer, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy, and he added Brown's three adult daughters and additional business entities as co-respondents. Some of the business entities were owned or operated by Brown and Wokocha. Wokocha alleged that other of the business entities were created at Brown's behest in the name of Brown's daughters with community funds in an effort to defraud the community estate.

Before trial, the daughters moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted their motion. The parties subsequently tried the case to the bench.¹ The trial court entered a final decree of divorce which divided the marital estate between Brown and Wokocha. Brown appealed.

Property Division

In her second issue, Brown contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wokocha a disproportionate share of the marital estate.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's division of marital property for an abuse of discretion. Barras v. Barras , 396 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The trial court has broad discretion when dividing the marital estate at divorce. Murff v. Murff , 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). If the evidence demonstrates a reasonable basis for doing so, a trial court may order a disproportionate division of the community property. Id. at 698–99 & n.1."To disturb a trial court's division of property, a party must show that the court clearly abused its discretion by a division or an order that is manifestly unjust or unfair." Barras , 396 S.W.3d at 164. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably or arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. ; Evans v. Evans , 14 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Worford v. Stamper , 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) ). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative nature to support the decision. Barras , 396 S.W.3d at 164.

In order to determine whether the assets of the community estate were divided in a "just and right" manner, an appellate court must have the trial court's findings on the value of those assets. Vasudevan v. Vasudevan , No. 14-14-00765-CV, 2015 WL 4774569, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Wells v. Wells , 251 S.W.3d 834, 840–41 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2008, no pet.) ). Without findings of fact, the appellate court does not know the basis for the division, the values assigned to the community assets, or the percentage of the marital estate that each party received. Id. (citing Hallum v. Hallum , No. 01-09-00095-CV, 2010 WL 4910232, at *6 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)); Funderburgh v. Funderburgh , No. 12-08-00428-CV, 2010 WL 2982906, at *2 (Tex. App.–Tyler July 30, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Wells , 251 S.W.3d at 840–41. Property inventories filed by the parties cannot serve as a substitute for findings of fact by the trial court. Id. (citing Funderburgh , 2010 WL 2982906, at *2 ). In the absence of trial court findings, we presume the trial court made all the necessary findings to support its judgment. Id. (citing Wells , 251 S.W.3d at 838 ); Hallum , 2010 WL 4910232, at *6. Thus, if a party does not request findings of fact from the trial court, a party cannot establish whether the trial court intended the division to be equal or disproportionate, and if disproportionate, what factors the trial court found to warrant an unequal distribution if one was intended.

Wade v. Wade , No. 01-13-00912-CV, 2014 WL 3398393, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tate v. Tate , 55 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.–El Paso, 2000, no pet.) ).

B. Analysis

Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wokocha a disproportionate share of the marital estate. Wokocha responds that the award was not disproportionate, and that, even if it were, the record supports a disproportionate award because there is evidence that Brown intentionally withheld information about some assets.

The final divorce decree does not reflect whether the awards to the spouses were equal or disproportionate. The decree merely states that the division of the marital estate is "just and right" and reflects that Wokocha's reimbursement claims "for the community's payment of property taxes, mortgage, and insurance for [Brown's] separate property real estate" were granted. The trial court did not make any findings regarding the value of any claim or asset, and the record does not reflect any request by Brown that the trial court file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the record does not contain findings reflecting the values that the trial court assigned to each community asset or liability, or to Wokocha's reimbursement claims, or the percentage of the marital estate that each party received. See Vasudevan , 2015 WL 4774569, at *4 ; Hallum , 2010 WL 4910232, at *6.

Without findings of fact, " ‘it is impossible for [us] to determine that the trial court abused its discretion in its division of the community property.’ " Vasudevan , 2015 WL 4774569, at *4 (quoting Hallum , 2010 WL 4910232, at *6 ). Because we do not know what value the trial court assigned to the community property assets or to Wokocha's reimbursement claims, or the percentage of the marital estate awarded to each party, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate. See Vasudevan , 2015 WL 4774569, at *4 (rejecting appellate complaint about disproportionate division of marital estate because appellant did not request findings of fact showing value trial court assigned to community assets or percentage of marital estate awarded to each party); Hallum , 2010 WL 4910232, at *6 (same); Funderburgh , 2010 WL 2982906, at *2 (same); Wells , 251 S.W.3d at 840–41 (same); see also Wade , 2014 WL 3398393, at *4 (if party does not request findings of fact from trial court, party cannot establish whether trial court intended marital estate division to be equal or disproportionate or basis for division).

We overrule Brown's second issue.

Classification of Property

In her first issue, Brown contends that the trial court erred by classifying three life insurance policies and three business entities as community property instead of her separate property.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A spouse's separate property is defined by statute as property "owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage" or "acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent," as well as any "recovery for personal injuries" sustained during the marriage, with limitations. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001. Community property is all property that was acquired by either spouse during the marriage that is not separate property. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.002. There is a statutory presumption that all property possessed by either spouse during or at dissolution of the marriage is community property.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(a). To overcome the presumption that property is community property, the spouse seeking to have the property categorized as separate property must establish that fact through "clear and convincing evidence." TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(b).

Mischaracterizing separate property as community property is an error that may require reversal. See Wade , 2014 WL 3398393, at *6 (first citing Pearson v. Fillingim , 332 S.W.3d 361, 363–64 (Tex. 2011) ("Certainly, a court cannot divest an owner of separate property."); then citing Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer , 554 S.W.2d 137, 139–41 (Tex. 1977) ). However, reversal is not always required. Id. A trial court does not err in characterizing separate property as community property if the party who had the burden to establish the separate nature fails to present adequate evidence to meet that burden. Id. (citing Pearson , 332 S.W.3d at 364 ). And even if the spouse who is arguing that property is separate property does satisfy her burden, a mischaracterization of separate property as community property will not require reversal if the mischaracterization had only a de minimus effect on the overall division of the estate. Id. (citing Robles v. Robles , 965 S.W.2d 605, 621–22 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) ).

It is only when the court mistakenly characterizes property that is of such magnitude that it materially affects the just and right division of the community estate that reversible error is demonstrated. See id. ; Rob les , 965 S.W.2d at 621–22 ; Stavinoha v. Stavinoha , 126 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (holding that reversal is...