Brown v. Wright

Decision Date13 December 1923
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesBROWN v. WRIGHT ET AL.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Newell Jennings Judge.

Action by Peter B. Brown against Howard J. Wright, Julia Shea Dennis Donovan, William J. Donovan, and another. Judgment for defendant Wright and for plaintiff, for $800, against the defendants Julia Shea, Dennis Donovan, and William J Donovan, and they appeal. Affirmed as to Julia Shea and Dennis Donovan, and set aside as to William J. Donovan, and new trial ordered.

Action to recover damages for negligently obstructing a highway and thereby causing injury to an automobile of the plaintiff brought to the superior court, and tried to the jury. Error judgment set aside, and new trial ordered as to William J. Donovan. No error as to Julia Shea and Dennis Donovan.

Upon the trial of this action to the jury, the plaintiff offered evidence to prove these facts: An unoccupied automobile was stalled upon the Berlin turnpike after sundown on November 16, 1920. It was then located in part on the concrete traveled path of the highway, which path was 18 feet in width. The place where the car stood was dark because of shadows and the fact that the sun had set, and so leaving the car was negligent, because it was left stalled from three to five minutes without lights upon it, as required by statute, and without giving warning in any way to cars approaching from the rear. That the car was owned by Julia Shea. That the car was owned by H. J. Wright. The plaintiff was driving an automobile with due care, approaching the stalled car from the rear, and came into collision with the stalled automobile, and his car was injured thereby.

The finding does not state specifically what the plaintiff's evidence tended to prove, if anything, as to who were the occupants of the car, and who was driving it.

The defendants offered evidence to prove these facts: In May, 1920, H. J. Wright & Co., a firm composed of the defendants H. J. Wright and William Donovan sold and delivered the automobile that was stalled, and gave title thereto to the defendant Julia Shea, but that she had not completed all payments on the car on the day of the accident. The defendant H. J. Wright had withdrawn from the partnership with William Donovan; William Donovan continuing the business. Julia Shea was unable to learn to operate the car and placed it in a garage. (The finding does not disclose the claimed proprietors of the garage.) She instructed William Donovan to demonstrate the car for sale. On the day of the accident, Julia Shea wished to exhibit the car to a prospective buyer in Hartford, and asked William Donovan to drive her to Hartford, but William Donovan was unable to comply, and hired his cousin, the defendant Dennis Donovan, to drive the car. Dennis Donovan was then a legally licensed operator under the laws of Connecticut. Dennis Donovan was not in the regular employ of either defendant Julia Shea or William Donovan. The stalling of the car was caused by the burning out of a fuse, which also caused the lights to go out. This was an accidental and unavoidable occurrence, and was immediately prior to the collision. The stalled car at the collision was standing at the extreme right-hand side of the road against the rail. The moon was then full, and it was bright and clear. The defendants were free from negligence causing the collision.

Alfred C. Baldwin, of Derby, and Daniel L. O'Neil, of New Haven, for appellants.

Charles S. Hamilton, of New Haven, and Henry Dryhurst, of Meriden, for appellee.

CURTIS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The finding as to the evidence offered by both parties does not give a clear presentation of the relations of the different defendants to the stalled automobile and to the collision. From the above facts claimed to have been proved by both parties, the following facts could have been reasonably and logically found by the jury:

Julia Shea purchased the automobile from the defendants H. J. Wright and William J. Donovan, and took title to and possession of it in May, 1920, but had not completed all payments on it at the date of the collision. She was unable to learn to operate it and desired to sell it. She put the automobile in a garage. She instructed William J. Donovan to demonstrate it for sale. On the day of the collision, she asked William J. Donovan to drive her to Hartford, so that she could exhibit the car to a prospective customer there. William J. Donovan was unable to comply and refused, but hired his cousin Dennis Donovan to drive the car. Dennis Donovan was not then in the regular employ of William Donovan or Julia Shea. The defendant H. J. Wright had dissolved partnership with William Donovan before the time of the collision.

While there are other subordinate facts that the claims of the parties would justify the jury in finding, there are no others that reasonably and logically could connect William J. Donovan with the transactions underlying this action.

From the above facts which the jury could have found, the only conclusions which the jury could logically and legally arrive at were that Julia Shea owned the stalled automobile at the time of the collision, which was then being driven by Dennis Donovan. The employment of Dennis to drive the car, by fair inference the jury could reasonably have found, was a fact known to, acquiesced in, and...

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14 cases
  • Ziman v. Whitley
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 8, 1929
    ...recovery were sought and no interrogatories were submitted to the jury. Wladyka v. Waterbury, 98 Conn. 305, 119 A. 149; Brown v. Wright, 100 Conn. 193, 199, 123 A. 7; Blake v. Waterbury, 105 Conn. 482.486, 136 A. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698. The increasing frequency of ......
  • Ziman v. Whitley
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 8, 1929
    ... ... Freeman's Appeal, 71 Conn. 708, 717, 43 A. 185; Brown v. Wilcox, 73 Conn. 100, 105, 46 A. 827 ...         In this situation the method of protection against the implications of a general verdict ... Wladyka v. Waterbury, 98 Conn. 305, 119 A. 149; Brown v. Wright, 100 Conn. 193, 199, 123 A. 7; Blake v. Waterbury, 105 Conn. 482. 486, 136 A. 95; Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698 ... ...
  • Marshall v. Fenton
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1928
    ... ... Error, and new trial granted as ... to defendant last named ... [142 A. 404] ... Charles ... V. James and Arthur M. Brown, both of Norwich, for appellant ... Reuben ... Taylor, Ralph G. Woolfson, and Samuel M. Gruskin, all of ... Hartford, for appellees ... Haverstock's control, Haverstock's negligence in ... operating the car could not be charged to Jones." ... See, also, Brown v. Wright, 100 Conn. 193, 199, 123 ... No ... question of lack of due care in intrusting the car to Fenton ... is suggested by the record; the ... ...
  • Cain v. Am. Policyholders Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1936
    ... ... Brown v. Wright, 100 Conn. 193, 199, 123 A. 7. Under the circumstances, also, Snellman was liable to the plaintiff for damages for the injuries the latter ... ...
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