Brown v. Yates, No. : 1:10-cv-00219-LJO-DLB (HC)
| Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California |
| Writing for the Court | Dennis L. Beck |
| Decision Date | 03 February 2011 |
| Parties | JAMES RAY BROWN, Petitioner, v. JAMES A. YATES, Respondent. |
| Docket Number | No. : 1:10-cv-00219-LJO-DLB (HC) |
JAMES RAY BROWN, Petitioner,
v.
JAMES A. YATES, Respondent.
No. : 1:10-cv-00219-LJO-DLB (HC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DATED: February 3, 2011
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Following a jury trial in the Fresno County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (count 1) and of assault with a firearm (count 2). Cal. Penal Code1 §§ 246, 245(a)(2). Street gang enhancements that were attached to both counts and a personal firearm use allegation that was attached to count 2 were found true. §§ 186.22(b)(1), 12022.5(a)(1). Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life imprisonment for count 1; the sentence imposed for count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654.
Petitioner appealed the judgment. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in all respects.
Page 2
On May 22, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. The petition was denied on June 27, 2007.
On April 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The petition was denied on May 3, 2007, without prejudice to refiling the same petition in the superior court.
On June 16, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court. The petition was denied on July 3, 2008.
On August 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The petition was denied on May 14, 2009.
On May 29, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The petition was denied on October 28, 2009.
Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 19, 2010.
Respondent filed an answer to the petition on August 13, 2010. Petitioner filed a traverse on
On October 7, 2005, Brittney Fulmer was driving in her blue Ford Probe on Jensen Avenue near the on ramp to Highway 41. Terence Williams was sitting in the front passenger seat and Melvin Cooper was sitting in the back seat behind Fulmer. Fulmer was traveling in the far right lane. Shortly after she proceeded through the intersection and prepared to enter the freeway ramp, she heard the sound of two gunshots coming from her left. She looked over and saw a tan or brown Toyota Camry. This was the only vehicle near her in traffic. The front passenger window of the Camry was open. Fulmer recognized the driver of the Camry as Jamie Stanfield. A male was sitting in the front passenger seat. When Fulmer subsequently examined her car, she observed a bullet hole above the driver's side wheel well.
Later that day, Fulmer identified [Petitioner] as the shooter to Fresno Police Officer Douglas Wright and she selected [Petitioner] and Stanfield in photographic lineups. Fulmer told Wright that she saw Petitioner's right arm outside the passenger window. He was pointing a gun at her. On January 2, 2006, Fulmer told Fresno Police Detective Ron Flowers that "[s]he saw [Petitioner] extend his arm out of the window of the tan car and fire two shots into her car."
Stanfield was arrested and interviewed on October 17, 2005. Flowers testified that Stanfield said that she was driving [Petitioner] toward an area of Fresno known as the Dog Pound. [Petitioner] received a cell phone call and became engaged in a heated conversation with another male. The caller said that he had been watching [Petitioner] and Stanfield while they were driving. The caller wanted to meet [Petitioner] or his group on Jensen Avenue. [Petitioner] told the caller, "Bitch ass nigga. I'm going to get you." Then he said, "When I catch
Page 3
you I'm going to smoke your black ass." As Stanfield drove onto Jensen Avenue [Petitioner] suddenly rolled down his window, produced a handgun and fired at least one shot at a beige car in the lane to the right of them. Stanfield asked [Petitioner] why he shot at the car. [Petitioner] replied that the car's occupants were from TWAMP (which is an alignment of Black street gangs) and they were about to be attacked. FN2.
FN2. At trial, Fulmer recanted her statements to the police and testified that she no longer thought that [Petitioner] was the shooter. Stanfield denied knowing [Petitioner] and recanted her statements to Flowers.
Detective Flowers also gave expert gang testimony. Williams is a member of a street gang known as the Young Black Soldiers (YBS). [Petitioner] is an active member of a street gang known as the Dog Pound Gang (DPG). The primary activities of the DPG include the sale of narcotics, shootings, weapons offenses, assaults, pimping, rape and murder. Flowers testified about two predicate crimes involving DPG members.
Flowers also testified that the YBS is one of a group of gangs that have aligned together in an association known as TWAMP. The DPG is allied with a rival alignment of gangs known as MUG. DPG members consider members of TWAMP allied gangs to be enemies. If two rival gang members see each other on the street, one will usually attempt to act out before the other.
Flowers opined that [Petitioner's] act of shooting into Fulmer's car was committed for the benefit of the DPG. The shooting benefitted the DPG in two ways. First, it potentially could have resulted in the death of a rival gang member who is a threat to the DPG. Second, it sent a strong signal to rival gangs that the DPG is a "force to be reckoned with." The shooting indicated to other gangs that DPG members are capable of and willing to use violence. Also, if [Petitioner] had not shot at Williams and this fact became known, [Petitioner] could have been perceived as a coward.
[Petitioner] presented an alibi defense. Briniece O'Guinn testified that she and [Petitioner] took their two children to a doctor's appointment scheduled around 1:45 p.m. Afterward, they took the bus to the police station and picked her car up from the impound lot. It was stipulated that O'Guinn's vehicle was released to her at approximately 4:51p.m. FN3
FN3. O'Guinn testified that she did not provide this information to Flowers because she "had [her] dates mixed up."
In rebuttal, Detective Flowers testified that he interviewed O'Guinn by telephone on January 6, 2006. O'Guinn said that she and [Petitioner] were together with their children at a Motel 6 on October 7, 2005, from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
(Ex. 1 at 4-5.)
Page 4
A. Jurisdiction
Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.
B. Standard of Review
Where a petitioner files his federal habeas petition after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), he can prevail only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown
Page 5
v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal law only if it is...
To continue reading
Request your trial