Brown v. Youth Center at Topeka

• Decision Date: 25 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-4219-DES.,93-4219-DES.
• Citation: 883 F. Supp. 572
• Parties: Michael G. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. YOUTH CENTER AT TOPEKA, The State of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Donna Whiteman, individually and in her capacity as Secretary of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Harold Allen, individually and in his capacity as Superintendent of the Youth Center at Topeka, David Hilderbrand, individually and in his capacity as Cottage Director at the Youth Center at Topeka, Larry Schmidt, individually and in his capacity as Youth Service Specialist III at Youth Center at Topeka, William VonHemel, individually and in his capacity as Youth Service Specialist II at the Youth Center at Topeka, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

883 F. Supp. 572

Michael G. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. YOUTH CENTER AT TOPEKA, The State of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Donna Whiteman, individually and in her capacity as Secretary of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Harold Allen, individually and in his capacity as Superintendent of the Youth Center at Topeka, David Hilderbrand, individually and in his capacity as Cottage Director at the Youth Center at Topeka, Larry Schmidt, individually and in his capacity as Youth Service Specialist III at Youth Center at Topeka, William VonHemel, individually and in his capacity as Youth Service Specialist II at the Youth Center at Topeka, Defendants.

No. 93-4219-DES.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

April 25, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Nina W. Tarr, Washburn Law Clinic, Peggy Meiering, William Mott, Legal Intern, Topeka, KS, for plaintiff.

Matthew W. Boddington, Kansas Dept. of SRS, Topeka, KS, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAFFELS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment.¹ Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging defendants terminated his employment, in which he claims a constitutionally protected property interest, without due process of law. The court has reviewed the parties' factual submissions and legal memoranda, as well as the relevant law, and shall rule without oral argument. See District of Kansas Rule of Practice and Procedure 206(d).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

A court shall render summary judgment upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The rule provides that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1985). The substantive law identifies which issues are material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A dispute over a material fact is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. Id. "Only disputes over facts that might properly affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.

The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir.1993). The movant may discharge its burden "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1985). The movant need not negate the nonmovant's claim. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.

Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the nonmovant must do more than merely show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1985). The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or the depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (interpreting Rule 56(e)). Rule 56(c) requires the court to enter summary judgment against a nonmovant who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Such a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmovant's case renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.

A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. O'Block, 788 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir.1986) (stating that "the court must consider factual inferences tending to show triable issues in the light most favorable to the existence of those issues"). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but merely to determine whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a finder of fact to return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Essentially, the court performs the threshold inquiry of determining whether a trial is necessary. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment, the following facts are either uncontroverted or construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.²

In August of 1989, plaintiff began his employment with the Youth Center at Topeka ("YCAT") as a temporary Youth Services Specialist I. He was assigned to work the night shift — 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. — at Arapaho Cottage. He became a permanent classified employee in October of 1989.

On December 23, 1991, he telephoned David Hilderbrand, his Cottage Director, at approximately 9:00 p.m. to request the evening off. Mr. Hilderbrand denied his request. Before reporting to work, plaintiff telephoned Mr. Hilderbrand two more times to request the evening off; however, Mr. Hilderbrand denied both requests. Plaintiff arrived for his shift at 10:50 p.m. At approximately 10:55 p.m., plaintiff encountered Mr. Hilderbrand as Mr. Hilderbrand was leaving YCAT. Plaintiff called Mr. Hilderbrand a "chicken shit" and a "son of a bitch" and threatened he was going "to whip Mr. Hilderbrand's ass." William VonHemel, YCAT assistant night manager, witnessed the encounter. Later that evening, Mr. VonHemel spoke to plaintiff regarding his behavior earlier in the shift.

Three days later, on December 26, 1991, plaintiff arrived at approximately 10:45 p.m. to begin his shift. Upon entering the Cottage, he again encountered Mr. Hilderbrand and called him a "chicken shit" and a "fucking liar." As a result of plaintiff's outburst, several students awoke. Terry Baty, another YCAT staff member, witnessed the outburst and quieted the students.

On February 3, 1992, Larry Schmidt, YCAT night shift manager, observed plaintiff sleeping on the job. Mr. Schmidt reported the incident in his night shift report.

Mr. Hilderbrand prepared a written memorandum, which he submitted to Ivan Bradley, his supervisor, on January 9, 1992, describing the December 23 and 26 encounters with plaintiff. William VonHemel prepared a written memorandum, which he submitted to William Hepp, his supervisor, on January 14, 1992, describing the events of December 23. Terry Baty prepared a written memorandum, which he submitted to Richard Kline, his supervisor, on January 13, 1992, describing the events of December 26.

On January 11, 1992, plaintiff received a copy of the Hilderbrand memorandum. Plaintiff responded to Mr. Hilderbrand's allegations in a written memorandum which he submitted to Mr. Bradley January 13, 1992. On January 15, 1992, Mr. Bradley prepared a written memorandum in which he discussed the allegations against plaintiff. On February 7, 1992, plaintiff received copies of the memoranda prepared by Mr. Baty and Mr. Bradley. At some time soon thereafter, plaintiff received a copy of Mr. VonHemel's memorandum. After receiving the Baty, Bradley, and VonHemel memoranda, plaintiff prepared another written memorandum, which he submitted to Harold Allen, the Supervisor of YCAT, February 10, 1992, responding to the allegations.

On February 11, 1992, Mr. Allen placed plaintiff on administrative leave with pay pending the conclusion of an investigation into the allegations regarding plaintiff's conduct. Mr. Allen also prepared a notice of proposed termination from employment, addressed to plaintiff and dated February 11, 1992. The notice discussed the reasons for plaintiff's proposed termination (the two verbal altercations with Mr. Hilderbrand and the February 3 incident observed by Mr. Schmidt), explained that plaintiff's conduct violated SRS and YCAT policy and procedure, and announced that a pre-termination hearing had been set for February 13, 1992, at 8:00 a.m., at which plaintiff could "present his reasons or explanations why his dismissal should not take place." Plaintiff contends he did not receive the notice until the afternoon of February 13. He contends, instead, that Mr. Allen only orally informed him February 11 that a meeting would be held February 13. Plaintiff also contends Mr. Allen did not inform him of the purpose of the meeting.³

Plaintiff met with Mr. Allen at 8:00 a.m., February 13, 1992. Plaintiff also submitted a written memorandum, dated February 13, 1992, in which he again addressed the allegations against him; particularly the February 3, 1992, incident. Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Ex. 11. Mr. Allen prepared a letter, dated February 14, 1992, in which he informed plaintiff of his dismissal effective February 18, 1992. The letter also informed plaintiff of his right to appeal to the State Civil Service Board ("the Board") within 30 days.

Plaintiff perfected a timely appeal. On April 6, 1992, the Board heard plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff appeared personally and by counsel, John Cassidy. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf and called six supporting witnesses. The State called Mr. Allen, Mr. Hilderbrand, Mr. VonHemel, Mr. Baty, and Mr. Schmidt, among others; plaintiff's counsel cross-examined each. The Board issued its Final Order affirming plaintiff's dismissal April 28, 1994. Plaintiff petitioned the Board for reconsideration. On June 3, 1992, the Board denied his petition. Plaintiff then petitioned the Shawnee County District Court for judicial review of the Board's decision. On April 6, 1993, the ...