Browne v. Bayless

• Decision Date: 29 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 00-0546.,1 CA-CV 00-0546.
• Citation: Browne v. Bayless, 200 Ariz. 261, 25 P.3d 749 (Ariz. App. 2001)
• Parties: Harry BROWNE; Marcene Candelaria; and Peter Schmerl, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Betsey BAYLESS, Secretary of State of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

25 P.3d 749

200 Ariz. 261

Harry BROWNE; Marcene Candelaria; and Peter Schmerl, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Betsey BAYLESS, Secretary of State of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.

No. -0546.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

May 29, 2001.

As Corrected June 1, 2001.

Christopher J. Raboin, Phoenix, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Janet A. Napolitano, Attorney General, by Thomas J. Dennis, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph A. Kanefield, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

GERBER, Judge.

¶ 1 The appellants, Harry Browne, Marcene Candelaria and Peter Schmerl (collectively referred to as "Browne"), requested an affirmative injunction requiring the Arizona Secretary of State, Betsey Bayless ("Secretary of State"), to accept Browne's late-filed petition to appear on the November 2000 Arizona ballot as an independent candidate for President of the United States. The trial court denied Browne's injunction request and ruled in favor of the Secretary of State. Browne now appeals from the trial court's ruling. He argues that the Arizona filing deadline for independent presidential candidates is unconstitutional because it unfairly and unnecessarily burdens independent candidates such as himself.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Browne was nominated for president by the Libertarian party in its national nominating convention in July 2000. However, the electors supporting his nomination were led by a person not named as the official Arizona state leader of the Libertarian party. Consequently, the Arizona Libertarian slate of electors did not name Browne as its nominee and his name did not appear on the Arizona ballot as such.

¶ 3 Believing that he would be his party's nominee, Browne did not submit the necessary signatures for the ballot as an independent candidate until after the June 14 statutory deadline. On August 17, 2000, two months after the June 14 deadline, he attempted to file with the Secretary of State his designation of electors and nominating petitions as an independent candidate under Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 16-341 (Supp.2000).

¶ 4 When the Secretary of State refused to accept Browne's designation of electors and nominating petitions, he brought a complaint against that office seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that A.R.S. section 16-341 was unconstitutional. The trial court found the statute constitutional, denied his request for injunction and dismissed his complaint. Browne timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (1992) and 12-2101(B) (1994). We reverse because we find the statute unconstitutional.

DISCUSSION

I. MOOTNESS

¶ 5 The Secretary of State argues that Browne's claims are moot. A case becomes moot "when an event occurs, pending an appeal, which renders the relief sought either impossible or without practical effect on the parties to the action." Sandblom v. Corbin, 125 Ariz. 178, 182, 608 P.2d 317, 321 (App.1980). We may consider a moot appeal if it presents significant questions of public importance that are likely to recur. Fisher v. Maricopa County Stadium Dist., 185 Ariz. 116, 119, 912 P.2d 1345, 1348 (App.1995). The constitutionality of A.R.S. section 16-341 is of public importance and Browne's untoward experiences could well recur with other independent presidential candidates. We accordingly decide that mootness presents no reason to avoid the issues raised.

II. LACHES

¶ 6 The Secretary of State argues that Browne's challenge is barred by laches because he waited until August 17, 2000 to file his petitions when he knew the statutory deadline was June 14. "[Laches] is an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct. [It] will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party." Sotomayor v. Burns, 336 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 35, 36, ¶ 6, 13 P.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (2000).

¶ 7 Though Browne was nominated as the national Libertarian party candidate on July 2, 2000, he was not nominated as the Arizona party candidate on that date. In response to his local party's non-support, on or about July 16, 2000, he decided to run in Arizona as an independent candidate. He promptly gathered signatures and filed his petition on August 17, 2000. When the Secretary of State rejected that petition, Browne filed a complaint with the superior court the next day. Given his diligence, we find that laches does not bar his action.

III. STANDING

¶ 8 The Secretary of State next contends that Browne lacks standing because he argues that the filing deadline is unconstitutional for independent candidates while he is affiliated with a recognized political party. She further argues that Browne's absence from the ballot was due to "intra-party squabbling" rather than his inability to timely file petition papers as an independent.

¶ 9 Browne was not formally endorsed by any political party in this state and therefore had to run as an independent candidate to appear on the Arizona ballot. Moreover, even a party-affiliated candidate may run as an independent. As such, Browne has standing to challenge the independent candidate filing deadline. Furthermore, one reason he did not appear on the ballot was that he missed the very filing deadline that he now asserts is unconstitutional. Given these factors, we conclude that Browne has standing to raise these issues.

IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A.R.S. SECTION 16-341

¶ 10 On the merits, Browne argues that A.R.S section 16-341 is unconstitutional because its June 14 deadline is unnecessarily restrictive. He also contends that the deadline treats independent presidential candidates dissimilarly from candidates of recognized parties. He further states that the Secretary of State cannot identify any valid administrative reason for a filing deadline 146 days prior to the November general election.

¶ 11 Browne relies heavily on Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), to support his arguments. In that case, Anderson, a Republican not nominated by his party, announced on April 24, 1980 that he would run as an independent candidate for president. On May 16, his supporters tendered a nominating petition and statement of candidacy to the Ohio Secretary of State, who refused to accept the documents because they were submitted after the March 20 deadline then required by the Ohio statute. Id. at 782-83, 103 S.Ct. 1564.

¶ 12 The Supreme Court found the Ohio deadline unconstitutional because it burdened the association rights of independent voters and candidates and placed significant restrictions on the nationwide presidential electoral process. Id. at 795, 103 S.Ct. 1564. The Court found that the deadline discriminated against political party candidates and voters with preferences outside the two dominant political parties. Id. at 794, 103 S.Ct. 1564.

¶ 13 The Court also stated that the propriety of state election deadlines cannot be resolved by any "litmus-paper test." Instead, a balancing test is involved:

[A] court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.

Id. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564. Because the Anderson facts closely mirror the facts of this case,¹ we adopt and apply its analysis to Browne's situation.

A. THE BURDEN

¶ 14 Under Anderson's analytical framework, we must first determine if Arizona's June 14 deadline burdens ballot access and, if so, the magnitude of that burden. Id. Not all restrictions on candidates' eligibility for the ballot constitutionally burden voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates. Id. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564. To achieve fair elections, the state may impose comprehensive and sometimes complex election requirements. Although these regulatory schemes necessarily affect the rights of some individuals to vote, the state's regulatory interests might justify them if they are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Id.

¶ 15 The present Arizona statutory scheme requires independent candidates to declare their candidacy by filing nomination petitions on the same date that the two major parties file their slates of electors without, however, identifying their candidates. See A.R.S. §§ 16-311 (Supp.2000), 16-341. This deadline is only facially equal; it actually treats differently-situated candidates alike in a way that can be grossly discriminatory. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799-801, 103 S.Ct. 1564. "An early filing deadline may have a substantial impact on independent-minded voters." Id. at 790, 103 S.Ct. 1564. The slates of electors filed by the major parties need not reveal the identity of their candidate² nor the content of their platforms. Because the major parties need not, and indeed usually do not, pick their candidates until their late summer national conventions,³ they have the advantage of continued strategic flexibility by comparison to independent candidates who must declare themselves candidates and file by June 14. Id. at 791, 103 S.Ct. 1564.

¶ 16 In national election campaigns, the parties' candidates and issues remain dynamic rather than static, often up to the time of the parties' conventions. The two major parties may change their...