Browne v. Sodexo, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-11995-JLT |
| Parties | RENALDO BROWNE, Plaintiff, v. SODEXO, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff Renaldo Browne ("Browne") has brought this action pro se against defendants Sodexo, Inc. ("Sodexo"), Lasell College ("Lasell") and Brian Gnandt ("Gnandt"),1 claiming that the defendants engaged in criminal conduct, discriminated against him and violated his constitutional rights as a result of an incident that occurred in January 2008, when Browne was working for Sodexo in a cafeteria located on Lasell's premises. Specifically, Browne alleges that while he was working in the cafeteria, Sodexo's General Manager made racially offensive remarks, which were directed at Browne and defendant Gnandt, and were overheard by Lasell's Director of HumanResources. He claims that he was harmed as a result of this incident, and that he is entitled to over $400,000 damages, criminal penalties and the reinstatement of his employment with Sodexo.
The matter is presently before the court on the defendants' motions to dismiss all of Browne's claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Docket Nos. 24, 33 and 44). As described below, this court finds that Browne has failed to state a claim against any of the defendants. In particular, this court concludes that the plaintiff lacks authority to seek criminal penalties against any of the defendants, that his discrimination claim against Sodexo is untimely and is precluded by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that Browne has failed to state a claim against Lasell for violation of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or for conspiracy to deprive him of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Accordingly, and for all the reasons detailed herein, this court recommends to the District Judge to whom this case is assigned that all three of the defendants' motions to dismiss be ALLOWED.
Also before the court are three motions that have been filed by the plaintiff, including (1) a "Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure Rule 37(A)(4)" (Docket No. 39), (2) a "Motion to Response to Dismissal by Plaintiff Pro Se Litigant Rule 4" (Docket No. 48), and (3) a "Motion for Relief from Judgment or Orders Rule 60(A) F.R.C.P." (Docket No. 49). The "Motion to Response to Dismissal," while labeled a "motion," consists of Browne's arguments in opposition to the defendants' motions to dismiss, and will be construed as his opposition memorandum. Accordingly, that motion (Docket No.48) is ALLOWED. For the reasons described below, Browne's remaining motions (Docket Nos. 39 and 49) are DENIED.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999). Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must construe his allegations liberally. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (). "Ordinarily, a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment." Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). "There is, however, a narrow exception 'for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.'" Id. (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)).2 Applying these standards to the instant case, the relevant facts are as follows.
In January 2008, at the time of the incident giving rise to this lawsuit, Browne was employed as a cook for Sodexo, and was working in a cafeteria located in Valentine Hall on Lasell's campus. (Docket No. 11; Sodexo Ex. 7 at 1).3 Browne, who is African American, alleges that shortly before the cafeteria was scheduled to close for the afternoon, the General Manager of Sodexo, Miread Van Heest, made "racial and derogatory" statements to the plaintiff. (Docket Nos. 11, 12 & 14). Browne's complaint does not describe the substance of the alleged comments. However, he claims that both the Human Resources Director of Lasell and Gnandt, an African American investigator for the MCAD, were present in the cafeteria and overheard the statements. (Docket Nos. 11 & 14). He further claims that the Human Resources Director warned Ms. Van Heest that the State investigator was standing nearby. (Docket Nos. 11 & 14). Ms. Van Heest allegedly replied that "no nigger State investigator" was going to do anything to her, but the Human Resources Director failed to take any action against her. (Docket Nos. 11 & 14). Browne contends that Gnandt heard this comment as well. (Docket No. 11).
Browne claims that as a result of this incident, each of the defendants committed a Class A misdemeanor. (Docket Nos. 11, 12 & 14). Additionally, Browne is seeking tohold Gnandt criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1017 and 1018, to hold Sodexo liable for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq ("Title VII"), and to hold Lasell liable for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). (Docket Nos. 11, 12 &14).
The record shows that on February 4, 2009, over a year after the incident giving rise to this lawsuit, Browne filed a charge against Sodexo with the EEOC ("EEOC Charge 438") in which he claimed that he had been subjected to employment discrimination on the basis of his race. (See Sodexo Ex. 5). Browne's charge, however, does not refer to the alleged January 2008 incident which forms the basis of this case. Specifically, in his EEOC charge, Browne claimed that in February, October and December 2008, he received three written warnings about his behavior from Ms. Van Heest, which were unjustified, and that in December 2008, Ms. Van Heest pointed at him and said that "she wanted to get rid of the black employees[.]" (Id. at 2-3). Additionally, Browne claimed that in January 2009, he learned that he had not been promoted to the position of Cook II even though he was next in line for the position. (Id. at 3). Significantly, however, Browne made no reference to the January 2008 incident at issue in this case. (See Sodexo Ex. 5).
On April 9, 2009, Browne filed a second charge of discrimination against Sodexo with the MCAD ("EEOC Charge 223").4 (Sodexo Ex. 7). Therein, Browne claimed that Sodexo was unlawfully retaliating against him for filing his earlier discrimination charge with the EEOC. (Id. at 1). Again, however, Browne made no reference to the alleged January 2008 incident in Valentine Hall at issue in this case. (See Sodexo Ex. 7).
Gnandt, in his capacity as an investigator at the MCAD, conducted an investigation of both charges, and concluded that there was a lack of probable cause to support Browne's claims. (Sodexo Ex. 6 at 7; Sodexo Ex. 8 at 6). Nothing in Gnandt's investigative report concerns the incident that allegedly took place in January 2008 and is at issue in this case. (See Sodexo Exs. 6 & 8). On February 27, 2010, the MCAD dismissed both of Browne's charges against Sodexo. (Sodexo Exs. 11 & 12). There is no evidence in the record whether Browne appealed EEOC Charge 438. On May 5, 2010, the agency denied Browne's appeal of EEOC Charge 223. (Sodexo Exs. 11 & 12; Docket No. 11 at Ex. 4). Subsequently, on July 29, 2010, the EEOC issued a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" ("Notice") to Browne informing him that it was adopting the MCAD's findings regarding EEOC Charge 223 and dismissing the charge. (Sodexo Ex. 13; Docket No. 11 at Ex. 3). In its Notice, the EEOC also informed Browne of his right to file a lawsuit in federal or state court within 90 days of receipt of the Notice. (Id.).
Additional factual details relevant to this court's analysis are set forth below.
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) test the sufficiency of the pleadings. Thus, when confronted with a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Cooperman, 171 F.3d at 46. Dismissal is only appropriate if the pleadings, so viewed, fail to support "'a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
Two underlying principles must guide the court's assessment as to the adequacy of the pleadings to support a claim for relief. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009). " Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)) (internal citations omitted). "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. (quoting Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). ...
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