Brownell v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 02 February 1892
• Citation: Brownell v. Chapman, 84 Iowa 504, 51 N.W. 249 (Iowa 1892)
• Parties: BROWNELL ET AL. v. CHAPMAN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

84 Iowa 504

51 N.W. 249

BROWNELL ET AL.

v.CHAPMAN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 2, 1892.

Appeal from superior court of Council Bluffs; J. E. F. MCGEE, Judge.

Action on a contract, in substance as follows: April 12th, 1889. D. Chapman, Esq., Council Bluffs, Iowa--Dear Sir: We will furnish you one of our Scotch marine boilers, 54 dia., 84 long, made of 60,000 T. S. marine steel shells, 5-16; * * * all the above delivered and set up, (you to do all wood-work,)--for the sum of ten hundred and twenty-three dollars, ($1,023.00.)We will allow you three hundred and sixty dollars ($360.00) for your two engines, boiler, heater, and inspirater, wheels, shafting, and couplings.Hoping to receive your order, we are, yours, truly, BROWNELL & Co. P. S.We guaranty to deliver above in thirty days from April 13th.It is understood you are to have 90 days' option on sale of engine and boiler you have.Accepted.D.CHAPMAN.”This action is to recover the balance of the contract price, after deducting the $360 for defendant's engines, etc.There was a failure to deliver the boilers, etc., on the part of plaintiffs for some 18 days after the time specified in the contract; and defendant presents a counter-claim because of the failure and for defective workmanship in putting in the boilers.A reply put in issue certain allegations of the counter-claim, and a trial by jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for defendant for $31.25.The plaintiffs appeal.Isaac Adams, for appellants.

D. B. Daily, Emmet Tinley, and Ambrose Burk, for appellee.

GRANGER, J.

1.Lake Manana is a small lake in the vicinity of Council Bluffs, in Pottawattamie county, and is a summer and pleasure resort.Boats are used on the lake for the accommodation of visitors, and among them was one known as the “M. F. Rohrer,” belonging to the defendant.The boat was operated on the lake in the season of 1888, and the boilers and machinery contracted for, as known to the parties, were to refit the boat for use in the season of 1889.A breach of the contract on the part of plaintiff by a failure to deliver within the time is not questioned, and the important question on this appeal is as to the proper measure of damage.The superior court admitted evidence to show, and instructed the jury on the theory, that the measure of damage was the rental value of the boat during the time defendant was deprived of its use in consequence of the breach.Appellants' thought is that the measure of damage is the “interest of the capital invested in the boat.”This latter rule has something of support in authority, but it is far outweighed by the number of cases and the reasoning supporting the rule adopted by the court.In considering the question we must keep in view the rule, universally recognized, that the damage for breach of contract must be limited to such as would naturally come within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.The plaintiff, when it agreed to furnish and set the boilers, knew they were to be used in operating the boat; that a breach on its part would deprive plaintiff of its use; and it would naturally contemplate the value of such use as the injury that would be sustained; and such is, as a matter of fact, the actual damage.Appellants cite a number of cases, but all except two, we think, support the rule adopted by the court.Brown v. Foster, 51 Pa. St. 165, is a case quite similar to this.Repairs to a boat by putting in machinery were to be completed by October 1st.The work was not done until December 15th.The trial court gave, as the rule of damage, “that the measure in such a case is the ordinary hire of such a boat for the time in question, for the time plaintiff was in default.”The complaint in that case of the rule as given was by the defendant, who was seeking damage, and the court said his complaint was without reason.The case cited is not authority for appellants' position.In Mining Syndicate v. Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665, the interest on the investment in a mill that had been delayed because of defective machinery was allowed as the measure of damage, but only in case the jury found there was no evidence of the rental value of the mill.The case clearly recognizes the rule as to rental value as a correct one.In Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, is the following syllabus, having full support in the opinion: “Upon a breach of a contract to deliver at a certain day a steam-engine built and purchased for the purpose of driving a planing-mill and other definite machinery, the ordinary rent or hire which could have been obtained for the use of the machinery whose operation was suspended for want of the steam-engine may be regarded as damages.”In Nye v. Alcohol Works, 51 Iowa, 129, 50 N. W. Rep. 988, this general principle has support argumentatively, but another rule, because of distinguishing facts, is sustained.The cases of Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N. W. Rep. 640, and Taylor v. Maguire, 12 Mo. 313, are not in harmony with this view, but they are clearly overborne by the weight of the other cases and the current of authority.The latter case cites, as decisive of the point, Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342.In Griffin v....