Brownfield v. Canon
| Decision Date | 01 January 1854 |
| Parties | Brownfield versus Canon. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
J. B. and A. Howell, for plaintiff in error.—Regarded only as a question of practice, the Court was in error. There is no instance in Pennsylvania where the name of the claimant has been substituted for that of the stakeholder. 4 Rawle 111 expressly says that constitutes the difference between the practice here and in England. This practice is recognised 9 Barr 51-52. The same was held by Judge SHARSWOOD in Philadelphia: cited 1 Troub. & Hal. 374, in note; 2 Miles 24; 9 Am. L. J. 135-136.
In this case, Searight, the commissioner, had pleaded, and the issue was made up between him and the plaintiff. If the money had not been paid to Brownfield, he would not only have lost his account, but would have been compelled to pay the plaintiff in addition.
The action could not have been maintained against the super intendent. He was a public officer: 9 Watts 27. Of this defence Brownfield was deprived by order of the Court. The effect of this judgment is to recover money from Brownfield, which was voluntarily paid to him under a claim of right, and this could not be done: 6 W. & Ser. 485; 9 Watts 462; 1 Barr 29.
Kaine and Ewing, contrà.—Mr. Searight died before the cause was tried. The jury were rightly sworn as to Brownfield, who then had the money. Indeed it was the only way, as is ruled in 1 Vernon 351. This case is referred to and affirmed in 4 Rawle 100. The case in 2 Miles 24, cited by the plaintiff in error, was under the provisions of the Act in relation to the District Court of Philadelphia, which is not in force here. The case of Coates v. Roberts, 4 Rawle 111, does not sustain the position contended for. Brownfield voluntarily put himself upon the record as the real defendant, and had the money: this being the case, there was no error in swearing the jury as to him alone. The authorities show that was the proper course, and he suffered no injury by the ruling of the Court.
The old common law process of interpleader is not much used with us, but it is not abolished, for we never consider an old remedy abandoned until we have an adequate substitute for it: 17 Ser. & R. 211, 314; 11 Id. 274; 9 Id. 323; 8 Id. 242; 1 P. A. Browne 82; 1 Miles 46. While, however, we receive the old forms, we modify them according to the analogies of our own general practice, and even enlarge their sphere according to the equitable principles of our common law: 4 Binn. 61; 4 Rawle 100; 9 State R. 51.
The principles of interpleading, and the cases in which it may be applied, are best exemplified in the practice in equity; but the form of the procedure in a common law case is very simple, and requires but little modification. It may be found very fully presented in the abridgments of Fitzherbert, Brooke and Viner, under the titles Garnishee, Enterpleader, and Interpleader, and in 2 Mod. Ent. 425, 427. The principle appears in various forms in our law; as where heirs, devisees, or alienees come in on notice by writ, or by the party to defend for their interests, where a warrantee or landlord comes in on notice to defend an action of ejectment, and other cases: see Brightly's Equity, 226.
Under our practice, where the middleman or stakeholder is sued, he may take the simple course of giving notice to the other claimant of the money or thing in controversy, to come and defend the action, or be barred of his claim. But this does not conclusively save the middleman from his liability to action by the other claimant; for the latter, not being a party on the record, is not held barred by the judgment until the fact of notice is properly proved. The middleman is not, therefore, conclusively protected by such judgment, for his proof of notice may fail him. Besides, if the middleman fail, he will have to pay the costs himself, and may have no available recourse.
It would therefore seem more prudent for the defendant to pursue the regular common law form of filing his suggestion, admitting the debt or duty, and his willingness to pay or perform, and stating the claims of third persons, and therefore pray for a scire facias to bring him in to interplead. Thus the third person, called, from his being warned, the garnishee, or, in other forms of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fisher v. Stevens Coal Co.
...scire facias or motion and rule. See Coates v. Roberts, 1833, 4 Rawle 100, 108, 109; McMunn v. Carothers, 4 Clark 354; Brownfield v. Canon, 25 Pa. 299, 301. In McMunn v. Carothers, supra, Judge Lowrie, then a judge of the District Court of Allegheny County, afterwards a justice and chief ju......
-
Clarke v. Real
...221; Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 339, 35 Am. Dec. 690, 709 note. The practice is set out at some length in Brownfield v. Canon (1855) 25 Pa. 299, 301, 302, and was recognized by our Supreme Court as late as the case of McKinley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1924) 278 Pa. 300, 304, 123 A. 304......
-
Fisher v. Stevens Coal Co.
...by scire facias or motion and rule. See Coates v. Roberts, 4 Rawle 100, 108, 109 (1833); McMunn v. Carothers, 4 Clark 354; Brownfield v. Canon, 25 Pa. 299, 301. McMunn v. Carothers, supra, Judge Lowrie, then a judge of the District Court of Allegheny County, afterwards a justice and chief j......
-
Sargent v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
...the interpleader: Brooke v. Smith, 13 Pa. C.C. 557; Loughlin v. McCormick, 2 W.N.C. 352; Bechtel v. Sheafer, 117 Pa. 555; Brownfield v. Canon, 25 Pa. 299; McNamara v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. of New York, 114 F. 910. G. C. Ladner, of Ladner & Ladner, for appellee. -- A party is not e......