Brownfield v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1899
• Citation: 107 Iowa 254,77 N.W. 1038
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: BROWNFIELD v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO.

107 Iowa 254

77 N.W. 1038

BROWNFIELD

v.CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 23, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Washington county; A. R. Dewey, Judge.

Action to recover damages for injuries caused by the alleged negligence of defendant. At the close of the evidence for plaintiff, under the court's instruction, the jury returned a verdict for defendant. From a judgment thereon, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.M. A. McCoid and J. F. Henderson, for appellant.

Carroll Wright and Scofield & Scofield, for appellee.

WATERMAN, J.

Plaintiff was in the employ of defendant as a locomotive fireman, and had so been at different times for a number of years prior to his injury. At the time complained of, he was engaged on his engine, which was hauling a freight train from Rock Island, Ill., over defendant's road, to Eldon, Iowa. The engineer had an order, on leaving Washington, which was an intermediate station, to run at a speed of 35 miles an hour to Brighton, 13 miles west. Plaintiff knew of this order. Some little time after leaving Washington, plaintiff noticed that something was wrong with the engine. As he says, “it was jerking backward and forward in a strange way. It was jerking and twisting around, and riding rough. * * * It was knocking, hitting, or kicking, or something of that kind. * * * I hadn't seen her act that way before, nor anything like it.” Plaintiff says that he thought this might have been caused by the slack wedge, between the engine and the tender, being out. He examined, and found this was not the cause. After this, a stop was made at Verdi, 7 miles from Washington, but no examination was made, either by plaintiff or the engineer. After leaving this station, and when at the top of what is called “Verdi Hill,” the strange action of the engine continuing, plaintiff asked the engineer “if he hadn't better stop the engine before he went down the hill,” to which the latter responded, “No; when he got to Brighton, he would look the engine over.” At the foot of the hill, the engine left the track, and, in the general wreck that ensued, plaintiff was injured. After the accident, one of the drive wheels of the engine was found broken from its axle, and lying beside the track.

2. The amended petition, upon which the case was tried, charges negligence in many particulars: in the construction of the engine, the failure to inspect it, the condition of the track, the rate of speed, and several other matters. The only evidence, however, related to some defect in the engine, and to the conduct of the engineer in running the train after such defect was or should have been known to him. Plaintiff, to make his case, proved the facts substantially as we have stated them, and rested. His contention is that the jury would have been justified in finding, from these facts, some one or more of the many acts of negligence charged. Counsel state the rule for which they contend in these words: “In case of an accident to an employé, from collision, derailment, or latent defect in machinery, negligence is presumed, until the contrary is shown.” This is the rule applied in passenger cases, but we had supposed it too well settled in this state to be the subject of serious controversy that, in any and all cases, the burden is upon an employé or servant to prove the negligence that is the proximate cause of his injury. Baldwin v. Railroad Co., 68 Iowa, 37, 25 N. W. 918;Case v. Railway Co., 64 Iowa, 762, 21 N. W. 30;Kuhns v. Railway Co., 70 Iowa, 565, 31 N. W. 868;Haden v. Railroad Co., 99 Iowa, 735, 48 N. W. 733. It is true that the happening of an accident to machinery may, under certain circumstances, raise a presumptionthat the machinery was in some way defective; but this is not enough to fix the liability of the master. It must be further shown, in order to hold him, that he had knowledge of such defect, or would have had such knowledge if he had exercised reasonable care and diligence. We may say, further, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, for which plaintiff contends, is not confined wholly to cases of injuries to passengers by carriers, but is extended to cover some other exceptional circumstances. These are mentioned, in a general way, in Case v. Railway Co., supra. Just what facts will bring a case within the rule it is needless now to discuss. It is sufficient to say that the rule does not...