Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., Inc., 35779

• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: ROGERS, Justice.
• Citation: 198 So. 656,196 La. 73
• Parties: BROWNFIELD v. SOUTHERN AMUSEMENT CO., Inc., et al.
• Decision Date: 28 June 1940
• Docket Number: 35779,35780.

198 So. 656

196 La. 73

BROWNFIELD
v.
SOUTHERN AMUSEMENT CO., Inc., et al.

Nos. 35779, 35780.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 28, 1940

Case Dismissed on Rehearing Nov. 4, 1940.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Mrs. Susie Brownfield, employee, opposed by the Southern Amusement Company, Inc., employer and its insurance carriers. An award in favor of the employee by the district court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and the employer and insurance carriers bring certiorari.

Suit dismissed on agreement of parties on rehearing. [198 So. 657]

[196 La. 76] Cook, Cook & Egan and Albert T. Hughes, Jr., all of Shreveport, for New Amsterdam Casualty Co.

E. W. & P. N. Browne, of Shreveport, for Southern Amusement Co., Inc., and Great American Indemnity Co. of N. Y.

Lee & Lee, of Shreveport, for Mrs. Susie Brownfield.

ROGERS, Justice.

Mrs. Susie Brownfield was injured in May, 1938, while in the employ of the Southern Amusement Company, Inc., and in this suit she is seeking compensation from her employer and its insurance carriers. An award in her favor by the district court was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. On the petitions of the employer and its insurance carriers, writs of certiorari [198 So. 658] were granted to review the record, and the matter is submitted by the relators upon two propositions: (1) that workmen's compensation payable to a married [196 La. 77] woman is community property and can be recovered only by the husband as head and master of the community; and (2) that an employee in a nonhazardous business can not, by using her own automobile to do certain required things, make her employer responsible for workmen's compensation.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Susie Brownfield, was employed by the defendant, Southern Amusement Company, Inc., as manager of its DeSoto Theatre in the Town of Mansfield during the year 1938 and prior thereto. Plaintiff's duties were principally of a clerical nature. She also sold and took up tickets and supervised the showing of pictures in the theatre.

On May 13, 1938, while seated on a tall stool at the cashier's window, in the performance of her duties, she fell and broke her right arm in two places above the elbow joint, causing her the permanent loss of ninety per cent of the use of her arm. At the time of her injury, she was married to Gerald Brownfield.

It appears that Mrs. Brownfield used her own automobile in checking and supervising outdoor advertising matter used by her employer and to occasionally transport delayed films from Shreveport to Mansfield. Due to a weak ankle, Mrs. Brownfiled was unable to drive the automobile and her husband drove it for her under her control and supervision. Mr. Brownfield was not employed by the Southern Amusement Company and he received no compensation from that company for his services. Mrs. Brownfield herself received a salary of $30 per week.

[196 La. 78] We shall consider the propositions submitted by the relators in their order.

The earnings of the wife not living apart from her husband belong to the matrimonial community. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37. Assimilating workman's compensation due the wife to earnings due the wife, defendants argue that the compensation is an asset of the community and must be claimed by the community through the husband. The argument is not sound.

It is true, in order to establish liability under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Act No. 20 of 1914, it is necessary to show that the relation of employer and employee exists between the parties. But it does not follow from this that the right of the workman to demand compensation is governed wholly by the law relating to private contracts. The obligation of the employer to pay compensation to his employee, or the employee's dependents is not the result of a contract. It is purely statutory.

The object of the Workmen's Compensation Law is to provide means of subsistence to the employee during a specific time, when his earning capacity has been partially or entirely destroyed, either temporarily or permanently by injury received in the course of his employment. Veasey v. Peters, 142 La. 1012, 77 So. 948. Another object of the law is to provide the means of subsistence to the dependents of the employee for his death if caused by the injury.

In the case of Tierney v. Tierney & Co., 176 Minn. 464, 223 N.W. 773, 774, the Supreme [196 La. 79] Court of Minnesota has properly characterized the Workmen's Compensation Law as follows:

‘ Although the rights and obligations created by the Compensation Law are of a contractual nature, in the sense that the law is not compulsory and applies only where both parties see fit to come under it, yet the rights granted and the obligations imposed rest upon the statute, and are limited to those granted or imposed by it.

‘ The statute creates two distinct rights-one for the benefit of the workman; the other for the benefit of his dependents. To the workman it gives compensation for disability caused by injuries sustained while in the performance of his duties. This is intended as compensation to him for loss of earnings. To his dependents it gives compensation for his death, if caused by the injury. This is intended as compensation for loss of the support which they would have received from him if he had lived. Dependents are given no rights except where death results from the injury. State ex Minn. 96, 154 N.W. 661. As the death of Mr. Tierney did not result from the injury, it is conceded that the relator has no claim under the provision for dependents. * *

‘ Among the reasons assigned for their conclusions are: That the right is purely statutory and does not extend beyond the life of the beneficiary unless the statute so provides; that the right, being nonasnonassignable, [198 So. 659] does not survive to others at death; that it grew out of the contract of employment, is in lieu of wages, is personal [196 La. 80] like the contract of employment, and is terminated by death, as that would have terminated the contract out of which it grew; that it is intended for the personal benefit of the beneficiary, and is not a vested right nor transmissible to others; and that,...