Browning ex rel. C.S. v. Edmonson Cnty.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-00057-GNS-HBB |
| Parties | WENDY BROWNING, mother and next friend of C.S., a minor; and DARRELL SMITH, as guardian of M.S., a minor PLAINTIFFS v. EDMONSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY; SHANE DOYLE; JORDAN JONES; and AUSTIN MEREDITH DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (DNs 57, 58, 59), the parties' Motions for Leave to Exceed Page Limitations (DNs 54, 55, 65, 78), and Defendants' Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Witness (DN 56). The motions are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow: (1) the Motions for Leave to Exceed Page Limitations are GRANTED; (2) Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (DNs 57, 58, 59) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and (3) Defendants' Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Witness (DN 56) is DENIED.
At approximately 9:30 p.m. on February 27, 2018, Defendant Austin Meredith ("Meredith"), an Edmonson County Special Deputy Sheriff, attempted to initiate a traffic stop on an automobile due to an unilluminated license plate and failure to wear seatbelts. (Meredith Dep. 9:20-25, 16:6-23, Oct. 28, 2019, DN 68-4; Jones & Meredith Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 1, DN 58-1; C.S. Dep. 26:17-25, Oct. 14, 2019, DN 75-1; M.S. Dep. 43:3-19, Nov. 6, 2019, DN 75-2). Plaintiffs C.S. and M.S., who were minors, were passengers in the vehicle driven by Brandon Embry ("Embry"). When Meredith turned on his police cruiser lights, the automobile immediately accelerated. (Meredith Dep. 18:24-19:6). Meredith pursued the automobile and was joined in pursuit by Defendant Jordan Jones ("Jones"), an Edmonson County Deputy Sheriff. (Meredith Dep. 22:16-25). The 12-minute chaser covering 18 miles and reaching speeds of around 120 miles per hour ended when the automobile collided with a third party's vehicle. (Jones & Meredith Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3; Jones Dep. 21:21-22:6, 44:2-7, Nov. 4, 2019, DN 68-3; Meredith Dep. 12:13-23).
After the collision, Jones exited his vehicle, pulled his gun out, pointed the gun at Embry, and ordered him to get out. (Jones Dep. 45:6-46:11). As Embry exited the vehicle, Jones punched him in the forehead, apparently to stop him from fleeing. (Jones Dep. 47:3-13). Jones then turned his attention to C.S. and ordered C.S. to show his hands multiple times without receiving a response. (Jones Dep. 51:21-52:3, 52:14-17). According to Jones, he then tased C.S. because of information Jones received about ammunition being in the car and C.S. not showing his hands after multiple orders to do so. (Jones Dep. 53:23-54:3). C.S. does not remember anything after the crash because he believes he lost consciousness and did not regain consciousness until he was lying face down on the ground handcuffed. (C.S. Dep. 32:23-34:2).
M.S. had to be mechanically extracted from the automobile. (Jones Dep. 55:10-14). C.S. and M.S. were flown by helicopter to a hospital to receive treatment for their injuries. .
Plaintiffs allege liability on the part of Defendants for M.S. and C.S.'s injuries. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3, DN 6). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against all Defendants, state law negligence and grossnegligence claims against all Defendants, and assault and battery claims against Meredith and Jones. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-20). All Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims, and both sides have moved to exceed the page limits on their supporting memoranda. . Defendants have also moved to preclude Plaintiffs' expert witness from testifying at trial in lieu of the potential denial of their summary judgment motions. (Defs.' Mot. Exclude Expert Witness 1, DN 56).
The Court possesses federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' federal law claims and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence demonstrating an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must then produce specific evidence proving the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable for the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must do more than merely show the existence of some "metaphysicaldoubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the nonmoving party must present facts proving that a genuine factual dispute exists by "citing to particular parts of the materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient" to overcome summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Generally, when both federal and state law claims are before a federal court, a federal court is to apply federal law to the plaintiff's federal law claims and state substantive law to the state law claims. Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 737, 741 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Kentucky substantive law applies to Plaintiffs' state law claims. Id. at 741 .
As an initial matter, regarding the parties' motions to exceed the page limit on their supporting memoranda, the only opposition to any of these motions is Plaintiffs' challenge to Defendants' collective motion to exceed the page limit on Defendants' reply to Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' summary judgment motions. . Defendants' combined reply is 37 pages. (. Local Rule 7.1(d) provides that a reply is not to exceed 15 pages. That being said, Defendants filed three separate motions (without objection from Plaintiffs), which would technically allow Defendants three replies of 15 pages each, for a total of 45 pages. As Defendants' combined replyis eight pages less than what would be allotted to them in total, and because the parties do not otherwise object to each other's motions for leave to exceed the page limit, all parties' motions for leave to exceed the page limit will be granted.
At the outset, Plaintiffs have conceded that they cannot continue to maintain some of their claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs have conceded dismissal of the following: (1) all claims against Meredith; (2) any state law claims against Defendant Edmonson County; and (3) any Fourth Amendment claims stemming from M.S. and C.S.'s injuries suffered as a result of the collision. . These claims will therefore be dismissed with prejudice. See Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 2011) ; see also Kline v. Mortg. Elec. Sec. Sys., 154 F. Supp. 3d 567, 572 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (). Plaintiffs also arguably asserted an assault claim against Jones but make no mention of that claim in response to Jones' summary judgment motion on that claim. . Because Plaintiffs have not opposed Jones' summary judgment motion on that claim, to the extent Plaintiffs intended to assert an assault claim against Jones, that claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs' remaining claims currently at issue are: (1) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Jones for tasing C.S.; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Jones for hisrole in the pursuit that led to M.S. and C.S.'s injuries; (3) Section 1983 failure to train and supervise claims stemming from the pursuit against Defendant Edmonson County and Defendant Shane Doyle ("Doyle"), the Edmonson County Sheriff; (4) state law negligence and gross negligence claims related to the pursuit against Jones and Doyle; and (5) a state law battery claim against Jones for use of force against C.S. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 16-20).
Plaintiffs' remaining Fourth Amendment claim against Jones alleges excessive force from Jones' tasing of C.S. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17). Jones seeks qualified immunity on this claim. (Jones & Meredith Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 13-16).
In determining whether Jones used excessive force against C.S. when...
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