Brownlee v. Ford

• Decision Date: 06 June 1946
• Docket Number: 31259.
• Citation: 38 S.E.2d 626,73 Ga.App. 861
• Parties: BROWNLEE v. FORD.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

38 S.E.2d 626

73 Ga.App. 861

BROWNLEE v. FORD.

No. 31259.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

June 6, 1946

Syllabus by the Court.

The alleged defamatory words complained of in the plaintiff's petition do not come within the purview of any of the provisions of Code, § 105-702, defining slander; and therefore, the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to the petition and dismissing the action.

J. A. Brownlee sued L. B. Ford for damages on account of the following alleged slanderous statements made of and about the plaintiff by the defendant: 'That Albert Brownlee (who is petitioner) and DeWitt Brownlee had made threats to burn them out (meaning the tenants in a residence then occupied by such tenants) and that he wanted her and her husband (meaning the tenant and his wife) to be on the lookout at night and if they heard their dog barking at night to get up and look around for you never can tell.'

The court sustained the defendant's general demurrer to the petition and dismissed the action, and the plaintiff excepted to that judgment.

W L. Nix, of Lawrenceville, for plaintiff in error.

M. A. Allison and Chas. C. Pittard, both of Lawrenceville, for defendant in error.

SUTTON Presiding Judge.

Code, § 105-702, defines slander as follows: 'Slander, or oral defamation, consists, first, in imputing to another a crime punishable by law; or, second, charging him with having some contagious disorder, or being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from society; or, third, in charges made against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or, fourth, any disparaging words productive of special damage flowing naturally therefrom. In the last case, the special damage is essential to support the action; in the first three, damage is inferred.'

The language alleged to have been used by the defendant does not impute to the plaintiff a crime punishable by law; nor does it consist in charges made against the plaintiff in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein. There is no allegation in the petition as to any special damages, and, therefore, it is lacking in the one essential necessary to support an action under the fourth division of the Code section. This leaves only the second subdivision of the Code section to be dealt with, viz 'charging him with having some contagious disorder, or being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from society.' Do the alleged slanderous words come under this division of said code section? We think not. They do not charge the plaintiff with having committed any act. At most, they charge only an intention to commit an act in the future. 'Spoken words charging merely an intention or disposition to commit crime in the future are not actionable, since such intent constitutes no crime.' Whitley v. Newman, 9 Ga.App. 89, 97, 70 S.E. 686, 690 and cit.; Morris v....