Brownsberger v. Department of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1734,89-1734
• Citation: 460 N.W.2d 449
• Parties: Scott W. BROWNSBERGER, Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 449

460 N.W.2d 449

Scott W. BROWNSBERGER, Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellant.

No. 89-1734.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 19, 1990.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Charles J. Krogmeier, Acting Deputy Atty. Gen., and Carolyn Olson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Terrance G. Rutherford and John Mitchell Trewet of Howard, Rutherford & Mailander, Atlantic, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

NEUMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) from a district court order that directed the DOT to rescind its revocation of plaintiff Scott Brownsberger's driver's license. The question is whether Iowa Code section 321J.13(4) (1989), which requires reinstatement under certain circumstances, effectively operates as a statutory exclusionary rule. We conclude that it does and, therefore, affirm the district court.

On January 15, 1989, Scott Brownsberger was arrested in Atlantic, Iowa, for operating his vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Upon his arrest, Brownsberger agreed in writing to furnish a breath sample for alcohol analysis. Because of his alleged failure to produce enough breath to trigger the recording device on the machine, however, Brownsberger was deemed to have refused the test. See Iowa Code § 321J.9. The DOT revoked Brownsberger's privilege to drive for 240 days. See id.

Meanwhile, in the parallel criminal prosecution for OWI, Brownsberger moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. In his motion he alleged that "[t]here existed no reasonable grounds to justify the police stopping Defendant's vehicle." Following hearing, the district court sustained Brownsberger's motion without explanation and the criminal case was ultimately dismissed.

Armed with a favorable ruling on his motion to suppress, Brownsberger petitioned the DOT to reopen his license revocation proceedings and rescind its earlier order. Brownsberger cited Iowa Code section 321J.13(4) as authority for his request. That statute provides, in pertinent part:

A person whose motor vehicle license or operating privilege has been or is being revoked under section 321J.9 or 321J.12 may reopen a department hearing on the revocation if the person submits ... a petition stating that a criminal action on a charge of a violation of section 321J.2 filed as a result of the same circumstances which resulted in the revocation has resulted in a decision in which the court has held that the peace officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of section 321J.2 had occurred to support a request for or to administer a chemical test.... Such a decision by the court is binding on the department and the department shall rescind the revocation.

Iowa Code § 321J.13(4).

The DOT resisted Brownsberger's petition, and following hearing, the hearing officer ruled that, because the district court gave no reason for sustaining the motion to suppress, Brownsberger could not benefit from section 321J.13(4). Brownsberger then petitioned the district court for judicial review of the agency's action. The district court held that implicit in the suppression ruling was the court's finding that no reasonable grounds existed to stop the vehicle. Therefore, the court held, the order suppressing all evidence obtained from the unconstitutional stop was binding on the DOT under section 321J.13(4). The court reversed the DOT's refusal to reinstate Brownsberger's license, and the DOT now appeals that decision.

The DOT contends on appeal that the district court's interpretation of section 321J.13(4) broadens the scope of the statute beyond its express terms and, in effect, creates an exclusionary rule unintended by the legislature. The thrust of the DOT's argument is that the district court erred by equating a finding of "no reasonable grounds to stop" with the statutorily mandated finding of no "reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of section 321J.2 had occurred to support a request for or to administer a chemical test." See Iowa Code § 321J.13(4). In other words, the DOT contends that the evidence gathered by the arresting officer may be used to defeat a petition under section 321J.13(4) even if that same evidence has been suppressed in the companion criminal case.

The DOT bases its argument on prior judicial decisions which considered criminal OWI prosecutions and DOT license revocations as separate and distinct proceedings. In Severson v. Sueppel, for example, this court held that acquittal of the crime of OWI did not preclude the DOT from revoking the motorist's privilege to drive. 260 Iowa 1169, 1176, 152 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1967). More recently, in Westendorf v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 400 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1987), this court held that the exclusionary rule--which prohibits the use of evidence in a criminal trial that has been obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights--has no application to civil administrative proceedings for license revocation. Id. at 557. Finally, the DOT relies on Morgan v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 428 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa App.1988), in which the court of appeals stated that "the determination of...