Broxton v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 93A02–1301–EX–79.,93A02–1301–EX–79. |
| Citation | 999 N.E.2d 1069 |
| Parties | James BROXTON, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, The Department of Indiana Workforce Development, and Sodexo, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
C. Richard Martin, Martin & Martin, Boonville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kathy Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees, Review Board and The Department of Workforce Development.
James Broxton appeals the denial of his request for unemployment benefits by the Review Board of the Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”). We affirm.
Broxton raises five issues, which we restate as:
Broxton has been employed by SDH Education Service West, LLC, also known as Sodexo Food Services (“Sodexo”), since 2008 as a cook at St. Joseph's College in Rensselaer. From August through May, Broxton works full time. During the summer months, he is only “on call.” Appellant's App. p. 13. He is required to call Sodexo each Tuesday to find out if work is available. If he fails to call in, Broxton could lose his job. In 2012, Broxton was on call from May 7th to August 18th, but he was never called in to work.
In prior summers, Broxton received unemployment insurance benefits. Broxton filed a claim for unemployment benefits, and on August 13, 2012, a claims deputy concluded that Broxton was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he “was on a vacation week mandated by the employer.” Id. at 20. Broxton appealed that determination to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and Sodexo did not participate in the appeal. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded:
Although the Claimant is on an on-call or as needed basis with the Employer during summer break every year, the period is a reduction in hours that regularly occurs as “a matter of practice, policy or procedure of which the Claimant was aware and to which the Claimant has agreed,” 646 IAC 5–8–1 (2011). Alternatively, the time is also a scheduled period during which activity is suspended, or a vacation, that is part of the Employer's regular policy or practice and the Claimant has reasonable assurance of employment when the period ends. The Claimant is ineligible for benefits based on [his] employment status with this Employer during the summer break period.
Id. at 38. Thus, the ALJ affirmed the claims deputy's determination that Broxton was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Broxton appealed the ALJ's determination to the Review Board. There was no hearing before the Review Board, and no additional evidence was admitted. The Review Board adopted the ALJ's findings of fact but struck the ALJ's conclusions of law and concluded that Broxton was “not partially or part-totally unemployed” because he “agreed to perform services for the Employer during the school year,” he was aware of the summer break, and he “agreed to this reduction or suspension of work hours during scheduled breaks through continued employment with the Employer.” Appellee's App. p. 2.
The Review Board also concluded that Broxton was not entitled to benefits due to Indiana Code Section 22–4–3–5, which denies unemployment benefits to certain employees on “a vacation week” without remuneration pursuant to a contract or regular policy. Although the Review Board noted that Indiana Code Section 22–4–3–5 was inapplicable if an employer “fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding the filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection with an individual, group, or mass separation arising from the vacation period,” the Review Board also noted that the “Department currently has no rules or policies requiring employers to file a notice regarding a claim arising out of a vacation period, nor is the Department statutorily required to enact a policy on this matter.” Id. at 3 (discussing Ind.Code § 22–4–3–5(c) ). The Review Board held that the term “vacation week” referenced “an employer-mandated period in which work is not performed.”Id. Further, the Review Board concluded that, “[b]ecause [Broxton] was on an unpaid vacation period and had reasonable assurance of employment following the summer break, [Broxton] was not totally, part-totally, or partially unemployed.” Id. at 4.
The Review Board also concluded that Broxton was “voluntarily unemployed during the summer break” due to his “assent” to Sodexo's practices. Id. at 5. Thus, the Review Board found that Broxton was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Broxton now appeals.
At the Review Board's request, in May 2013, this appeal was consolidated with numerous other appeals raising similar issues based on the Review Board's interpretation of Indiana Code Section 22–4–3–5. In June 2013, after a pre-appeal conference, this appeal and two other appeals, D.B. v. Review Board of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., No. 93A02–1301–EX–71, and Amerson v. Review Board of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., No. 93A02–1301–EX–67, were designated as “test cases” and allowed to proceed. The remaining appeals were held in abeyance pending completion of the test cases. On November 5, 2013, a panel of this court affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits in D.B., 2 N.E.3d 705, No. 93A02–1301–EX–71 (Ind.Ct.App. Nov. 5, 2013), and on November 26, 2013, another panel of this court affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits in Amerson, No. 93A02–1301–EX–67 (Ind.Ct.App. Nov.26, 2013).
Broxton argues that the Review Board erred when it denied his request for unemployment benefits. On appeal, we review the Review Board's (1) determinations of specific or basic underlying facts; (2) conclusions or inferences from those facts, or determinations of ultimate facts; and (3) conclusions of law. McClain v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind.1998). The Review Board's findings of basic fact are subject to a “substantial evidence” standard of review. Id. In this analysis, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board's findings. Id. Reversal is warranted only if there is no substantial evidence to support the Review Board's findings. Id. (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ). Next, the Review Board's determinations of ultimate facts, which involve an inference or deduction based upon the findings of basic fact, are generally reviewed to ensure that the Review Board's inference is reasonable. Id. at 1317–18. Finally, we review conclusions of law to determine whether the Review Board correctly interpreted and applied the law. McHugh v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).
When interpreting a statute, we will give great weight to an interpretation of the statute by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, unless such interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Two Market Square Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 679 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind.1997). This same rule of deference applies to agency interpretation of administrative regulations that it has drafted and is charged with enforcing. Id. “Deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute becomes a consideration when a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.”
South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Lucas, 881 N.E.2d 30, 32 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). When faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, we defer to the agency. Id. If we determine that an agency's interpretation is reasonable, we terminate our analysis and will not address the reasonableness of the other party's proposed interpretation. Id. “Terminating the analysis recognizes ‘the general policies of acknowledging the expertise of agencies empowered to interpret and enforce statutes and increasing public reliance on agency interpretations.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Young, 855 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) ).
Broxton first argues that the Review Board erred when it interpreted the notice provisions of Indiana Code Section 22–4–3–5. That statute provides:
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