Broyles v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America

• Decision Date: 07 March 1942
• Docket Number: 35413.
• Citation: 122 P.2d 763,155 Kan. 74
• Parties: BROYLES v. ORDER OF UNITED COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS OF AMERICA.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

122 P.2d 763

155 Kan. 74

BROYLES v. ORDER OF UNITED COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS OF AMERICA.

No. 35413.

Supreme Court of Kansas

March 7, 1942

Rehearing Granted April 13, 1942.

Syllabus by the Court.

In beneficiary's action to recover death benefits under accident policy, providing indemnity against the result of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, occasioned by the accident alone and independent of all other causes, burden was on beneficiary to prove that insured met his death as a result of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, occasioned by the accident alone and independent of all other causes.

In beneficiary's action to recover death benefits under accident policy, the burden was on insurer to prove facts entitling it to exemption from liability under exemption clause of policy, excluding liability for death resulting from murder or disappearance, or injuries intentionally inflicted by others.

In beneficiary's action to recover death benefits under accident policy, providing indemnity against bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, and exempting insurer from liability for murder or injuries intentionally inflicted by others, there was no presumption that a sane person committed suicide or that he was murdered.

In beneficiary's action to recover death benefits under accident policy, insuring against death caused solely by external, violent and accidental means, proof that death resulted from unexplained, violent, and external means made out a "prima facie case" that injuries causing death were "accidental" within meaning of policy coverage, without direct and positive testimony on that point, since the law will not presume that injuries were inflicted intentionally by the deceased or by some other person.

The killing of insured by a third person, though intentional, is deemed "accidental" within the meaning of accident policy, insuring against death resulting from bodily injury sustained directly and independently of any other cause through external, violent and purely accidental means, if the killing was not brought about by the agency of the insured.

Evidence that insured was found lying with his head in a pool of blood on the floor of his office, the door of which was locked made out a "prima facie case" that his injuries were "accidental" within meaning of accident policy, insuring against death resulting from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means.

In beneficiary's action to recover death benefits under accident policy, insuring against death resulting from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, evidence that insured was found unconscious with his head in a pool of blood, was taken to a hospital where he remained unconscious for a period of about four days and then died, made a "prima facie case" that insured died from his injuries.

A distinction may on occasion be drawn between "presumptions" and "inferences", although the words are often used synonymously.

Inferences based on other inferences are not sufficient to meet the burden of proof resting on the pleader.

The rule that inferences based on other inferences are not sufficient to meet the burden of proof has no application to different inferences made from an admitted or proved fact or state of facts, but as many inferences may be drawn from a fact or state of facts as it will justify, so long as each has a factual foundation.

In beneficiary's action to recover death benefits under accident policy, presumptions that insured's injuries were accidentally received and that death resulted from the injuries were "concurrent presumptions", and one did not rest or depend upon the other so as to render applicable the rule that presumptions based on presumptions are insufficient to meet the burden of proof.

Where first trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff, after which defendant was granted a new trial at which it was stipulated the record at first trial should constitute the evidence error in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's evidence did not entitle plaintiff to entry of judgment in her favor in the Supreme Court, but defendant was entitled to an opportunity to prove its affirmative defense.

1. In an action to recover death benefits under an accident insurance policy such as is described in the opinion, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the insured met his death as the result of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, occasioned by the accident alone and independent of all other causes.

2. In such a case as described, where the defendant seeks to avoid liability on the ground the accident or injury for which recovery is sought is covered by an exemption in the policy the burden is on the defendant to prove the facts which bring the case within the exemption.

3. In such a case as described, there is no presumption that a sane person committed suicide, nor that he was murdered.

4. In such a case as described, where the proof shows death of the insured by unexplained, violent and external means, a prima facie showing is made that the injuries were accidental.

5. In such a case as described, where the proof shows that the insured was found unconscious with his head in a pool of blood, was taken to a hospital where he remained unconscious for a period of about four days and then died, a prima facie showing is made he died from his injuries.

6. The rule that inferences based on other inferences are not sufficient to meet the burden of proof has no application to different inferences made from an admitted or proven fact or state of facts. As many inferences may be drawn from a fact or state of facts, as it will justify, so long as each has a factual foundation.

Appeal from District Court, Neosho County; LeRoy Bradfield, Judge.

Action by Anna Mae Broyles against the Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, a corporation, to recover death benefits under an accident insurance policy issued by defendant. From an adverse judgment, rendered after defendant's demurrer to her evidence had been sustained, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions.

Leslie H. Cable, of Chanute, and W. K. Thompson, of Topeka, for appellant.

T. R. Evans and Robert N. Allen, both of Chanute, and E. W. Dillon, of Columbus, Ohio, for appellee.

THIELE Justice.

This was an action to recover death benefits under an accident insurance policy.

There were two trials in the district court, at the first of which the Hon. J. T. Cooper presided as judge, and his death having intervened the second was before his successor, the Hon. LeRoy Bradfield. At the first trial, defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's evidence was overruled, and the defendant having elected to stand on its demurrer, the cause was submitted to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant's motion for a new trial was allowed. At the second trial it was stipulated a jury should be waived and the cause submitted upon the transcript of the record of the first trial. After argument the trial court took the matter under advisement, and thereafter it sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's evidence and rendered judgment against plaintiff for costs.

Plaintiff appeals, assigning as error, the ruling on the demurrer, and the rendition of judgment against her. In view of what transpired, we may treat the matter as though the defendant's demurrer had been sustained when first interposed.

For our purposes the pleadings may be very much summarized. Plaintiff alleged she was the widow of Arthur N. Broyles, and named as beneficiary of any death benefits under an accident insurance policy issued by the defendant; that she notified defendant of injuries received by her husband on December 24, 1935, and of his death on December 29, 1935; that she furnished proofs of his death and on February 26, 1936, the defendant notified her of its refusal to pay. These allegations are admitted by defendant's answer. Defendant's answer denied allegations of the petition that on the late afternoon of December 24, 1935, two daughters of plaintiff found Arthur N. Broyles on the floor of his place of business with a fractured skull; that he was taken to a hospital and there died on December 29, 1935; that the injury was not self-inflicted but was accidental; that she was not present when Arthur N. Broyles received the injury and that the exact nature and manner thereof was unknown to her. In addition to the above admissions and denials, the answer alleged the death of Arthur N. Broyles was due to murder and to injuries intentionally inflicted by others.

Only two paragraphs of the accident insurance policy need be noticed. The indemnity provision is: "*** against the results of bodily injury hereinafter mentioned, effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, herein termed the accident, which shall be occasioned by the said accident alone and independent of all other causes."

Under the heading of "Exemptions", it is provided there shall be no liability "*** to any person for any benefit for death resulting from murder or disappearance, injuries intentionally inflicted by others, resulting in death."

In view of the rule respecting test of sufficiency of evidence as against a demurrer (see e. g. Shoup v. First Nat Bank, 145 Kan. 971, 975, 67 P.2d 569; Robinson v. Short, 148 Kan. 134, 79 P.2d 903; Jones v. McCullough, 148 Kan. 561, 83 P.2d 669; Trezise v. State Highway Comm., 150 Kan. 845, 96 P.2d 637) we limit our review of plaintiff's evidence to that...