Broz v. Schweiker

Citation677 F.2d 1351
Decision Date07 June 1982
Docket NumberNos. 81-7140,81-7336,81-7143,81-7370 and 81-7466,s. 81-7140
PartiesJohn BROZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health & Human Services, a Department of the United States Government, Defendant-Appellant. Richard D. HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, The Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Corrine LITTLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Thomas O. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant. Fred SOESBE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Anne Buxton Sobol, Dept. of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant in all cases.

Thomas H. Figures, Asst. U. S. Atty., Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellant in No. 81-7140.

E. T. Rolison, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellant in Nos. 81-7143, 81-7466.

Ginny S. Granade, Asst. U. S. Atty., Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellant in No. 81-7370.

Joseph E. Carr, IV, Legal Services Corp. of Ala., Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee in No. 81-7140.

Steven Emens, Alabama Legal Services, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee in No. 7143.

Michael J. Salmon, Gulf Shores, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee in No. 81-7336.

Daniel L. McCleave, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee in No. 81-7370.

Nettles, Cox & Barker, Kenneth O. Simon, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee in No. 81-7466.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and MERRITT *, Circuit Judges.

GODBOLD, Chief Judge:

In these five consolidated appeals we decide the validity of the Department of Health and Human Services' Medical-Vocational Guidelines, popularly known as the "grid regulations," which are employed in determinations of Social Security disability benefits. 1 These regulations appear at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 2 (1981), and were promulgated in 1978 under the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits portion of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 2 In each of these cases disability benefits were denied on the basis of these grid regulations after a hearing conducted by an Administrative Law Judge. Each case was appealed to the Southern District of Alabama where a United States magistrate recommended that the grid regulations be held invalid and that the decision of the ALJ be reversed and remanded for reconsideration apart from the regulations. The district court adopted the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations as its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Secretary of Health and Human Services appeals.

After a description of the grid regulations, we address first the question common to all of these cases, namely, the validity of the regulations, and then turn to alleged erroneous findings and procedures in the individual cases. We conclude that the regulations as they have been applied are invalid because they conclusively determine the effect of age on disability, but that they are capable of valid application by providing an individual determination of the age factor.

I. The Act and the regulations

The Act provides benefits to qualified individuals who are disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). "Disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any (permanent) medically determinable physical or mental impairment." Id. at § 423(d)(1)(A). Some impairments are per se disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525 (1981). For those not per se disabling a two-stage analysis is used to determine whether an impairment is disabling. A claimant must first show an impairment serious enough to prevent work in his or her previous job. Here the burden of proof is on the claimant. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1981). If this burden is met the burden shifts to the Secretary to prove that the claimant is capable, "considering his age, education, and work experience, (of) engag(ing) in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 3

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines come into play at this second stage. Part of these regulations provide a general framework to guide the ALJ in his analysis of the medical and vocational facts that bear on his determination of whether a claimant is capable of performing other substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545-.1573 (1981). The part of the regulations at issue here, Appendix 2 to 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, is no mere guideline, however, but is a detailed grid system directing a conclusion in certain cases on the issue of ability to perform other substantial work, based on the claimant's age, education, and work experience characteristics. These grid regulations are structured in this fashion: The ALJ first ascertains a claimant's "residual functional capacity," which involves findings as to the claimant's ability to lift weight, sit, stand, push, and pull. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1981). For claimants found capable of sedentary, light, or medium work, the regulations provide three tables, one corresponding to each level of residual functional capacity. These tables account for the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience, which are mentioned in the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The ALJ determines a claimant's age, education, and work experience and reads from the appropriate table and line the conclusion of whether the claimant is disabled.

When the grid regulations apply, they leave no discretion to the ALJ, for they direct the ultimate conclusion of whether a claimant is capable of other substantial gainful work in the national economy. Where the grids do not apply, however, the ALJ determines for himself, under the general guidelines accompanying the grids, whether the claimant is capable of other substantial work. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, App. 2 § 200.00(a), (d). The grid regulations do not apply unless each factor in the matrix is met by a characteristic of the claimant. Id. There are two notable exclusions from the grids. At a given residual functional capacity, if a claimant is capable of some work at that level but not a full range of work, then that level of the grids is not applicable. Id. at §§ 201.00(h), (i), 202.00(b); see 43 Fed.Reg. 9284, 9300. Accord Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 1982); Kirk v. Secretary, 667 F.2d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 1981). Second, in determining residual functional capacity only exertional limitations are considered, i.e., ability to lift, stand, push, pull, handle, etc. If a claimant has nonexertional impairments that significantly limit the ability to do basic work activities 4-for example, sensory impairments such as skin or respiratory sensitivity and mental or emotional impairments-then the grid regulations do not apply. Id. at § 200.00(e).

II. Validity of the regulations
A. Introduction

The effect of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines can be described in different ways. First, in directing a conclusion as to a claimant's ability to perform other substantial work, the essential effect of the Guidelines is to remove this ultimate issue from adjudication. Once a claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience are known, the determination of whether the claimant is capable of substantial work in the national economy is made by the Secretary's regulations and not by the ALJ. Second, under the regulations, vocational expert testimony to support a conclusion of not disabled is unnecessary, and vocational expert testimony contradicting the conclusion is irrelevant. Thus, the regulations might be viewed as supplying the evidence necessary to discharge the agency's burden of proving by substantial evidence that a claimant no longer able to perform his previous work is capable of other substantial gainful activity. Third, the regulations might also be viewed as taking administrative notice of certain facts; that is, the regulations are based on the agency's observation that a substantial number of unskilled sedentary, light, and medium occupations exist in the national economy, and the agency's observation of the physical requirements for these jobs. See Appendix 2, supra, at §§ 201.00(a), 202.00(a), 203.00(a).

Correspondingly, in this case three lines of attack are made on the regulations: (1) They deprive a claimant of the right to an individual determination of disability by an ALJ at a hearing; (2) they improperly relieve the Secretary of the burden of demonstrating by substantial evidence that a claimant is capable of other substantial work; and (3) they fail to allow a claimant an opportunity to rebut the facts that are administratively noticed through the regulations.

B. The right to a hearing versus the authority to rulemake

(1) The statutory language

The Act confers the right to a hearing and to have an initial disability determination affirmed, reversed, or modified on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). The regulations have the effect of removing from ALJs, who conduct such hearings, the ultimate decision of the claimant's ability to perform other substantial gainful work and relegating to determination at the hearing only the subsidiary facts of residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. The regulations direct, for instance, that a 45-year old claimant capable of sedentary work with no transferable work skills and only limited education is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 2 § 201.18. This determination is conclusive and is made on the basis of facts noticed...

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