Brubaker v. Morton, 73-2974
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before DUNIWAY and GOODWIN; ALFRED T. GOODWIN |
| Citation | 500 F.2d 200 |
| Parties | R. W. BRUBAKER, who is also known as Ronald W. Brubaker, et al., Appellants, v. Rogers C. B. MORTON, as Secretary of the Interior of the United States ofAmerica, Appellee. |
| Docket Number | No. 73-2974,73-2974 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1974 |
Page 200
al., Appellants,
v.
Rogers C. B. MORTON, as Secretary of the Interior of the
United States ofAmerica, Appellee.
Page 201
John B. Lonergan, San Bernardino, Cal., for appellants.
Edmund B. Clark, Chief, App. Section, Dept. of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Before DUNIWAY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and SKOPIL, * District judge.
OPINION
ALFRED T. GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
The Secretary of the Interior invalidated appellants' placer mining claims located on public lands. Appellants sued, 1 contending that the Secretary erred in concluding that mineral deposits of colored stone, used for decorative roofing material, were 'common varieties' of stone, not subject to claim and location under the federal mining laws. The district court agreed with the Secretary, and granted summary judgment. We affirm.
The Secretary's decision was the culmination of administrative proceedings initiated by the filing of contests by the Bureau of Land Management in 1963, charging that the claims were of a 'common variety' of stone, not locatable under the mining laws at the times the claims were located. 2 After ten years of hearings and administrative appeals, the Interior Board of Land Appeals, acting pursuant to authority delegated to it by the Secretary, 43 C.F.R. 4.1, held that appellants' claims were void because their brightly colored stone, while selling for a higher price than gray stone,
Page 202
did not have a special and distinct value over that of other stone deposits in common supply in the same market area. Hence, their stone was a common variety within the meaning of section 3 of the Act of July 23, 1955, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U.S.C. 611, and was not subject to mineral filing. 3Title 30 U.S.C. 611 states in pertinent part as follows:
'No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite or cinders * * * shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws * * *. 'Common varieties' as used in sections 601, 603, and 611 to 615 of this title does not include deposits of such materials which are valuable because the deposit has some property giving it distinct and special value * * *.'
In United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 88 S.Ct. 1327, 20 L.Ed.2d 170 (1968), the Supreme Court held that this section does apply to common varieties of building stone, but that 30 U.S.C. 161,...
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United States v. Corbin Farm Service, Crim. No. S-77-179.
...Statement No. 7, 42 Fed.Reg. 21496, 21499 (Apr. 27, 1977). This interpretation is entitled to great weight. E. g., Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200, 202 (9th Cir. 1974) ("A court faced with a problem of statutory construction should give great deference to the interpretation of a statute by......
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Montana Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agcy., CV-76-136-BLG.
...in order." Udall v. Tallman, supra at 16, 85 S.Ct. at 801. This position is adopted in the Ninth Circuit as well. Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the judicial deference to an administrative interpretation of a regulation is not an absolute requirement, especially ......
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Nance v. E.P.A., s. 77-3058
...512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). Page 714 Agency interpretations of federal statutes are entitled to great weight. Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974). "(T)he construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indica......
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New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long
...268, 276, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200, 202 (9 Cir. 1974). Accordingly, the opinion of the FDA Chief Counsel as to the preemptive reach of the FDA hearing aid regulations with res......
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United States v. Corbin Farm Service, Crim. No. S-77-179.
...Statement No. 7, 42 Fed.Reg. 21496, 21499 (Apr. 27, 1977). This interpretation is entitled to great weight. E. g., Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200, 202 (9th Cir. 1974) ("A court faced with a problem of statutory construction should give great deference to the interpretation of a statute by......
-
Montana Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agcy., CV-76-136-BLG.
...in order." Udall v. Tallman, supra at 16, 85 S.Ct. at 801. This position is adopted in the Ninth Circuit as well. Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the judicial deference to an administrative interpretation of a regulation is not an absolute requirement, especially ......
-
Nance v. E.P.A., s. 77-3058
...512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). Page 714 Agency interpretations of federal statutes are entitled to great weight. Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974). "(T)he construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indica......
-
New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long
...268, 276, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200, 202 (9 Cir. 1974). Accordingly, the opinion of the FDA Chief Counsel as to the preemptive reach of the FDA hearing aid regulations with res......