Bruce R., In re

• Citation: 662 A.2d 107,234 Conn. 194
• Decision Date: 11 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 14943,14943
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: In re BRUCE R. et al. *

Page 107

662 A.2d 107

234 Conn. 194

In re BRUCE R. et al. ^*

No. 14943.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 10, 1995.

Decided July 11, 1995.

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Cynthia C. Bott, New Haven and Edward Giacci, Seymour, for appellant (petitioner father).

Sean Orion LeBas, Ansonia, for appellee (respondent mother).

JoNel Newman, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

NORCOTT, Judge.

The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly granted the petitioner father's petitions ¹ to terminate his parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq. without first considering his financial condition and the financial condition of his children's custodial parent. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate his parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717(f). ² The respondent mother, who has sole custody of the children, appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that § 45a-717(f) required that the trial court consider the financial condition of the parents, including the parent who is seeking to terminate his or her parental rights, as a factor in determining the best interest of the children. ³ In re Bruce R., 34 Conn.App. 176, 640 A.2d 643 (1994). Thereafter, we granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of this case, was the financial condition of the natural parents a required consideration in determining whether termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children?" In re Bruce R., 230 Conn. 902, 644 A.2d 915 (1994). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court in its opinion narrated the following undisputed facts. "During the petitioner's marriage to the respondent, they had two children issue of the marriage, a son born June 18, 1980, and a daughter, born December 2, 1987. On March 25, 1988, their marriage was dissolved by the Superior Court. In the decree of dissolution, the respondent was granted custody of the two minor children and the petitioner was granted liberal rights of visitation. The decree further ordered the petitioner to pay $75 per week for the support of each minor child, [to] maintain medical and life insurance for their benefit, and to pay one-half of all their unreimbursed medical expenses. After the dissolution, problems arose between the petitioner and respondent that affected the petitioner's rights of visitation.

"On May 14, 1991, the petitioner filed petitions in the Court of Probate for the district of Derby seeking to terminate his parental rights with respect to both children. Both petitions alleged the following reasons for seeking such termination of parental rights: 'Since the date of dissolution, the children have been used as pawns. I have been denied visitation when requested. Allegations have been raised that I am not a fit father which led the Superior Court to enter supervised visitation. Since that order, additional problems with visitation have arisen which are now affecting the well-being of the children. In mid-winter 1990/1991, Respondent, mother of the minor [children], suggested that in the best interest of the children, that I consent to termination of my parental rights. After careful consideration and thought and after reviewing the inability of Respondent and me to discuss any difficulties that we have, including important matters in the [children's lives], it is clear that I agree with her contention that my parental rights be terminated. The [children's] well-being is affected adversely by the difficulties between Respondent and me which I do not believe can be cured through counseling. It is further clear that the ultimate best interest of the children will be served by the termination of my parental rights to allow Respondent to live her life without any concern for me or of me and thereby ease the pressure on the [children] emotionally.' Along with the petitions seeking to terminate parental rights, the petitioner executed and filed the consent form required by General Statutes § 45a-715(d). ⁴ The Court of Probate appointed an attorney for the children and ordered the department of children and youth services (DCYS) ⁵ to make an investigation and subsequent written report regarding the proposed termination. [See General Statutes § 45a-717(e).] DCYS contracted with a private agency, Community Children and Family Services, to conduct the investigation and that private agency thereafter submitted a written report to the Court of Probate. The report was based on the information gathered from interviews with the petitioner, the respondent, and both children. The report recommended that the petitions for termination of parental rights be denied on the ground that 'it does not seem to bear that inability to get along with his ex-wife relieves [the petitioner] from responsibility for providing for his children.'

"On motion of the respondent, the petitions for termination of parental rights were ordered transferred from the Court of Probate to the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-715(g). On July 7, 1992, the attorney for the children requested that the court issue an order to obtain updated evaluations of the petitioner, the respondent, and the minor children. By agreement of all counsel, Ralph S. Welsh was appointed to conduct these evaluations. The evaluations were conducted on December 8 and 29, 1992, and written reports were submitted to the trial court. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the termination of the petitioner's parental rights on May 21 and 24, 1993. The petitioner, the respondent, Welsh, and the son's therapist, Annette Bonomo, testified at the hearing. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate the petitioner's parental rights on May 24, 1993." In re Bruce R., supra, 34 Conn.App. at 178-80, 640 A.2d 643.

The respondent mother, who contested the termination of the petitioner's parental rights in the trial court, appealed. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that when the parent whose rights are being terminated consents to the termination, General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq. "requires that the trial court consider, as one of the elements necessary to make the determination of what is in the best interests of the children, the financial condition of the natural parents." Id., at 184-85, 640 A.2d 643. The Appellate Court stressed: "We do not hold, nor do we imply, that the financial conditions of the parents may alone determine the best interests of a child. We do hold that the trial court must be adequately apprised of such financial condition, must give it due consideration, and must accord it as much weight in its decision as the trial court in its discretion deems appropriate in light of all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed termination of parental rights." Id., at 185, 640 A.2d 643.

On appeal, the petitioner contends that § 45a-715 et seq. contains no mandate that the trial court consider the financial condition of the parents in determining the best interest of the child in consensual termination proceedings and, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly construed the statutory scheme to impose such a requirement. In addition, the petitioner claims that such a requirement constitutes a constitutionally impermissible classification based on wealth.

Before turning to the petitioner's claims, it is necessary to understand fully the significance of the issue before this court. "[T]he termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430, 362 A.2d 532, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 294, 46 L.Ed.2d 268 (1975). A judgment terminating a parent's rights not only severs the emotional and physical ties between parent and child, but also absolves that parent of all future support obligations. General Statutes § 45a-707(g). ⁶ It would be anathema for our law to allow parents to terminate voluntarily their parental rights "solely for the purpose of evading or relieving [themselves] of responsibility to pay child support." 3 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children (2d Ed.1994) § 28.14, p. 45. As one court wrote, "[s]imply put, no parent may blithely walk away from his or her parental responsibilities." In Interest of A.B., 151 Wis.2d 312, 322, 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis.App.1989). Against this backdrop, we turn to the petitioner's claims.

I

The petitioner first claims that the Appellate Court improperly required that the financial condition of the parents be considered by a trial court as one of the criteria for determining the best interest of the child in consensual termination proceedings. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the procedure and criteria for the consensual termination of parental rights are clearly set forth in General Statutes § 45a-717(f), and therefore, the Appellate Court improperly looked to § 45a-717(e)(1) ⁷ for guidance in interpreting the phrase "best interest of the child" contained in § 45a-717(f). We disagree.

The termination of parental rights is governed strictly by statute. ⁸ General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq.; see also General Statutes § 17a-112 (termination of parental rights of children committed to commissioner of children and families). Pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-715(a), ⁹ a petition to terminate parental rights can be initiated by the child's parent, ¹⁰ guardian or blood relative, the town selectmen, the commissioner of children and families or a child care agency authorized by the state. The petition must state the facts upon which the termination is sought and the legal grounds for authorizing termination. General Statutes § 45a-715(b)(6). Within...