Bruce v. Cascade Collections, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 April 2005 |
Citation | 110 P.3d 587,199 Or. App. 59 |
Parties | Diane D. BRUCE, Appellant, v. CASCADE COLLECTIONS, INC., an Oregon corporation, Respondent, and Green Thumb Yard Maintenance, Inc., dba Green Thumb Landscaping, an Oregon corporation, Defendant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Conrad E. Yunker, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. With him on the briefs was Conrad E. Yunker, P.C.
Jeffrey I. Hasson, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and LINDER and ORTEGA,1 Judges.
Plaintiff appeals from a supplemental judgment, challenging, inter alia, the trial court's denial of attorney fees under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 USC sections 1681 to 1681v, and the court's denial of the costs of computer-assisted legal research. The trial court concluded that (1) plaintiff had failed to adequately plead an entitlement to fees under the FCRA; and (2) in all events, plaintiff's requested fees were so unreasonable as to preclude any award of fees. We disagree with both of those determinations. We further conclude that the trial court's denial of the recovery of computer-assisted research expenses depended on an incorrect legal premise. Accordingly, we vacate the supplemental judgment and remand.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant subsequently filed an answer, including affirmative defenses and counterclaims. That answer denied the allegations of the first amended complaint that specified violations of the FCRA. In addition, as a first counterclaim, defendant alleged that it was "entitled to its reasonable attorney fees in defending the claim under the Oregon Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act."3
Plaintiff immediately accepted that offer of judgment.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff then filed a statement pursuant to ORCP 68 C(4) for costs and disbursements and attorney fees. The caption of that submission expressly requested that the court render findings of fact.4 The statement recited that plaintiff's requested entitlement to costs and fees was based on the FCRA and, specifically, "15 USC § 1681a(o)."5 Plaintiff sought fees of $3,262.50 for representation on the FCRA claim, as well as costs and disbursements, including $134.57 for "computer research." Plaintiff concurrently filed an "alternative motion" to file a second amended complaint, which differed from the first amended complaint in that it revised one paragraph of the first claim for relief to include an allegation that plaintiff was "entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 15 USC § 1681o(a)."
Defendant opposed both plaintiff's Rule 68 C statement and the alternative motion to amend. Defendant asserted, inter alia, that (1) plaintiff could not recover prevailing party fees under the FCRA because plaintiff had not adequately pleaded an entitlement to fees in the first amended complaint; (2) plaintiff's alternative motion to amend the complaint after the acceptance of the offer of judgment was untimely; (3) plaintiff's requested fees were unreasonable under the criteria of ORS 20.075(2); (4) the cost of computer research was not recoverable; and (5) the court was not obligated to render findings under ORCP 68 C(4)(c) because "[t]here was no trial in this matter."
The trial court denied both plaintiff's motion to amend and any recovery of attorney fees. With respect to the denial of attorney fees, the court stated:
The court rendered no findings of fact amplifying its alternative rationale that plaintiff's requested fees were not "reasonable." The court also concluded, without explanation, that plaintiff's claimed computer research expenses were not recoverable.
Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing supplemental judgment and raises five assignments of error. Those assignments challenge the trial court's determination that the first amended complaint did not adequately plead an entitlement to fees under the FCRA, the denial of plaintiff's alternative motion to amend, the court's failure to render findings explaining its alternative determination that the requested fees were unreasonable, the denial of computer research expenses, and the inclusion of allegedly extraneous language in the supplemental judgment.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that plaintiff's first amended complaint adequately pleaded entitlement to attorney fees under the FCRA. Further, to the extent that the trial court's denial of attorney fees was alternatively based on its determination that the requested fees were "not reasonable," that alternative ground was insufficient because the court failed to render findings of fact as required under ORCP 68 C(4)(e) and failed to explain why the alleged unreasonableness of the requested fees would justify the complete denial of any attorney fees. Finally, we conclude that reasonably incurred expenses of computer-assisted legal research are recoverable as a component of attorney fees under the FCRA. Accordingly, we vacate the supplemental judgment and remand.6
We begin with the sufficiency of plaintiff's pleadings of an entitlement of attorney fees. ORCP 68 C(2)(a) provides:
Page and Page, 103 Or.App. 431, 434, 797 P.2d 408 (1990); see, e.g., Lumbermen's v. Dakota Ventures, 157 Or.App. 370, 375, 971 P.2d 430 (1998) (); Hogue and Hogue, 118 Or. App. 89, 92, 846 P.2d 422 (1993) (). Indeed, in Page itself, we affirmed the award of attorney fees notwithstanding that the prevailing party's request for fees "relied on the wrong statute." Page, 103 Or.App. at 433-34, 797 P.2d 408; cf. St. Sauver and St. Sauver, 196 Or.App. 175, 189-90, 100 P.3d 1076 (2004) ().
Here, the allegations of plaintiff's claim for relief under the FCRA — which was plaintiff's sole claim against defendant — asserted the facts that "would provide a basis for an award of fees" under the FCRA. Page, 103 Or.App. at 434, 797 P.2d 408. Moreover, although the allegations of the claim for relief itself did not explicitly state that plaintiff was seeking attorney fees, the paragraph of the prayer that describes the relief sought for the FCRA claim did so state. 199 Or. App. at 61, 110 P.3d at 588. Thus, defendant was "fairly alerted to the fact that attorney fees would be sought" under the FCRA. Lumbermen's,157 Or.App. at 375,971 P.2d 430. Finally, defendant was not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to explicitly invoke a particular fee-generating provision of the FCRA (viz., 15 USC section 1681o(a)) in the allegations of the first claim for relief. Indeed, the form of judgment that defendant's counsel submitted, and the trial court ultimately executed,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Moyer v. Columbia State Bank
... ... See Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc. , 355 Or. 319, 324, 325 P.3d 707 (2014) ("[U]nder ORCP 47 C, the party ... Bruce v. Cascade Collections, Inc ., 199 Or. App. 59, 66, 110 P.3d 587, rev ... ...
-
Carrillo v. City of Stanfield
... ... See Karjalainen v. Curtis Johnston & Pennywise, Inc., 208 Or.App. 674, 681, 146 P.3d 336 (2006), rev. den., 342 Or. 473, 155 ... to make the findings necessary for meaningful appellate review); Bruce v. Cascade Collections, Inc., 199 Or.App. 59, 72, 110 P.3d 587, rev. den., ... ...
-
Hoff v. Certainteed Corp.
... ... CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, and Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. A162891 Court of Appeals of Oregon. Argued and ... In Bruce v. Cascade Collections, Inc. , 199 Or. App. 59, 110 P.3d 587, rev. den ... ...
-
Swartsley v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp.
... ... in Nguyen were materially distinguishable from those in Bruce v. Cascade Collections, Inc., 199 Or.App. 59, 110 P.3d 587, rev. den., 339 ... ...