Bruce v. Dean

• Decision Date: 17 November 1927
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: L. H. BRUCE, COMMITTEE, ETC. v. WILLIAM F. DEAN, JR., ADM'R OF RAYMOND STANTON DEAN.

Page 39

149 Va. 39

L. H. BRUCE, COMMITTEE, ETC. v. WILLIAM F. DEAN, JR., ADM'R OF RAYMOND STANTON DEAN.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Richmond.

November 17, 1927.

1. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Parties — Suit Against Committee of Grantor, a Convict — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a suit by an administrator whose decedent had been killed by the grantor, for the purpose of having declared fraudulent and void a deed of trust to an industrial school in consideration of the maintenance by the school of the grantor's children. The grantor was a life convict. Section 5184 of the Code of 1919 provides that gifts and conveyances with intent to hinder or defraud creditors, or "other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully entitled to," etc., shall be void. It was contended that as the administrator was not a creditor of the grantor, section 5184 had no application.

Held: That a deed made with intent to defraud a recovery by a third person of damages in an action of tort, even before trial and judgment, was fraudulent and void to the same extent as a conveyance to hinder, delay and defraud existing creditors.

2. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Voluntary Conveyances — Deed by Father in Consideration of an Agreement to Support Infant Children — Case at Bar. — A conveyance by a life convict to an industrial school, in consideration of an undertaking by the school to support grantor's infant children, was not a conveyance to the children of the grantor, while he was indebted, but was, in effect, a conveyance to a third party upon the assumption by the grantee of the obligation of the grantor to support, maintain and educate his children during their minority. It was therefore founded upon valuable consideration and not voluntary.

3. CONTRACTS — Consideration — Support and Maintenance. — Support, whether of the promisor or a third person, is a valuable consideration.

4. PARENT AND CHILD — Duty of Parent to Support Child. — It is the legal as well as the moral duty of a father to support his dependent infant children.

5. PARENT AND CHILD — Duty of Parent to Support Child — Parent Confined in Penitentiary. — A father who is confined in the penitentiary for life is still liable for the support of his minor child.

6. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Conveyance by Convict in Consideration of Undertaking to Support Convict's Children — Natural Love and Affection — Case at Bar. — Where with a moral and legal obligation resting upon him to support his minor children, which he could never perform because he was about to be deprived of his liberty for his lifetime, a father contracted with an industrial school to maintain his infant children, and in consideration of this obligation which it assumed to perform, conveyed his equity in all his real estate, the value of which was not greater than, or even equal to, the obligation assumed to the industrial school, and no benefit could enure to the father by reason of the conveyance, nor was the conveyance made in response to the sentiment of affection or favor, these facts distinguish the case from that class of cases where the moving consideration was affection or favor, or where individual benefit accrued to the grantor, while his property is put beyond the reach of his creditors.

7. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Conveyance by Convict to Industrial School — Consideration to Support his Children — Relationship of Debtor and Creditor — References — Gifts — Case at Bar. — In the instant case a father, a life convict, conveyed his equity in his estate to an industrial school in consideration of the school undertaking the support of his six minor children. The effect of the conveyance was that the property itself became the property of the industrial school. The assumption of the obligation to support the infant children created the relationship of creditor and debtor.

Held: That the case was not one of a gift to the children in fraud of the rights of existing creditors, that there was no intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, but that the debtor had a right to prefer the industrial school a creditor to the exclusion of other creditors.

8. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Proof — Burden of Proof. — The proof in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance must be clear, cogent and convincing and the burden rests on the party alleging the existence of fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed and should not be assumed on doubtful evidence or circumstances of mere suspicion.

9. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Fraud of Grantor — Necessity of Proof of Fraud of Grantee. — In a suit to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent, it is not sufficient to prove intentional fraud on the part of the grantor, where a valuable consideration has been paid, but in order to set aside such conveyance, it is necessary to prove that the grantee had notice of the fraudulent intention of the grantor. Such notice may be proven either by direct and positive evidence or it may be inferred from circumstances, but in either case the proof of such notice must be so strong and clear as to fix upon the grantee the imputation of mala fides.

10. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Conveyance by Life Convict in Consideration of Support of His Children — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a suit by an administrator whose decedent had been killed by the grantor, for the purpose of having declared fraudulent and void a deed of trust to an industrial school in consideration of the maintenance by the school of the grantor's children.

Held: That the deed attacked was for a valuable consideration; that there was no intent on the part of the grantor to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors; that, even if there was an intent on the part of the grantor to defraud, the grantee had no knowledge of such intent, and that the trial court erred in setting aside the deed.

11. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Parties on Appeal — Guardian Ad Litem — Interest of Infants — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a suit by the administrator of a decedent to have set aside as fraudulent a deed by the slayer of his decedent of the grantor's equity in his estate, upon consideration of the grantee, an industrial school, undertaking the support of grantor's infant children. The lower court set aside the deed and on appeal counsel for the administrator contended that the appeal should be dismissed because the industrial school was not a party to the appeal, because the committee for the grantor had no standing to maintain the litigation for his ward, and because the appeal could not be maintained by the guardian ad litem for the infant children.

Held: That the infants having a substantial interest in the litigation the court would not dismiss the appeal upon the technical ground that the appeal is prosecuted by the guardian ad litem for the infants instead of in the name of the infants by their guardian ad litem. The appeal in the interest of the infants brings the whole matter in controversy before the appellate court; it was immaterial whether the industrial school prosecuted the appeal or whether the committee had any interest.

Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Greene county. Decree for complainant. Defendant appeals.

The opinion states the case.

Geo. S. Harnsberger and Geo. N. Conrad, for the appellant.

Chas. A. Hammer, for the appellee.

CHICHESTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit instituted on August 4, 1925, by William F. Dean, Jr., administrator of Raymond S. Dean, deceased, against L. H. Bruce, committee of L. Gruver Meadows, for the purpose of having declared voluntary, "fraudulent and void, so far as the complainant's demands are concerned," a certain deed of trust, bearing date July 18, 1925, from L. Gruver Meadows to the Church of the Brethren Industrial School.

The trust deed, which complainant seeks to have set aside conveyed all the real estate owned by Meadows (subject to certain deeds of trust, mentioned in the bill, but with which we are not concerned) to the grantee named in the deed, in trust that the "property shall be used, or its proceeds used by the party of the second part, in defraying the expenses of the maintenance, education and rearing the six children of the party of the first part," naming them, all children of the grantor, and all infants.

The facts which formed the basis of the proceeding here before the court, are, in the main, undisputed, and are embodied in the following statement:

L. Gruver Meadows was indicted in May, 1925, for the murder of Raymond Stanton Dean, and Serena Meadows, his wife. He alleged as his reason for the double homicide, that Dean was unduly intimate with his wife. On the trial for murdering his wife on June 30th, he was convicted of murder in the first degree and on July 20th, was sentenced to life imprisonment. As a result of the death of the mother and the life imprisonment of the father the six children, ranging in age from one and one-half years to twelve years, were left without either parent to care for and support them. There were no relatives who were willing to look after these infants and an uncle carried them to the Church of the Brethren Industrial School, located in Greene county, where they have been since that time. The industrial school is a subsidiary of, and is controlled by, "The General Mission Board of the Church of the Brethren," a corporation.

A few days after the children were brought to industrial school, the principal of the school asked for compensation for their care and maintenance, and thereupon assurances were given the superintendent by counsel for Lloyd Gruver Meadows and later by Lloyd Gruver Meadows, himself, that remuneration would be made to the industrial school for its care and support of the children. In pursuance of this assurance Meadows did pay the industrial school, on account of the care and maintenance of the children,...