Bruce v. Doolittle

• Decision Date: 31 January 1876
• Citation: 81 Ill. 103,1876 WL 9925
• Parties: MANNING A. BRUCEv.MARIA J. DOOLITTLE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

81 Ill. 103

1876 WL 9925 (Ill.)

MANNING A. BRUCE

v.MARIA J. DOOLITTLE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1876.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Scott county; the Hon. CYRUS EPLER, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. BEASON & BLINN, for the appellant.

Mr. JAMES M. EPLER, and Mr. WM. W. BERRY, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a proceeding, instituted in the county court of Scott county, to compel Manning A. Bruce, who had been appointed guardian, in 1848, of Maria J., Elvira L. and James W. Campbell, to render an account and make final report of his guardianship.

The guardian, who is appellant here, was brought in by citation, issued and served under the provision of the statute enacted for that purpose.

In the county court an order was entered, requiring appellant to account, as guardian, for certain moneys in his hands belonging to his wards, from which he appealed to the circuit court, where a trial was had before the court, and the court found, from the evidence, that appellant had in his hands $3735.09 belonging to his wards. The court, thereupon, entered an order requiring appellant to pay over to Maria J. Doolittle $1395.04, and to Elvira L. Cackley $1395.04, and to the heirs of James W. Campbell $945. To reverse the order of the circuit court, this appeal has been taken.

It is first urged, that an action is barred on the guardian's bond by the Statute of Limitations, and appellant could not, therefore, be required to render an account on citation issued by the county court.

So far as appears from the record, the Statute of Limitations was not set up or relied upon by appellant in the county court, where the proceedings were commenced, or in the circuit court, where the order appealed from was entered. But, even if the statute had been set up, it would have been no bar to this proceeding. This proceeding, by citation, to require a guardian to account, is not an action either at law or in equity, within the meaning of the statute, in bar of which the Statute of Limitations can be pleaded. Gilbert v. Guptill, 34 Ill. 112.

The main object of the proceeding is, to determine the amount of money in the hands of the guardian due the wards, and require an account. The statute confers express power on county courts to compel guardians to render their accounts upon oath, touching their guardianship, and also authority to require guardians to give additional security, when necessary, and in default thereof, power of removal.

At the time the citation was issued, in 1872, the bond executed by the guardian and his sureties was in force. The guardian had rendered no final report of his doings as such, and the county court not only had the power to require an account, but it was a duty resting upon it to take action in the matter.

It appears, from the record, that the appellant rendered an account to the county court, in 1851, which showed a balance in his hands belonging to his wards, and although efforts were made by the county court after that time to compel a further account and settlement by citation, they proved unavailing, and appellant was not brought before the court until 1872.

It is claimed by appellant, that the account rendered in 1851 is final between the guardian and the wards, and that the circuit court, in stating the account, could not go behind that account, or in any manner reopen it for further adjudication.

While the approval of the guardian's account by the court in 1851 was a judicial act, yet, if the guardian had received moneys which he failed to account for, or charged himself with too small an amount, no reason is perceived why the wards may not require the account to be correctly stated and the guardian properly charged. Bond v. Lockwood, 33 Ill. 215.

Prior to the rendition of the account in 1851, the guardian had sold real estate belonging to the wards, under decree of the circuit court, for the purpose of raising money for their education and support. In 1850 he filed a report of sale, under oath, to the court, from which it appears the lands sold for $2200. Notwithstanding this fact, only a short time afterwards he rendered an account in the probate court, in which he charged himself with $2002, as the amount for which the real estate sold. But, not satisfied with this concealment of money that belonged to his wards, he also reported that $667.33 of the proceeds of...