Bruce v. Guernsey

Decision Date26 January 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–1352.,14–1352.
Citation777 F.3d 872
PartiesFalyn BRUCE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Derek GUERNSEY, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John A. Baker, Attorney, Baker, Baker & Krajewski, Springfield, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Natalie D. Thompson, Attorney, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, IL, James Andrew Borland, Attorney, Christopher D. Galanos, Attorney, Quinn, Johnston, Henderson, Pretorius & Cerulo, Springfield, IL, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

WOOD, Chief Judge.

After Falyn Bruce's high-school boyfriend told a school official that Bruce had attempted to kill herself, the official contacted local authorities. A police officer, Justin Harris, went to the home where Bruce was staying and detained her until a county sheriff's deputy, Derek Guernsey, arrived on the scene. Guernsey then took Bruce against her will to a local hospital where she was subjected to a mental health examination. At the time they took these steps, Harris and Guernsey had only a report of Bruce's alleged suicidal ideation; they took no account of contradictory information, including her father's statements and her calm demeanor. Bruce filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Harris and Guernsey's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states. The district court held that probable cause for the seizure was apparent on the face of Bruce's complaint. It also found that Guernsey had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. Bruce has appealed; we now affirm the district court's judgment in favor of Harris but reverse and remand for further proceedings as to Guernsey.

I

Our account of the facts follows Bruce's First Amended Complaint. Because the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, we proceed on the assumption that these facts are true (without making any finding to that effect). See Santana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 679 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir.2012). On September 5, 2011, Bruce was with her boyfriend, B.S., at B.S.'s home. At the time, Bruce was 17 years old. Bruce and B.S. had an argument, and Bruce wanted to leave. Initially B.S. attempted to stop her, but Bruce eventually managed to get away. She contacted her friend, D.F., and wound

up spending the night at D.F.'s home. Around 8:00 the next morning, Bruce spoke on the phone with James Bruce, her father and custodial guardian. She explained to him that she was fine but did not want to go to school. Mr. Bruce told her that he would inform her school, Riverton High School, that she would be absent.

Sometime on the morning of September 6, B.S. told some of Bruce's friends that Bruce had attempted suicide the night before by tightening a belt around her neck. (Bruce swears that this is a lie and that she never has been suicidal.) But she was not around to refute the assertion, and so some of her friends told the Riverton High School guidance counselor about B.S.'s claim. The counselor contacted the Riverton Police Department. The Department dispatched police officer Andrew Landgrebe to the school. Mr. Bruce—who later arrived at the school—told Landgrebe that he had spoken to Bruce and that she was fine. Landgrebe, however, disregarded the father's statement, contacted the Sangamon County dispatch service, told the dispatcher that Bruce was possibly suicidal, and suggested that they send someone to check on her.

At 10:17 a.m., a dispatcher for Sangamon County contacted Rochester Police Department officer Justin Harris and told him that Bruce was possibly suicidal. Harris went to D.F.'s house and spoke to Bruce. During this encounter, Bruce was “perfectly fine and showed absolutely no signs of physical, mental or emotional distress.” Harris evidently thought so: he advised the Sangamon County dispatch that Bruce was “o.k.” and that emergency medical services were not needed. Nevertheless, Harris entered D.F.'s home and told Bruce to come outside of the house because Sangamon County was coming to get her.” In response to Bruce's question why she had to leave the house, Harris said, “if you want to ask questions I can just handcuff you and take you out myself.” Feeling that she had no choice, Bruce went outside to the driveway. There were other people at D.F.'s home with Bruce, but Harris did not ask any of them whether they had any concerns about Bruce's mental state. He never asked Bruce about her mental wellbeing, nor did he observe any physical injuries.

At 10:26 a.m., a Sangamon County dispatcher contacted Mr. Bruce and gave him the address of D.F's home. The dispatcher told him that Bruce was fine and that he should go to the home to pick her up. At 10:54 a.m., Sangamon County Sheriff's Deputy Derek Guernsey arrived at D.F.'s house; Mr. Bruce arrived at the same time. Two minutes later, Harris left the scene. That was the last Harris saw of Bruce; this means that Harris was present for less than 37 minutes (he was contacted at 10:17, presumably took a few minutes to travel to the house, and then left at 10:54).

When Guernsey arrived, he directed Bruce to get into his police car. Both Bruce and her father objected, telling Guernsey that Bruce was fine and that they wanted Bruce to go with Mr. Bruce. Guernsey insisted, however, that Bruce come with him to St. John's Hospital. At this time, Guernsey had been told only that Bruce was possibly suicidal; he had not been informed that she allegedly had threatened or attempted suicide. He did not ask Bruce or anyone else present about her mental state. In fact, throughout all these events neither Guernsey nor Harris personally observed any behavior or actions indicating that Bruce was mentally disturbed or a danger to herself or others.

At 11:05 a.m., Guernsey left D.F.'s home with Bruce in his police car; the two arrived at St. John's Hospital shortly thereafter. (It appears that Mr. Bruce drove there separately, became upset, and was eventually forced to leave.) At the hospital, Guernsey and another sheriff's deputy, Troy Sweeney, retained custody of Bruce until the hospital briefly admitted her at 1:55 p.m. Guernsey signed a petition for in-voluntary judicial admission at 11:30 a.m. In the petition, he stated that Bruce was likely to harm herself or others if not treated as an inpatient and that Bruce needed immediate hospitalization. Guernsey's petition incorrectly noted that he was attaching a copy of a doctor's medical examination; in fact, none was attached. (There was an option to state that no certificate was attached because a doctor could not be located after a diligent effort, but Guernsey did not select this option.) He also falsely wrote in the petition that Bruce had told him that she was thinking of suicide. Bruce did not see a doctor until 11:53 a.m., after Guernsey completed the form. A few hours after she was admitted to St. John's, she was sent to a nearby behavioral health center for evaluation; she was released from that institution three days later.

Bruce later initiated this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sued Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney, alleging that they violated the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably seizing her. In addition, Bruce alleged a due process violation by Guernsey related to his filing of a false document, i.e., the petition for involuntary judicial admission. Bruce also named Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department as defendants, alleging a failure to train their employees.

The defendants promptly filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted them, dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Bruce then filed an amended complaint containing essentially the same allegations except for the due process claim against Guernsey. Again the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. It found that Harris and Guernsey had probable cause to seize Bruce and that Guernsey was entitled to qualified immunity in any case because he had at least arguable probable cause when he took Bruce into custody.

Because she had no additional facts to plead, Bruce moved to modify the district court's order to a dismissal with prejudice, so that she could appeal. The district court obliged with an order stating that it would dismiss the complaint with prejudice if Bruce filed a notice of appeal. After Bruce did so, the district court entered final judgment. Bruce then filed an amended notice of appeal to make clear that she was appealing the district court's final judgment. (This was a belt-and-suspenders move. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2). That is why we eventually dismissed the second appeal.) Bruce now challenges only the district court's dismissals of Harris and Guernsey.

II

We review a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. See Santana, 679 F.3d at 620. Because both defendants concede that they seized Bruce, the central question for this appeal is whether each defendant had either probable cause to do so, or arguable probable cause such that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Neither defendant argues that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), justified his actions.)

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution governs mental-health seizures. See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 732 (7th Cir.2013). Like ordinary seizures, mental-health seizures comply with the Fourth Amendment if officers have probable cause, which exists “only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to seizure under the governing legal standard.” Id. (quoting Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir.1992) ). Generally speaking, a mental-health seizure is lawful if there is probable cause to believe that the person seized is a danger to herself or others. See, e.g., Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099,...

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