Bruce v. Riddle

• Decision Date: 05 February 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 78-1966.
• Citation: 464 F. Supp. 745
• Parties: Tom S. BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. C. Daniel RIDDLE, I. H. Gibson, Mike Fair, Melvin Pace, John L. Bauer, W. Bentley Hines, Johnnie M. Smith, W. Shannon Linning, Larry H. McCalla, Marshall L. Cason, J. Harlon Riggins, W. B. Bennett, Charles F. Styles, and Clyde E. Morgan, individually and as members of the Greenville County Council and Greenville County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

464 F. Supp. 745

Tom S. BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. C. Daniel RIDDLE, I. H. Gibson, Mike Fair, Melvin Pace, John L. Bauer, W. Bentley Hines, Johnnie M. Smith, W. Shannon Linning, Larry H. McCalla, Marshall L. Cason, J. Harlon Riggins, W. B. Bennett, Charles F. Styles, and Clyde E. Morgan, individually and as members of the Greenville County Council and Greenville County, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 78-1966.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division.

February 5, 1979.

A. Camden Lewis, Columbia, S. C., for plaintiff.

J. D. Todd, Jr., Mark R. Holmes, Greenville, S. C., for defendants.

D. Michael Parham, Abrams, Bowen, Robertson, Tapp & Parham, Joseph H. Earle, Jr., County Atty., James H. Lengel, Greenville, S. C., for intervenors.

ORDER

HEMPHILL, District Judge.

The matter before the court for decision is the motion of the members of the Greenville County Council named as individual defendants in this action for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion extends to all causes of action which the plaintiff has sought to allege in his complaint and is based on the theory that the defendants enjoy legislative immunity from this suit in which the plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability upon them for actions taken by them in the performance of their legislative functions as elected members of the County Council of Greenville County, South Carolina.

The basic elements of this action are clearly set forth in the complaint, which alleges that the defendants acted in their official capacity to amend the Greenville County Zoning Ordinance, thereby changing the zoning classification of the plaintiff's property. He objects to the rezoning and seeks to recover monetary damages (including punitive damages) for diminution in value of his property which he says has resulted from the rezoning. Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1343 for causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, and the similar provisions contained in Article 1, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution.

Zoning is a legislative function. This conclusion was expressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Conway v. City of Greenville, 254 S.C. 96, 173 S.E.2d 648 (1970), and the legislative nature of local zoning enactments also was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974). Thus, it is clear that a member of the Greenville County Council is legislating when he votes to enact an amendment to the existing Greenville County Zoning Ordinance. As such, he is no less a legislator than any member of the South Carolina Legislature or the Congress of the United States, and he is fully entitled to all of the safeguards and immunities which the common law traditionally has provided to forestall interference with the legislative functions of government. Cf. Shannon Fredericksburg Motor Inn, Inc. v. Hicks, 434 F.Supp. 803 (E.D.Va.1977).

There is nothing particularly novel in the plaintiff's effort here to recover monetary damages from local legislators/officials for allegedly unconstitutional actions. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), the plaintiff alleged constitutional violations by members of an investigating committee of the California Legislature and invoked 8 U.S.C. § 43 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983) to seek compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants had investigated and allegedly damaged the plaintiff through their activities on the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, but the Supreme Court concluded without hesitation that the individual defendants and the legislative committee itself, which was named as a defendant, were not subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act when their actions were taken "in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act."

The basis of the Court's decision in Tenney v. Brandhove was the absolute immunity which the common law of England and the United States has long afforded legislators at all levels against civil liability for acts done within the sphere of their legislative activities. The enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other portions of the Civil Rights Act did not, according to the holding in Tenney v. Brandhove, abrogate the legislative immunity which the Court found to exist at common law. That finding alone was dispositive in Tenney v. Brandhove, but the result there would not have been altered if the plaintiff had alleged (as is the case in this action) causes of action for constitutional violations independent of the Civil Rights Act. With its origins firmly based in the common law, the doctrine of legislative immunity is fully applicable either within or outside the scope of the sort of limited constitutional tort action sanctioned by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Court's discussion of legislative immunity in Tenney v. Brandhove is succinct but complete, and it would be difficult indeed to improve upon the language of Justice Frankfurter's opinion. Two passages in particular are worthy of note in connection with this motion. In the first, the Court observed by quoting a member of the committee which translated the common law of legislative immunity into the Federal Constitution in the Speech and Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6:

In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence. (341 U.S. at 373, 71 S.Ct. at 786, 95 L.Ed. at 1025).

Further, in Justice Frankfurter's words:

The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130, 3 L.Ed. 162, that it was not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned. (341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788, 95 L.Ed. at 1027).

The applicability of the legislative immunity defense in South Carolina was not at issue in Tenney v. Brandhove, but the Court did make some enlightening observations about its availability here and in virtually all other states. After discussing the evolution of legislative immunity in the English common law, the Court observed in footnote 3 that the South...