Bruce v. United States
| Decision Date | 17 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 2:08-cr-00121,CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-cv-00892 |
| Parties | TAMIKA BRUCE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Petitioner Tamika Bruce, pro se, brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Docket 46 & 51.]1 On August 4, 2009, this Court referred Petitioner's habeas application to Magistrate Judge Mary E. Stanley for proposed findings of fact and a recommendation ("PF&R") (Docket 48.) On September 22, 2010, Magistrate Judge Stanley issued a PF&R (Docket 67) recommending the dismissal of Petitioner's application with prejudice because her application lacks merit. On November 10, 2010, Petitioner filed timely objections to the PF&R. [Docket 71], which she supplemented on August 24, 2012, through an untimely letter to the Court. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Stanley's proposed findings and recommendation.
This Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a petitioner "makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
As a preliminary matter, the Court must first determine whether the Petitioner's objections were timely filed. Objections to the PF&R in this case were due on October 26, 2010. It appears from the dates assigned by prison officials on the envelopes containing Petitioner's objections that she first attempted to mail her objections on October 25, 2010, and then again on October 26, 2010. (Docket 71 at 13-17). The address label for each of these mailings is typed or computer-generated and reads: "Clerk US Court, 300 Virginia Street E, Charleston, WV - 25301, United States." Both mailings bear a printed postal label stating "Return to Sender" for "insufficient address." Id. On November 5, 2010, Petitioner mailed her objections a third time, this time with the handwritten address: "Robert C. Byrd, United States Courthouse, 300 Virginia Street East, rm 2400, Charleston, West Virginia 25301." (Id.) This third effort was successful.
Where it appears to the Court that Petitioner provided her written objections to prison officials prior to the October 26, 2010, deadline, and where it appears Petitioner was reasonablydiligent in her attempts to comply with the filing deadlines prescribed by the Court, the Court FINDS that Petitioner's objections were timely filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thompson v. Raspberry, 993 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1993)( that for purposes of rule specifying time during which appeal must be taken from magistrate's recommended disposition of prisoner petition, pro se prisoner's written objections to magistrate's report and recommendations must be deemed filed and served at moment they are forwarded to prison officials for delivery to district court, provided prisoner has done all that he or she can reasonably do to insure documents are received by clerk of court in timely manner).
The Court now turns to the substance of Petitioner's objections to the PF&R. The essence of Petitioner's claims is that her lawyer, in the course of his representation of Petitioner in connection with her guilty plea and sentencing on a drug charge, made a variety of errors. Petitioner's objections are fairly summarized as follows:
(1) First Objection
In the PF&R, the Magistrate Judge Stanley proposes that the Court find that Petitioner "has not alleged that 'but for counsel's errors, she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial ,' as required by Fields." (Docket 67 at 5.) Magistrate Judge Stanley also proposes that the Court find that Petitioner "failed to show that she suffered any prejudice because she received the minimum sentence possible for her guilty plea." (Docket 67 at 5-6.)
Petitioner objects to these proposed findings claiming that "she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" had her attorney followed her instructions duringan un-transcribed pause in the plea hearing where, allegedly, Petitioner privately instructed her attorney to advise the court that the Stipulation of Facts was not true. (Docket 71 at 3.) Petitioner asserts that her lawyer advised her to go through with the guilty plea anyway even though she had just told him the Stipulation of Facts was not true. (Id.) Petitioner also contends that had she gone to trial she could have pursued an entrapment defense and "could have had a 50/50 chance of receiving no time at all." (Docket 71 at 4.);
(2) Second Objection
In the PF&R, the Magistrate Judge proposes the Court find that Petitioner "failed to show that her attorney revealed confidential communications to anyone." (Docket 67 at 7.)
Petitioner claims that the Magistrate Judge misconstrued the facts concerning this allegation and offers additional facts for clarification. (Docket 71 at 4.)
(3) Third Objection
In the PF&R, the Magistrate Judge proposes that the Court find that Petitioner's claim that the guilty plea hearing transcript omits several sentences is without foundation.
Petitioner, partially reiterating her first objection, claims that the Magistrate Judge's proposed finding is erroneous because the transcript omits private discussions that occurred at the guilty plea hearing between Petitioner and her counsel (Id. at 5.) Petitioner also claims that the transcript does not reflect her alleged statement to the sentencing judge, United States District Court Chief Judge Joseph Robert Goodwin, that "I don't believe in my plea, I believe in my lawyer and my lawyer believes in my plea." (Id.) She states "That statement somehow has been omitted from the transcript." (Id.)
(4) Fourth Objection
In the PF&R, the Magistrate Judge proposes that the Court find that Petitioner "has shown no extraordinary circumstances, that the truth of her sworn statements made during the Rule 11 colloquy are conclusively established, and that [Petitioner's] allegations in her § 2255 motion contradict the sworn statements." (Docket 67 at 13.) The Magistrate Judge also proposes that the Court find that Petitioner "waived her right to pursue a collateral attack except as to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, that her attorney did not induce her enter a guilty plea; that her sworn statements at the plea hearing establish that her guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and that [Petitioner] was not denied effective assistance of counsel in relation to the guilty plea." (Id.)
Petitioner objects to these proposed findings because: a) her attorney failed to provide her "all the information to make an educated decision" whether to plead guilty and, consequently, her guilty plea was defective; b) her attorney did not give her proper advice regarding relevant conduct issues and a firearm enhancement; c) her attorney failed to show her the stipulation of facts prior to the plea hearing; and d) she told her attorney during the plea hearing that the facts in the stipulation "were not facts"; but her attorney "induced" her to plead guilty anyway. (Docket 71 at 7.) Petitioner also claims that because of these errors, the Court should find that her collateral attack waiver is invalid. (Id. at 6-8.)
(5) Fifth Objection
Finally, in the PF&R, the Magistrate Judge proposes that the Court find that Petitioner "failed to show that her attorney's performance resulted in any prejudice to her." (Docket 67 at 15.)
Petitioner objects to this proposed finding on the basis that her counsel made various sentencing guideline errors. (Docket 71 at 8.) She contends that pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1(b), she was not subject to the 120-month, mandatory minimum sentence "so her sentence should have been a guideline sentence to begin with." (Id. at 8.) She offers a variety of alternative sentencing guideline calculations that she claims are appropriate to her case. (Id. at 10-11.)
In her PF&R, Magistrate Judge Stanley recommends the Court dismiss Petitioner's § 2255 application on the grounds that each of Petitioner's contentions lack merit. [Docket 67].
The full factual and procedural history of this case and Petitioner's related criminal case (Criminal No. 2:08-00121) is set forth in the PF&R, yet the events that occurred during Petitioner's guilty plea and sentencing hearings merit fuller development in light of the issues raised by Petitioner.
Petitioner was indicted on charges relating to possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine (Count One), fifty grams or more of crack cocaine (Count Two), cocaine (Count Three) and marijuana (Count Four). (Docket 5 at 1-4.) Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Count Two of the Indictment. (Docket at 59-1.) The plea agreement contained a written Stipulation of Facts that bears the Petitioner's signature, as well as the signatures of her counsel, Trent A. Redman, and the Assistant United States Attorney. (Criminal No. 2:08-cr-00121, Docket 30 at 9-10.) The plea agreement also contained a waiver of Petitioner's appellate and collateral attack rights. (Id. ¶ 11.) This waiver permitted the parties to appeal the Court's sentencing guideline calculation in the event that it differed from that ...
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