Brulotte v. Cormier Hosiery Mills, Inc., 7846
| Decision Date | 19 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 7846,7846 |
| Citation | 118 N.H. 432,387 A.2d 1162 |
| Parties | Norman BRULOTTE v. CORMIER HOSIERY MILLS, INC. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Wescott, Millham & Dyer, Laconia (Rodney N. Dyer, Laconia, orally), for plaintiff.
Normandin, Cheney & O'Neil, Laconia (David O. Huot, Laconia, orally), for defendant.
JOHNSON, Justice (By special assignment pursuant to RSA 490:3).
This is a petition for declaratory judgment filed by the plaintiff seeking an interpretation of the company's profit-sharing plan and of certain statements contained in the company's Employee's Handbook. The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts to a Master (Mayland H. Morse, Jr., Esq.) who recommended a verdict for the plaintiff. The master's report was approved by the Court, and defendant's exceptions were transferred by Loughlin, J.
The plaintiff, Norman Brulotte, became a full-time employee of the company in November 1967 and was terminated as of January 1, 1974. At the time of his termination he had had more than five years' continuous service with the company. The plaintiff's entitlement under the company profit-sharing plan is described in the following provision of the company's Employee's Handbook :
WHAT IF I LEAVE THE COMPANY?
If you leave before retirement, your rights will depend on the length of time you were a participant in the plan. They also depend upon the reason why you leave the company. If you were displaced by automation or job elimination, your rights in your account are determined from this table:
If you were a profit You are entitled to
sharing participant for this percentage of
this many years your profit sharing
account balance
fewer than 1 none
1 but fewer than 2 5%
2 but fewer than 3 10%
3 but fewer than 4 40%
4 but fewer than 5 70%
5 or more 100%
If you leave or are discharged for any reason other than automation or job elimination, you are entitled to 5% of your account balance for each year of participation. This amount will be paid to you as of the January 1 after you leave.
Mr. Brulotte was employed in the quality control department of the company with one other employee. The volume of work for the plant, as a whole, had decreased and the plaintiff's employment was terminated due to lack of work. The other employee continued to carry on the functions of the department. Because the volume of work for the plant did not increase after the plaintiff's termination, he was not rehired nor was anyone hired to replace him. If the volume of work had increased, the company would have had to hire someone to fill the same position once held by the plaintiff.
The parties have agreed on all issues concerning plaintiff's entitlement but one: whether, based upon these facts, plaintiff's termination was for "any reason other than . . . job elimination." Plaintiff contends that he was terminated because his job was eliminated, whereas the company contends the job was not eliminated but was terminated because of lack of work for that particular job.
The answer to the question before us depends upon the interpretation of the phrase "job elimination" as set forth in the company's Employee's Handbook. To reach an accurate interpretation we must determine what the words meant to those who used them. See Brampton Woolen Co. v. Local Union 112, 95 N.H. 255, 257, 61 A.2d 796, 797 (1948).
The master concluded that a person in the...
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