Brumfield v. Barrett, C16-3109-LTS

• Decision Date: 26 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. C16-3109-LTS,C16-3109-LTS
• Parties: MARQUIS BRUMFIELD, Plaintiff, v. REBECCA BARRETT, NETTI RENSHAW, DON HARRIS, ROBERT JOHNSON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

MARQUIS BRUMFIELD, Plaintiff, v. REBECCA BARRETT, NETTI RENSHAW,DON HARRIS, ROBERT JOHNSON, Defendants.

No. C16-3109-LTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CENTRAL DIVISION

October 26, 2016

ORDER

This matter is before the court on plaintiff's October 14, 2016, application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). Along with his application, plaintiff submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) and supporting documentation (Doc. No. 1-1).

I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Plaintiff did not submit the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (requiring filing fee). In order for a court to authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of the filing fee, a person must submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all the assets the person possesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In addition, a prisoner must submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner was or is confined. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Based on the plaintiff's statements, it is clear that he does not have sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee. Thus, in forma pauperis status shall be granted to plaintiff. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

A prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full $350.00 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The full filing fee will be collected even if the court dismisses the case because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks money damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Because the court deems it appropriate to grant plaintiff in forma pauperis status, plaintiff is required to pay the full filing fee by making payments on an installment basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see also In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he [Prisoner Litigation Reform Act] makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal.").

Concerning the computation of the initial partial filing fee, plaintiff is required to submit 20 percent of the greater of his average monthly account balance or average monthly deposits for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Based on plaintiff's statements, the court finds that the initial partial filing fee is $12.00. Id. Plaintiff shall submit $12.00 by no later than November 21, 2016. Id. If necessary, plaintiff may request in a written motion an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee.

In addition to the initial partial filing fee, plaintiff must "make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner's institution to collect the additional monthly payments and forward them to the court. Specifically,

[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Therefore, after plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the remaining installments shall be collected by the institution having custody of plaintiff. See id. The clerk's office shall send a copy of this order and the notice of collection of filing fee to the appropriate official at the place where plaintiff is an inmate.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pro se complaint must be liberally construed. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). In addition, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless, they must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). A court, however, can dismiss at any time a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A claim is "frivolous" if it "lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); accord Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Accordingly, a court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims that fail "'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .'", see Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555), or that are premised on meritless legal theories or clearly lack any factual basis, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. See, e.g., Denton, 504 U.S. at 27 (considering frivolousness); Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a district court may dismiss an action if an affirmative defense exists).

III. CLAIMS ASSERTED

Currently confined at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility in Fort Dodge, Iowa, plaintiff submitted a complaint to redress issues that are related to the execution of his sentence and his confinement within the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue appears to be proper as the events giving rise to the instant action occurred in this district and the defendants are located in this district.

In the statement of claim portion of the complaint, plaintiff generally asserts that the defendants: discriminated against him and interfered with his relationship with his wife and an ex-girlfriend to whom he tried to write, deprived him of the opportunity to be with his family, retaliated against him, violated policies and procedures, harassed and defamed him and refused to remedy the situation. As relief, plaintiff states that he wants: the disciplinary report dismissed, a transfer to another facility, parole to be granted, the defendants to be terminated and punitive damages in light of the burden that the defendants' actions have placed on his marriage and the cruel and unusual punishment that he experienced.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a "broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). "One cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983' — for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 "merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred."); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) ("Constitution and laws" means 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights created by federal statute, as well as those created by the Constitution.). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Plaintiff's Claims

Given the facts alleged in the complaint, the court concludes that the plaintiff is unable to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is primarily challenging the execution of his state sentence, not the conditions of his confinement, and, therefore, he can only bring this action as a habeas corpus action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (stating that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is barred if the plaintiff's claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement or its duration); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (finding that a writ of habeas corpus is the only federal remedy available if a plaintiff is challenging the validity of his conviction or the duration of his incarceration andseeking a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release); Deloria v. Lightenberg, 400 F. App'x 117, 118 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997) (concluding that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage action in which the inmate did not seek restoration of good time credits to avoid being out of court under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an inmate is unable to seek...