Brun v. Lazzell, 50.
| Decision Date | 09 April 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 50.,50. |
| Citation | 191 A. 240 |
| Parties | BRUN et al. v. LAZZELL. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Joseph N. Ulman, Judge.
Mandamus proceeding by Charles B. Lazzell against B. Lucien Brun and others, constituting the Maryland State Board of Dental Examiners, to compel it to cancel its revocation of the license or certificate of registration of petitioner, which had been revoked by the board. From an order granting the writ of mandamus, the board appeals.
Reversed and petition dismissed.
Argued before BOND, C. J., and URNER, OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL, SHEHAN, and JOHNSON, JJ.
Charles T. LeViness, 3d, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Herbert R. O'Conor, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants. Willis R. Jones, of Baltimore (Joseph O. Buchoff, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
This appeal is from an order granting the writ of mandamus on the petition of Charles B. Lazzell, to compel the respondents, B. Lucien Brun, J. Stevenson Hopkins, Louis Rossman, T. L. McCarriar, Frank P. Haynes, and Arthur P. Dixon, constituting the Maryland state board of dental examiners, to cancel its revocation of the license or certificate of registration, which had been revoked by the board December 26, 1935, effective January 1, 1936.
The petition states that the petitioner (appellee) graduated from the school of dentistry of the University of Maryland in the year 1926; that later in that year he passed the examination conducted by the then board of dental examiners, a certificate of registration was issued to him, and thereafter until January 1, 1936, he was engaged in the practice of his profession in this state; that on December 26, 1935, he received a letter from the board of dental examiners advising him that it had revoked his license; that prior to that letter he had received a letter under date of April 13, 1935, advising him that, at a meeting of the board held April 12, 1935, under the authority of section 8 of the Maryland State Dental Law of 1933, c. 564 (Code, Supp.1935, art. 32, § 8), his license to practice dentistry had been canceled because of his "recent conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude," unless he show cause to the contrary, in writing, to the board on or before April 20, 1935; that following the receipt of this letter of April 13, 1935, he filed an answer in writing "(a) that he had not been convicted of any crime involving "moral turpitude"; (b) that the offense of "indecent exposure" does not involve "moral turpitude"; and (c) that the circumstances under which petitioner pleaded guilty to the offense of "indecent exposure" did not involve "moral turpitude"; that a hearing was had on the charges before the board on December 3, 1935, at which the petitioner appeared in person and by attorney, at which he admitted that he had pleaded guilty to the offense of "indecent exposure," and he was so found; that he related the circumstances concerning the plea and conviction; that his testimony showed that "he had not committed the offense of 'indecent exposure' in any public place and that the circum stances which led to his plea of guilty and conviction were entirely accidental so far as * * * petitioner was concerned, and that no one would have seen or been able to see * * * petitioner exposed except by peeping through windows or open doors into the privacy of the office or home of * * * petitioner"; that his admission as stated was the only evidence at the hearing and that it showed there was "no intent to commit the crime of 'indecent exposure.'"
The petitioner denied the authority of the dental board to revoke his license because he had been licensed to practice dentistry before the passage of the act of 1933, c. 564 (Code Supplement, art. 32), by section 11 of which it was provided that "nothing in this Article, or in any other provision of this Code, shall be so construed as to interfere with the rights and privileges of physicians and surgeons, * * * nor of persons holding certificates duly issued to them by the State Board of Dental Examiners of Maryland prior to the passage of this Act."
The board filed a demurrer and answer to the petition. The order appealed from sustained the petitioner's demurrer to the answer so there is no need to consider any of the grounds of the board's demurrer, except the sufficiency of the charge of "indecent exposure" as involving "moral turpitude," and the application of the act of 1933, c. 564. By way of answer the board either flatly admitted or denied the statements of fact and legal conclusions, and, as they are clearly enough stated in the petition, it is not necessary to repeat them, except to say that the answer concluded by specifically charging that on October 17, 1931, the petitioner was arrested on a charge of indecent exposure to which he pleaded guilty, was convicted and fined $100 and costs at the Northwestern police station; that on February 15, 1935, he was arrested by a patrolman who saw him expose himself to several school girls who were passing the house in which he had his office, and when the case came up for trial petitioner pleaded guilty. He was also indicted for a similar offense committed February 12, 1935, to which he pleaded guilty, and it was upon this information of the three pleas of guilty and conviction, the board of dental examiners made the charges, had the hearing, and revoked the license of the petitioner, which he now seeks to set aside by mandamus.
The petitioner demurred to the answer, his first ground being the usual "bad in substance and insufficient in law," and the second in effect that the act of 1933 granted those licensed prior to that time immunity from any charges of misconduct.
The court sustained the petitioner's demurrer to the respondents' answer, and canceled the revocation of the petitioner's license or certificate of revocation, on the ground that the petitioner having been licensed prior to the passage of the act of 1933, c. 564, § 11, the board was without authority to apply the provisions of that section to the charge of misconduct made against him. In the order the court assigned as the reason for its action the decisions of this court in Smith v. Gaither, 144 Md. 484, 125 A. 58, and Upshur v. Ward, 94 Md. 778, 51 A. 828, but in our opinion neither of them is applicable to the facts of this case. In Smith v. Gaither, supra, certain taxpayers of Baltimore filed a bill to restrain Gaither, the police commissioner, from paying a policeman, Harry Ernest, his salary, thus, in effect to dismiss him from the force, on the ground that in his application for appointment he had withheld certain information, which, if then disclosed, would have disqualified him, and that therefore his appointment was void. Subsequent to his appointment and before the bill was filed, the Legislature passed the act of 1922, c. 507, p. 1449, making some changes in the organization of the police department of Baltimore, by which it was provided that, "nothing herein contained shall be construed to legislate out of office any police officer, detective or officer of police now on the force," and it was there held that the effect of this act was to retain him on the force.
In Upshur v. Ward, 94 Md. 778, 51 A. 828, Ward, a captain of police, had been removed from office on the ground that his appointment had been illegally made. He applied for a writ of mandamus which was granted, and on appeal affirmed. After his appointment the act of 1900, c. 425, was passed, which provided "that nothing herein contained [in chapter 425] shall be construed to legislate out of office any police officer, detective or officer of police now on the force." The decisions in both cases were that the acts mentioned served to remove any disqualifications of policeman and officer of police theretofore existing.
Chapter 564 of the acts of 1933 was a repeal and re-enactment with amendments of article 32 of the Code (1924 Edition), and among its provisions was section 11, which reads as follows: and it is this section which the petitioner contends absolves him from the prosecution of the charges preferred against him by the board of dental examiners. In the opinion of this court, it has no such effect.
This section is a repetition and reenactment of a section of the same number contained in article 32 of the Code of 1924, as enacted by the act of 1920, c. 481, which was in effect when the petitioner was licensed to practice dentistry in this state, and...
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Bane v. State
...contrary to the accepted and customary conduct between men." State v. Duckett, supra; Ricketts v. State, supra; Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240 (1937). Moral turpitude suggests, therefore, "such a disregard for social values on the part of the perpetrator, that one coul......
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Ricketts v. State
...that it connoted conduct which was base or vile and contrary to the accepted and customary conduct between men. Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 320, 191 A. 240 (1937). In Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 185 A.2d 488 (1962) we recognized a broader base for the use of prior convictions......
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Matthews v. State
...be crimes of moral turpitude has yet to be determined. Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. at 707, 436 A.2d 906, citing Dental Examiners v. Lazell, 172 Md. 314, 320, 191 A. 240 (1937). In Lazell, this very question was What is moral turpitude? Lexicographers and courts agree on the definition, but t......
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Oltman v. Board of Physicians
...applications of the term "moral turpitude" are evident when we compare the Court of Appeals's decisions in Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240 (1937), and Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981). We turn to review those In Lazzell, 172 Md. at 321-22, 191 A.......