Brune v. Morse

Decision Date20 March 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72-1122.,72-1122.
Citation475 F.2d 858
PartiesArthur BRUNE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles J. MORSE et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Burton H. Shostak, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff-appellant.

Alan M. Levy, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants-appellees.

Before HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, District Judge.*

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The sole issue on this appeal is the right of Arthur Brune to receive pension benefits from the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund on normal retirement. The trial court, 339 F.Supp. 159, held that Brune was not entitled to receive benefits because he had not been employed in the "Teamster industry" for twenty continuous years. We affirm.

Various Teamster affiliates and employers with whom they had collective bargaining agreements negotiated a pension plan to be effective July 1, 1964.1 Under the plan, an employee is eligible for normal retirement if he meets the following conditions at the time of retirement.

(1) Age 57.

(2) Twenty years of service in the Teamster industry.

(3) Five years of service under a Teamster collective bargaining agreement.

(4) Eighty weeks payment into the pension fund on his behalf.

(5) Is in an employee classification status at the time of retirement.

It is conceded that Brune meets all qualifications except the one requiring twenty years of continuous service in the Teamster industry.

Service in the Teamster industry is defined in the plan as follows:

"(a) Employment within a classification of work and in an industry which was at the time of such employment normally covered by Teamster contracts in the local metropolitan area; and/or
"(b) Employment in the same classification of work in which employed after the Effective Date under a Teamster contract and on which pension contributions have been made on behalf of the employee; and/or
"(c) Employment requiring the usual Teamster skills in traditional Teamster industries at the time of such employment; * * *"

Brune worked for the International Shoe Company, in St. Louis, Missouri, from 1927 until 1960, as a lasting machine operator. That company did not have a collective bargaining agreement with a Teamster Union during that period and did not make contributions to the Central States Pension Fund. Moreover, the Teamsters Union did not have collective bargaining agreements with other shoe manufacturers in the St. Louis area during the period. The Teamsters Union did, however, have collective bargaining agreements with retail shoe repair shops in the area, and such contracts covered persons who operated lasting machines.

Brune worked as a warehouseman at Buescher's Wholesale in St. Louis, Missouri, from 1961 to 1969. That company had a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters and contributed to the Central States Pension Fund on behalf of Brune from 1967 to Brune's retirement in 1969.

When Brune retired, he applied for a pension. He added his years of service with International Shoe to his years of service with Buescher's Wholesale to obtain the necessary twenty years. The trustees denied Brune's application on the grounds that he did not have twenty years of credited service within the Teamster industry. They stated that Brune was entitled to credit for all years worked for Buescher's Wholesale but not for the years worked for International Shoe. They did so on the grounds that during the years he worked for International Shoe, Brune was a production worker in a shoe factory rather than in a retail repair shop, and that there were no Teamster contracts covering production workers in shoe factories in the geographic area during the years in question.

Brune commenced an action in District Court. He again contended that he was entitled to credit for his years of service with International Shoe Company. The court rejected this contention. It stated:

"It is the opinion of the Court that the business of repairing shoes is not the same industry as that of manufacturing shoes although the subject matters of the two businesses are the same — shoes. Manufacturing is producing or making shoes. The logical extension of that process might well include distribution, marketing and ultimate retail sale to the consumer. However, shoe repair is a service performed at the request of and to the benefit of the shoe consumer. It is independent of and outside the process of manufacturing and producing shoes for ultimate sale to the consumer.
"Black\'s Law Dictionary defines `Industry\' as:
"`Any department or branch of art, occupation, or business conducted as a means of livelihood or for profit; especially, one which employs much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 83 Okl. 161, 201 P. 260, 264; Dessen v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington, 190 Wash. 69, 66 P.2d 867, 869.\'
"Identical skills or crafts are utilized in different industries without altering the classification of the skill and without merging the industries into one single industry. The service of repairing shoes is a branch of trade distinct from that of manufacturing shoes.
"Accordingly, the Court finds that at the time of plaintiff\'s employment as a shoe production worker, that industry was not normally covered by teamster contract in the local metropolitan area. The Court concludes that plaintiff\'s years of employment with
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16 cases
  • Alvares v. Erickson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 10, 1975
    ...pension trust where neither the union nor the employer was a party. Brune v. Morse, E.D.Mo., 1972, 339 F.Supp. 159, aff'd, 8 Cir., 1973, 475 F.2d 858 (action challenging pension eligibility rules). We are mindful that the court in Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 1 Cir., 1968, 393 F.2d 421, 4......
  • Bruch v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • September 25, 1987
    ...of his duties. At least one court has done so in explicit reliance on Sec. 187 of the Restatement of Trusts. See Brune v. Morse, 475 F.2d 858, 860 n. 2 (8th Cir.1973). Because the LMRA's precautions assure that the plan administrator will be neutral, it is easy to understand why the courts ......
  • Rehmar v. Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • October 15, 1976
    ...347 F.Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D.Mo.1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1973); Brune v. Morse, 339 F.Supp. 159 (E.D.Mo.1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1973).3 We have discovered, however, two decisions to the contrary. In Bean v. International Organization of Masters, 511 F.2d 975 (2d Cir......
  • Terito v. John S. Swift Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1981
    ...Pension Fund, 10th Cir., 513 F.2d 1173; Giler v. Board of Sheet Metal Workers of So. California, 9th Cir., 509 F.2d 848; Brune v. Morse, 8th Cir., 475 F.2d 858.) Thus, where as here, the fiduciary is granted broad discretion to administer the plan, the Court will intervene only upon a showi......
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