Brunelle v. City of Scranton
| Decision Date | 17 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIV NO. 3:15-CV-960 |
| Parties | ALEXANDER BRUNELLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SCRANTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Mariani)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
The plaintiff in this litigation, Alexander Brunelle, is a real estate contractor and developer who initiated this lawsuit on May 15, 2015, and is now bringing an eleven-count complaint against the City of Scranton, Patrick Hinton, Director of the City of Scranton Department of Licensing and Patricia Jennings-Fowler, a Housing Inspector for the City of Scranton, charging them with a host of illegal and arbitrary actions allegedly taken relative to the plaintiff's business activities and properties in Scranton. (Doc. 28.)
Brunelle's complaint is a detailed, 67 page, 273 paragraph pleading. (Id.) In it, Brunelle provides a lengthy factual recital describing a pattern of allegedly discriminatory conduct by the defendants targeting properties owned by the plaintiff. (Id., ¶¶30-195.) According to Brunelle, the defendants targeted at least eleven properties which he owned, and engaged in a wide array of discriminatory practices. (Id.) Thus, Brunelle alleges that the defendants singled him out for discriminatory non-traffic criminal citations, issuing more than 150 baseless criminal complaints against Brunelle and properties which he owned. (Id., ¶194(e).) Brunelle also alleges that the defendants issued baseless condemnation orders on various properties which he owned, condemning properties even after the properties had been inspected and approved for occupancy. (Id., ¶¶30-195.) Brunelle further avers that Fowler and Hinton issued arbitrary, contradictory and peremptory directives to the plaintiff which stymied efforts to renovate, market and rent these properties. For example, according to Brunelle, with respect to a property owned by the plaintiff on Lavelle Street in Scranton, in April of 2014 defendant Fowler simultaneously served stop work and mandate orders on the property. The stop work order required the plaintiff to cease operations immediately; the mandate order required him to correct deficiencies at the property immediately. By issuing both orders simultaneously, Brunelle asserts that the defendants "put Plaintiff in an absurd situation as Plaintiff was prohibited from working on the property pursuant to the Stop Work Order but simultaneously required to address the alleged trash and sanitation violations immediately." (Id., ¶143.)
The complaint further avers that the defendants have issued demolition orders to arbitrarily frustrate Brunelle's business endeavors. Specifically, Brunelle contends that the defendants issued demolition orders on properties acquired by the plaintiff in December 2014, thus preventing the plaintiff from making any improvements or renovations to the property, but had yet to act upon these demolition orders as of June, 2017. (Id.,¶¶167-77.) Brunelle further asserts that the defendants have arbitrarily denied licenses and permits to the plaintiff's brother, Theodore Brunelle, who served as an independent contractor on many of the plaintiff's renovation projects in order to deter and frustrate those projects. (Id., ¶194(d).)
According to Brunelle, many of these actions have been taken by the defendants without affording Brunelle any notice or opportunity to respond to alleged deficiencies. (Id., ¶¶30-195.) Moreover, Brunelle claims that both Fowler and Hinton have made statements which confirm their discriminatory bias against the plaintiff, including allegedly informing the plaintiff's employees that their actions are designed to send a message to the plaintiff, or deter the plaintiff and his family members from filing lawsuits. (Id., ¶¶190, 194(d).)
Brunelle also specifically alleges that Defendant Fowler has engaged in disparate and discriminatory enforcement targeting his properties, by describing a pattern of disparate code enforcement by Fowler as compared to all other cityinspectors. (Id., ¶¶30-40.) Finally, Brunelle alleges that this pattern of unlawful and discriminatory conduct increased after the plaintiff filed his initial complaint in federal court. (Id., ¶¶194(a)-194(i).) Furthermore, according to Brunelle, a city employee informed one of the plaintiff's employees: "that Patrick Hinton had instructed that no permits were to be issued for work by Theodore Brunelle while his brother's Alexander Brunelle's lawsuit was pending in the Federal Court." (Id., ¶194(d).)
Set against the backdrop of these well-pleaded facts, Brunelle brings eleven separate claims against the defendants. Six of these counts allege federal constitutional infractions. Specifically, Brunelle alleges that the conduct of these officials: (1) denied the plaintiff procedural due process (Id., Count 1 ¶¶195-209); (2) constituted a substantive due process violation, (Id., Count 2, ¶¶210-15); (3) violated Brunelle's right to equal protection under the law, (Id., Count 3, ¶¶216-26); (4) was taken in retaliation against Brunelle for exercising his First Amendment Right to petition the courts for redress of grievances, (Id., Count 4, ¶¶227-231); (5) amounted to an unlawful and unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, (Id., Count 5, ¶¶232-6); (6) entailed unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, (Id., Count 6 ¶¶237-45); and (7) constituted malicious prosecution in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Id., Count 8, ¶¶253-57.) Brunelle further allegesthat the City of Scranton is legally responsible for the actions of its officers and employees because by failing to adequately train and oversee the actions of these employees, the city effectively fostered a custom, policy and practice of illegal discrimination. (Id., Count 7, ¶¶246-52.) Brunelle's complaint then asserts a series of pendant state law tort claims, including state law allegations of malicious prosecution (Id., Count 9, ¶¶258-62); abuse of process, (Id., Count 10, ¶¶263-67); and tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relationships. (Id., Count 11, ¶¶268-73.)
The defendants have now moved to dismiss seven of these claims, (Doc. 30),1 arguing that Brunelle's detailed complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect to Brunelle's equal protection, unlawful taking, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and interference with contractual relations claims. The defendants also contend that the well-pleaded facts set forth in this 273 paragraph complaint are insufficient to establish a colorable claim of municipal federal civil rights liability against the City of Scranton. This motion is fully briefed, (Docs. 34 and 37), and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, with one exception, it is recommended that this motion to dismiss be denied. The one exception to this recommendation relatesto Count V of Brunelle's complaint which brings a claim under the Takings Clause to the Fifth Amendment. While the defendants have moved to dismiss this claim arguing that Brunelle is required as a matter of law to exhaust his state remedies for just compensation prior to bringing a Takings Clause claim in federal court; see Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-96 (1985)), the United States Supreme Court has recently accepted a petition for writ of certiorari which invites the Court to set aside this state court exhaustion and ripeness requirement in Takings Clause cases. See Knick v. Twp., No. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 WL 4701549, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted in part sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 138 S. Ct. 1262, 200 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2018). Given this recent action by the Supreme Court, it is submitted that this Court should stay further action with respect to the motion to dismiss this particular claim pending the Supreme Court's decision in Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 138 S. Ct. 1262, 200 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2018). See Miller v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-1715, 2015 WL 13649106, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2015)(Granting stay pending Supreme Court decision).
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint andall reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the...
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