Brunelle v. Nashua Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.
| Decision Date | 01 March 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 3757.,3757. |
| Parties | BRUNELLE et al. v. NASHUA BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Goodnow, Judge.
Action on the case by Andrew L. Brunelle and Joanna R. Brunelle against the Nashua Building & Loan Association to recover damages for breach of a contract relative to sale of land, and to recover for negligent performance of an undertaking by defendant to look after plaintiff's interest relative to the sale. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court.
Judgment on the verdict.
Case, to recover damages for breach of a contract relative to the sale of land, with an amended count to recover for the negligent performance of an undertaking by the defendant, The Nashua Building & Loan Association, to look after the plaintiffs' interest relative to this sale. Trial by jury, after a view, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiffs. During the trial exceptions were taken to the admission and exclusion of evidence, to the Court's denial of certain requests for instructions, and to the Court's consideration of motions out of order. The defendant also excepted to the Court's denial of its motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict, to the granting of plaintiffs' motion to amend their declaration, to the ruling as to the form of action as amended, to the measure of damages and to the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict.
It appears that a written contract was made between the parties on July 16, 1940, whereby the plaintiffs were to purchase certain land and buildings, including a garage, from the defendant, which was to convey by ‘good and sufficient deed.’ Evidence was introduced without objection that the plaintiffs, who were inexperienced, relied on a separate oral undertaking of the defendant's secretary, concerning whose authority no question is raised, to see to it that they received a good title and that all steps were taken to protect their interest and properly complete the transaction. The property was conveyed by quitclaim deed dated August 31, 1940, subject to encumbrances unknown to the plaintiffs but which were known to the defendant. The record shows a certain portion of the property, including the land where the garage set, was sold for taxes by the City of Nashua for the years 1934-1939 inclusive; that a deed was given to the city of this parcel on October 1, 1941, and that the latter conveyed it to a purchaser on November 1, 1944. The plaintiffs asserted they relied implicitly upon the defendant's secretary and learned nothing of this situation until shorty after November 1, 1944, at which time the period for redemption had expired.
At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the Court indicated that he should grant the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on the original declaration, but permitted the plaintiffs to reopen and amend by adding a count to the effect that reasonably relying upon the secretary's promise to protect their interest and give them good title they had taken no steps to protect themselves, and as a result of his negligent performance of this undertaking they had been damaged.
Further facts appear in the opinion. Transferred by Goodnow, C. J.
Warren, Wilson, Wiggin & Sundeen, of Manchester (Roger E. Sundeen, of Manchester, orally), for plaintiffs.
J. Leonard Killkelley, of Nashua, for defendant.
The procedural objections raised by the defendant present little difficulty. It is too elementary to require citation that such matters under our laws are governed by what justice and convenience require. As no abuse of discretion appears in the Court's consideration of certain motions out of order, the defendant's exceptions relative thereto are overruled. It further appears that the real grounds for the plaintiffs' complaints were known to the defendant as a result of conferences between the parties some two years before the trial. During the trial evidence was introduced elaborating their position. The defendant was not taken by surprise by this evidence, to which it made no objection, nor was it put to any disadvantage afterwards by the allowance of the amendment to the plaintiffs' cause of action, as the record discloses that the basis of the plaintiffs' amended action was not contract but tort for the defendant's negligent conduct of their affairs, testimony concerning which was of course admissible. It seems the Court's discretion in permitting the amendment was properly exercised. Brown v. Brockway, 87 N.H. 342, 179 A. 411; Dondero v. Ferranti, 90 N.H. 554, 3 A.2d 831.
The defendant, however, claims that it should prevail because no action sounding in tort can be maintained to recover damages for a breach of contract. We turn therefore to a review of the authorities to determine whether this contention is well founded on the facts of this case.
The uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiffs was to the effect that they were totally inexperienced in real estate matters and that the defendant's secretary told them that ‘we had nothing to fear’; that ‘he would take care of everything’ and gave them to understand that they would receive a clear title. He further assured them that ‘there was no need of hiring a lawyer, and that he had been doing that (i. e. handling the details of real estate transactions) for years and would treat us right.’ The plaintiffs testified they relied completely upon the defendant's performance of the undertaking and did nothing to protect themselves.
The case was submitted to the jury on a charge to the effect that if they found the defendant undertook to act for the plaintiffs and performed so negligently as to result in damage to them without fault of their own they could recover. The jury returned a verdict in their favor to which the Association excepted.
The defendant's argument overlooks the fact, previously mentioned, that the suit here rests not on the contract but on the broad and sensible principle running throughout our tort...
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...is not entirely clear on this question. In one case predating the adoption of the current Restatement of Torts, Brunelle v. Nashua Building and Loan Association, 95 N.H. 391, 64 A.2d 315 (1949), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the defendant, a seller of real estate, could be held ......
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