Brunhammer v. Markell

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
• Decision Date: 19 November 2015
• Docket Number: Civ. Action No. 15-864-GMS
• Citation: Brunhammer v. Markell, Civ. Action No. 15-864-GMS (D. Del. Nov 19, 2015)
• Parties: PAUL M. BRUNHAMMER, Plaintiff, v. JACK A. MARKELL, et al., Defendants.

PAUL M. BRUNHAMMER, Plaintiff, v. JACK A. MARKELL, et al., Defendants.

Civ. Action No. 15-864-GMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

November 19, 2015

MEMORANDUM

The plaintiff, Paul M. Brunhammer ("Brunhammer"), a New Jersey inmate at the Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center ("ADTC") in Avenel, New Jersey, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ (D.I. 1.) He appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I. 7.) The court proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

I. BACKGROUND

Brunhammer is currently serving a sentence in the State of New Jersey with a maximum sentence release date of January 20, 2016. Brunhammer was arrested in New Jersey on February 8, 2010. His father was arrested the same day, and they were both housed at the Salem County Correctional Facility ("SCCF") in New Jersey. An order to keep them separate resulted in Brunhammer's transfer to the Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF") on February 25, 2010. Brunhammer was sentenced on September 21, 2010, and transferred to the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC") on October 11, 2010.

Brunhammer alleges that unbeknownst to him, on October 11, 2010, the Superior Court for the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County ("Superior Court") issued a warrant for his arrest and an authorization for extradition. (D.I. 6, Pa-14.) On October 27, 2010, the Superior Court issued and mailed a summons to the Camden County Jail for Brunhammer's arraignment scheduled for November 5, 2010. (Id. at Pa-14, Pa-17.) Brunhammer alleges that the mailed summons was returned by CCCF. It was received by the Superior Court with the notation "attempted not known or insufficient address." (Id. at Pa-14.) Brunhammer alleges that he was unable to attend the arraignment because a request for transport was not issued to the NJDOC. Brunhammer alleges that the Superior Court is under the control of Griffin, the Delaware State Court Administrator.

An August 17, 2015 memo to Brunhammer from the ADTC Classification Officer notified him that detainers were lodged against him. (D.I. 6, Pa-35.) On August 19, 2015, he was notified by Social Services at ADTC that he was indicted in the State of Delaware on October 11, 2010 on multiple charges related to an alleged sexual assault. Also on August 19, 2015, Brunhammer received a notice of untried indictment, information or complaint and of right to request disposition. (Id. at Pa-33.) After notification of the indictment, Brunhammer obtained paperwork from the Superior Court that included an authorization for extradition, dated September 28, 2010, for Paul Brunhammer with a NJDOC prisoner identification of NJ SBI # 466601E. (Id. at Pa-22.) Brunhammer states that NJ SBI # 466601E belongs to his father; Brunhammer's number is NJ SBI # 566735E. Brunhammer alleges that, regardless of the incorrect number, the form indicates that the State of Delaware was aware of his location and knew that he was incarcerated within the NJDOC. Brunhammer made inquiry to the SCCF and,on August 28, 2015, was advised by its classification department that when he arrived at SCCF on February 8, 2010, a check was conducted that day "which came up none for detainers." (Id. at 6 at Pa-38.) The classification supervisor indicated that would have been the only time it would have checked for wants and warrants because the classification department does not conduct a "wants and warrant check on people prior to them being transferred to State Prison" and "on return visits to attend court [it does] not check for wants or warrants on State Remands." (Id.)

Brunhammer alleges he has been wanted on a warrant in the State of Delaware since October 11, 2010, but neither the court system nor the Delaware State Police made a diligent effort to locate him. He alleges that the Delaware State Police contacted him in 2011 or 2011 regarding another matter, had an opportunity to inform him of the arrest warrant, but did not. Brunhammer alleges that counsel was not assigned to the case at its inception, investigation is essential when charged with such a crime, and the investigation should not have been allowed to "go cold" for five years without notification to him. In addition, he alleges that once the detainer was filed he is in Delaware's custody and cannot be released from his NJDOC sentence until he is either picked up by the State of Delaware or the State of Delaware drops the detainer against him.

Brunhammer alleges the defendants Delaware Governor Jack A Markell ("Markell"), New Jersey Governor Christopher J. Christie ("Christie"), Delaware State Court Administrator Patricia Walther Griffin ("Griffin"), Delaware State Police Superintendent Colonel Nathaniel McQueen, Jr. ("McQueen"), NJDOC Commissioner Gary M. Lanigan ("Lanigan"), ADTC Administrator Sherry Yates ("Yates"), ADTC Chief Classification Officer Adelle Aroneo ("Aroneo"), and the CCCF violated his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel, aspeedy trial, and due process, all of which will lead to unconstitutional detainment and violation of his right to equal protection.

More particularly, Brunhammer alleges that Markell has a duty to ensure that all laws, statutes, bill, policies, or codes formed and enforced in the State of Delaware conform to the rights provided in the United States Constitution. He also alleges that Markell has a duty to ensure that all persons suspected of a crime in the State of Delaware are brought to justice in a timely fashion that ensures all constitutional protections are preserved as much as possible.

Brunhammer alleges that Christie, Lanigan, Yates, and Aroneo have the duty of ensuring that all laws, statutes, and administrative codes in the State of New Jersey conform to the federal constitution and, in particular, N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:9-3.5 and § 10A:9-3.14 regarding classification of inmates. In addition, he alleges that it is the institutional classification department's responsibility to check for detainers prior to an inmate's change in custody status. Finally, Brunhammer alleges that CCCF has a responsibility to forward any warrants/detainers lodged against an inmate, currently or previously in its custody, who is transferred to a state prison to the appropriate officials at the state classification office.

Brunhammer seeks injunctive relief against the State of Delaware to enjoin it from further prosecution against him, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. He has also filed two motions for injunctive relief (D.I. 3, 9),² a request for counsel (D.I. 4), and a motion for an order for service of the complaint (D.I. 5).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Brunhammer proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court must grant Brunhammer leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court must take three steps: "(1) identify[] the elements of the claim, (2) review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) look| ] at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluat[e] whether all of the elements identified in...