Brunn v. Weiss, Docket No. 7435

• Decision Date: 20 April 1971
• Docket Number: Docket No. 7435,No. 1,1
• Parties: David BRUNN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank WEISS et al., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 904

188 N.W.2d 904

32 Mich.App. 428

David BRUNN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank WEISS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 7435.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

April 20, 1971.

Released for Publication Aug. 17, 1971.

Bernard J. Fieger, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John E. MacDonald, Wayne, for defendants-appellees.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and HOLBROOK and BRONSON, JJ.

DANHOF, Judge.

This is a libel action brought by plaintiff teachers against defendant school board members. The school board publishes a newsletter dealing with school affairs and the plaintiffs contend that they were libeled in this publication. The defendants moved for a summary judgment on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) and the trial court granted the motion, stating only 'That the Court is of the opinion that based upon the pleadings as filed herein, no cause of action is stated.'

For the reasons herein stated we reverse. In a motion for summary judgment it is axiomatic that all well-pleaded material allegations contained in the complaint are to be taken as true. Applying this to the instant case we must reverse because on the basis of the record before us there exist possible issues of fact. We note that on a more complete record, summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3) might well be appropriate.

The defendants argue that viewed in the setting in which they were made the remarks were not libelous. The difficulty with this argument is that the record before us does not show what the setting was. In this regard we note that the newsletter in which the statements were made has not been made a part of the record.

The defendants also argue that the remarks applied to a group in general, and therefore, the plaintiffs have not been individually libeled. Chapman v. Romney (1967), 6 Mich.App. 36, 148 N.W.2d 230. The plaintiffs contend that they were individually defamed. Again, we are confronted by the problem that we do not have an adequate record. This question might well be resolved by the production of the newsletter or by affidavit, but on the record before us there is a question of fact.

The defendants' final contention is that the summary judgment should be affirmed because they have an absolute privilege. ¹ We disagree. Under some circumstances a local government official may be held to have an absolute privilege. However, a review of the authorities convinces us that there is no absolute privilege in this case.

In Wachsmuth v. Merchants' National Bank (1893), 96 Mich. 426, 56 N.W. 9, it was stated that a resolution offered in the line of duty by a city council member was absolutely privileged. In Trebilcock v. Anderson (1898), 117 Mich. 39, 75 N.W. 129, a mayor's veto message was held absolutely privileged. In Madill v. Currie (1912), 168 Mich. 546, 134 N.W. 1004 the defendant was a chairman of a committee appointed by the board of supervisors to audit the accounts of the county treasurer. The defendant released the results of the audit and the court held that he had a qualified privilege stating that if the result had been released as the official report of the committee there would have been an absolute privilege. In Bolton v. Walker (1917), 197 Mich. 699, 164...