Brunner v. Beltmann Grp.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-03396 |
| Parties | ROBERT and KAREN BRUNNER, Plaintiffs, v. BELTMANN GROUP INCORPORATED, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Steven C. Seeger
This case is about an interstate move gone wrong, and the question is whether it belongs in federal court. The dispute starts where the story ends: many of Plaintiffs' household goods were lost or destroyed during their move from the Midwest to New England.
In 2012, Robert and Karen Brunner (the two Plaintiffs) moved out of Illinois. Defendant Beltmann Group packed their household items, shipped them to its storage facility in Illinois, and stored them for six years. In the meantime, the Brunners lived in New York City, and eventually moved to Vermont in 2018. North American Van Lines, a non-party, then shipped their possessions from Beltmann's storage facility in Illinois to the Brunners' new home in Vermont. Unfortunately, some of their belongings arrived damaged, and some did not arrive at all.
The Brunners filed a common law breach of contract claim against Beltmann in Illinois state court for the loss of their household goods. See Complaint ("Cplt.") at 22-23 (Dckt. No. 1-1). Beltmann removed the case to federal court on the grounds that the claim was preempted by the Carmack Amendment, a federal statute that provides an exclusive federal remedy for damage to goods in interstate shipments.
Plaintiffs now move to remand. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to remand is denied.
Robert and Karen Brunner left Illinois and moved to the East Coast in 2012. Before leaving the state, the Brunners arranged for North American Van Lines and its servicing agent, Beltmann Group, to move their belongings across the country. In 2012, Beltmann gave the Brunners an estimate for the packing, storage, and delivery of their goods. See Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. to Remand ("Def.'s Response") at 3 (Dckt. No. 15). The estimate recognized that the Brunners were moving from Illinois to "Bethlehem, PA." See Exhibits to Def.'s Response, Ex. A at 2 (Dckt. No. 15-2). So, from the very first interaction, Beltmann contemplated an interstate move.
The parties ultimately entered into a contract, known as the bill of lading. See id., Ex. B at 5. The contract contemplated that Beltmann would handle the first part of the cross-country journey. The bill of lading required Beltmann to pack the Brunners' household goods at their Illinois home, ship them to its facility in a nearby Chicagoland suburb, and store them pending further instructions. Id. Like the estimate, the bill of lading contemplated an eventual shipment from the Illinois storage facility to a to-be-determined address in "Bethlehem, PA." Id.
Once the Brunners finalized their new address, North American Van Lines would ship the goods from Beltmann's Illinois storage facility to the Brunners' Pennsylvania home. See id., Ex. A at 2 (Dckt. No. 15-2); Def.'s Aff. of Michael Harvey ("Harvey Aff.") at 3-4 (Dckt. No. 15-1). The specific address was up in the air, but the interstate character of the shipment was not. Everyone understood that the goods - like the Brunners - were leaving Illinois.
As planned, Beltmann packed the goods at the Brunners' house in Illinois, transported them to its storage facility in Illinois, and provided "storage-in-transit," awaiting the specific Pennsylvania address from the Brunners. See Harvey Aff. at ¶¶ 15-16 (Dckt. No. 15-1). Storage "in transit" means that "the shipper and Beltmann intend for the storage to be temporary before delivery to a final destination." Id. at ¶ 14. "In transit" took longer than one might expect: the Brunners' possessions sat in storage until 2018, six long years. See Def.'s Response at ¶¶ 18-20 (Dckt. No. 15). But the household belongings remained in transit nonetheless - no one viewed the storage facility as the final destination.
The Brunners apparently had a change of heart about moving to Pennsylvania. Instead, the Brunners moved to New York City, and they did not seek delivery of their items during their time in New York. See Pls.' Mot. to Remand at ¶ 2 (Dckt. No. 12). The Brunners do not say why. Maybe there wasn't enough space in New York.
In 2018, the Brunners moved to Vermont and asked Beltmann for an estimate to ship their possessions to their new home in the Green Mountain State. See Harvey Aff. at ¶ 17 (Dckt. No. 15-1). That 2018 estimate - which bears both Beltmann and North American Moving Company logos in the letterhead - contemplates the Vermont destination. See Exhibits to Def.'s Response, Ex. C at 8 (Dckt. No. 15-2). The estimate states that Beltmann would be the originating agent for the Vermont move, and that Hanover Transfer & Storage would be the Destination Agent. Id.
The 2018 estimate is the last piece of paper in the record about the final leg of the journey (before the move took place, that is). There was no new bill of lading. Instead, the original bill of lading from 2012 apparently governed the move in 2018, even though the move took place years later.
In March 2018, North American Van Lines picked up the items and shipped them to the Brunners' new home in Vermont. See Pls.' Mot. to Remand at ¶¶ 12-13 (Dckt No. 12). Their belongings did not arrive all in one piece. Some of their possessions suffered "damage[]" along the way. See Cplt. at ¶ 6 (Dckt. No. 1-1). Some of their belongings never made it at all. Id.
The carrier, North American Van Lines, "took responsibility for the damage to the Brunners' personal property in transit from Western Springs, Illinois to West Dover, Vermont," and paid the Brunners for the damage to those goods. Pls. Mot. to Remand at ¶¶ 6-7 (Dckt. No. 12). North American Van Lines reviewed its shipping records, including a detailed listing of the items it picked up from the Beltmann storage site, and agreed to pay for the damage to items that it received from Beltmann in good condition. See Pls.' Mot. to Remand, Ex. A at 45 (Dckt. No. 12). Ultimately, North American Van Lines paid the Brunners $4,225 for damage that occurred on its watch. Id. North American Van Lines recommended that the Brunners reach out to Beltmann for the rest of the loss. Id.
The Brunners later sued Beltmann for $34,700, the alleged balance of the damages, plus fees and costs. See Cplt. at 1-2 (Dckt. No. 1-1). They filed a complaint against Beltmann in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging breach of contract for lost and damaged household goods. On May 20, 2019, Defendant removed the case to federal court on the grounds that the Carmack Amendment preempts Plaintiffs' common law breach of contract claim. See Notice of Removal at 2 (Dckt. No. 1). Plaintiffs filed a petition for remand, arguing that the Carmack Amendment does not apply. See generally Pls.' Mot. for Remand (Dckt. No. 12).
At first glance, the complaint may not seem to belong in federal court. Diversity jurisdiction does not apply. The parties are diverse, but the amount in controversy (less than $35,000) is far below the statutory minimum of $75,000+. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Federal question jurisdiction does not leap from the pages of the complaint, either. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule . . . a suit 'arises under' federal law 'only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law].'" Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). Federal defenses and federal counterclaims don't count. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60; Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002). Here, the Brunners did not purport to bring a federal cause of action. Instead, they filed a breach of contract claim against Beltmann under state law. See generally Cplt. at 1-2 (Dckt. No. 1-1).
If the analysis ended there, so would this case (in federal court, anyway). But federal question jurisdiction can arise from complete preemption. A complaint "purporting to rest on state law, we have recognized, can be recharacterized as one 'arising under' federal law if the law governing the complaint is exclusively federal." Vaden, 556 U.S. at 61. That is, a complaint that advances only a state law claim may belong in federal court if federal law completely occupies the field. Id.; see also City of Chicago v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 384 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2004) (); Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 919-20 (7th Cir. 2000) ().
Under the complete preemption doctrine, "[w]hen a plaintiff has asserted a cause of action under state law that has been judicially declared to be completely preempted by federal law, that claim - no matter how it may have been set out in the complaint or characterized by the plaintiff - is necessarily federal, and will be recharacterized as federal, thereby permitting removal." 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3722.1 (4th ed. 2019). In those cases, "federal law does not merely preempt a state law to some degree; rather, it substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action, thereby manifesting Congress's intent to permit removal." Id. at § 3722.2.
If there is complete preemption of a state law claim, the Court will "recharacterize the plaintiff's cause of action as a federal claim for relief, making removal proper on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction." Id. So, even when a complaint alleges only state law claims, if Congress has occupied...
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