Bruno v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Bridgeport
Decision Date | 28 February 1984 |
Citation | 192 Conn. 335,472 A.2d 328 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Kenneth C. BRUNO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al. |
Thomas K. Jackson, Deputy City Atty., for appellee (named defendant).
Gregory P. Lynch, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).
Andrew D. Cretella, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant Leonard L. crone).
Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA, GRILLO and DALY, JJ.
This case is a sequel to that of Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 184 Conn. 246, 440 A.2d 155 (1981) (hereinafter Bruno I ), wherein the plaintiff requested injunctive relief from the civil service commission's (hereinafter commission) refusal to appoint him to the position of recreation superintendent of the city of Bridgeport. The undisputed facts forming the basis for the former appeal are as follows:
In 1969, the plaintiff Kenneth C. Bruno, while a resident of Bridgeport, was appointed to the position of recreation supervisor for the city of Bridgeport. In 1972, he moved to the town of Stratford where he resided until 1980 when he returned to Bridgeport. In September of 1976, the commission announced that it intended to conduct an open, competitive examination for the position of recreation superintendent within the civil service system. The notice of application for this position specifically required "[b]ona fide residence in the City of Bridgeport for not less than one year immediately preceding the date of examination." Pursuant to the notice, the plaintiff made his application for the position and examination although he did not meet the residency requirement. The defendant Leonard L. Crone, who met the rule II(3) 1 durational residency requirement as provided in the notice, also applied for the position and examination.
By letter dated October 18, 1976, the commission notified the plaintiff that his application to take the recreation superintendent examination was disapproved for failure to meet the requirement as to bona fide residence in the city of Bridgeport. The plaintiff appealed this denial to the commission and was subsequently notified that he would be permitted to take the examination "without prejudice to the merits of the residency question" and that his taking of the examination was in "no way a waiver" of the residency requirement.
The examination for the position of recreation superintendent consisted of individual oral interviews at various times and an evaluation of the applicant's training and experience. On December 17, 1976, the civil service commission notified the plaintiff that he had achieved the highest score among all persons examined. When Crone was informed that he had scored second highest on the examination, he appealed to the commission challenging his placement as number two on the employment list.
On April 4, 1977, the commission, acting in accordance with instructions from the city attorney of Bridgeport, voted not to appoint the plaintiff to the position of recreation superintendent. Thereafter, on October 6, 1977, the plaintiff filed an action against the commission seeking an injunction restraining the commission from refusing to appoint him to the position of recreation superintendent. After Crone was granted leave to be made a party defendant, he filed an answer, cross complaint and counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to the position of recreation superintendent. The issue was joined on Crone's counterclaim by the filing of an answer by the commission and the filing of an answer and affirmative defense by the plaintiff Bruno. By April 3, 1979, the plaintiff had withdrawn his complaint against the commission for injunctive relief, and the trial was conducted on Crone's counterclaim. The trial court ordered that Crone be placed first on the list. The court held that the plaintiff, because of rule II(3), was not qualified to take the examination and that he was foreclosed from attacking the constitutionality of the rule. This court subsequently reversed that judgment, ruling that the trial court erred when it concluded that, on the basis of Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 428, 115 A.2d 328 (1955), the plaintiff could not challenge the rule. We opined that the record was not adequate for this court to determine the durational residency rule's constitutionality and that a determination as to its constitutionality must await the development, at the trial level, of a sufficiently complete record: "[T]he present record is deficient because it contains no evidence or factual determinations concerning the governmental interests advanced by the rule, the degree to which the means employed by the rule are tailored to achieve its legislative objectives, or the extent to which various rights of the plaintiff (footnote omitted) are affected by the rule." Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 184 Conn. 251, 440 A.2d 155. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 2
On remand, the plaintiff, over strong objections by Crone, filed a substitute complaint naming both the commission and Crone as defendants. At the hearing before the state referee, the following governmental interests were advanced by the commission as compelling reasons in favor of the durational residency requirement:
In regard to the above-cited contentions of the commission, the court found the following facts:
It was on the basis of these findings of facts that the trial court concluded that the classification created by rule II(3) touched upon a fundamental right of the plaintiff to travel either within or outside the state. Therefore, the court, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), reasoned that rule II(3) would be unconstitutional unless the state could demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to justify the law. After examining the reasons advanced by the commission, the court concluded that "they [the commission] cannot satisfy the heavy burden placed on the City to show a compelling state interest or a rational basis for the rule." Judgment was thus rendered in...
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