Bruno v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 December 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 300,300 |
| Citation | 308 U.S. 287,60 S.Ct. 198,84 L.Ed. 257 |
| Parties | BRUNO v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Samuel B. Wasserman and M. Michael Edelstein, both of New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. O. John Rogge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 288-290 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In affirming the conviction of Jerry Bruno, who, with eighty-seven others, was convicted of a conspiracy to violate the narcotic laws, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with an important question in the administration of federal criminal justice in such a way as to lead us to grant certiorari, 308 U.S. 536, 60 S.Ct. 112, 84 L.Ed. —-.
Some of Bruno's co-defendants took the witness-stand. He did not. The trial court gave the following instructions to the jury regarding the attitude to be observed by them towards the accused as a witness: 'It is the privilege of a defendant to testify as a witness if, and only when, he so elects; and when he does testify his credibility is to be determined in the light of his interest, which usually is greater than that of any other witness, and is therefore a matter which may seriously affect the credence that shall be given to his testimony.'
Bruno requested this additional instruction: 'The failure of any defendant to take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf, does not create any presumption against him; the jury is charged that it must not permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against any such defendant, nor should this fact enter into the discussions or deliberations of the jury in any manner.'
The trial judge declined this request, saying 'I feel that I've already covered that.' The exception to this denial having been saved, the Circuit Court of Appeals found no error in the refusal, although confessing that the guidance which had been given the jury 'was not the equivalent of what the defendant had requested', United States v. Bruno, 2 Cir., 105 F.2d 921, 923. By this, we take it, the court below meant that the topic on which Bruno proffered an instruction had not been charged at all.
Therefore, the narrow question before us is whether in these circumstances Bruno had the indefeasible right to have the jury told in substance what he asked the judge to tell it. The issue is determined by a proper application of the Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, now 28 U.S.C.A. § 632, 28 U.S.C.A. § 632.1
That Act freed the accused in a federal prosecution from his common law disability as a witness. But Congress coupled his privilege to be a witness with the right to have a failure to exercise the privilege not tell against him. The accused could Such was the command of the law-makers. The only way Congress could provide that abstention from testifying should not tell against an accused was by an implied direction to judges to exercise their traditional duty in guiding the jury by indicating the considerations relevant to the latter's verdict on the facts. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 715, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343. By legislating against the creation of any 'presumption' from a failure to testify, Congress could not have meant to legislate against the psychological operation of the jury's mind. It laid down canons of judicial administration for the trial judge to the extent that his instructions to the jury, certainly when appropriately invoked, might affect the behavior of jurors. Concededly the charge requested by Bruno was correct. The Act of March 16, 1878, gave him the right to invoke it.
A subsidiary question remains for determination. It derives from the Act of February 26, 1919, 40 Stat. 1181, 28 U.S.C. § 391, 28 U.S.C.A. §...
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