MOLL, J.
The plaintiff, Lisa Bruno, appeals, and the defendant Heritage Homes Construction Company, LLC, cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court denying their respective motions for attorney's fees.1
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred by failing to award her (1) attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb and/or (2) attorney's fees and other litigation-related costs pursuant to a fee-shifting provision of a construction contract executed by the parties. On cross appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motion for attorney's fees because the defendant, not the plaintiff, is the prevailing party in this matter. We conclude that the court did not err in denying both motions for attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as previously set forth by this court or by the trial court, and complex procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. "[T]he present case ‘arises from dealings between the parties concerning the construction by [the defendant] of a new home in Ridgefield for [the plaintiff] and her former husband ....’ In her operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that ... the defendant breached the construction contract by failing to provide her with (1) invoices on a biweekly basis and (2) written change orders regarding modification to the contract.
"A trial was held in 2013. Following the close of evidence and at the request of the defendant, the court provided the jury with an instruction on the special defense of waiver. The court further instructed the jury to ‘separately answer jury interrogatories asking whether it "[found] in favor of [the plaintiff] on her claim of breach of contract against [the defendant]" and, if so, whether "[the plaintiff] waived the breach of contract by the defendant ...." ’ The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on the breach of contract claim. In so doing, the jury ‘expressly’ based that verdict ‘on its answers to jury interrogatories that (1) [the defendant] had breached its contract with the plaintiff, but (2) the plaintiff had waived that breach.’ ... The trial court denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion to set aside the verdict. ...
"On appeal [in Bruno v. Whipple , 162 Conn. App. 186, 130 A.3d 899 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 138 A.3d 280 (2016) ], this court concluded that the trial court improperly denied the motion to set aside the verdict in favor of the defendant on the breach of contract count. As the court stated, the trial court ‘abused its discretion by permitting [the defendant] to raise the special defense of waiver for the first time after the close of evidence at trial, as it had not been specially pleaded, the pleadings did not allege any facts supporting an inference of waiver, and the claim that the plaintiff knowingly relinquished her contractual rights was not fully litigated at trial without objection by the plaintiff. Accordingly ... the court should have set aside the jury's verdict as to waiver.’ ...
"In light of that conclusion, this court explained that it ‘must now address the scope of the remand of this case to the trial court. Specifically, [it] must determine whether the case should be remanded for a hearing in damages on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim or whether the jury's verdict on her breach of contract claim also must be set aside and remanded for a retrial on that issue.’ ... The court noted that, ‘[i]n finding in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim, the jury essentially has determined liability in her favor against [the defendant] and the remaining determination is damages resulting from that breach.’ ... Accordingly, this court concluded that ‘because the improper verdict on the special defense of waiver is wholly separable from the verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim ... limiting the remand to a hearing in damages on the breach of contract verdict does not work injustice in this case.’ ... The court thus ordered the case to be ‘remanded for a hearing in damages on the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim.’ " (Citations omitted.) Bruno v. Whipple , 186 Conn. App. 299, 302–304, 199 A.3d 604 (2018), cert. denied, 331 Conn. 911, 203 A.3d 1245 (2019).
On remand, after holding a hearing in damages on January 26, 2017, the court, Truglia , J. , issued its memorandum of decision on February 21, 2017. Concluding that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to compensatory damages on her breach of contract claim, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. The court further explained that, in addition to compensatory damages, "[t]he plaintiff ... claim[ed] attorney's fees and cost[s] incurred in prosecuting this action," as well as statutory fees in accordance with General Statutes §§ 52-245, 52-257, and 52-258 as the prevailing party. The court noted that, although the plaintiff offered her own testimony regarding amounts paid to attorneys and expert witnesses over the course of the litigation,2 she failed to "introduce into evidence at the hearing in damages affidavits of fees from any of the attorneys or experts (including time records) that she consulted in connection with this case." Ultimately, the court disposed of the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees and costs in a footnote, stating that, "[i]nsofar as the plaintiff is not the prevailing party in this action, the court makes no award for attorney's fees and costs." The plaintiff then appealed to this court.
On appeal in Bruno v. Whipple , supra, 186 Conn. App. 299, 199 A.3d 604, this court explained: "The plaintiff ... contends that the court committed reversible error by exceeding the scope of the remand order when it directed judgment to enter in favor of the defendant and against [the] plaintiff on the breach of contract count of the complaint. We agree that the court's directive was improper in light of the prior jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on that count. Guided by the precedent of our Supreme Court, we nonetheless conclude that the court's directive does not constitute reversible error under the facts of this case. ...
"In the present case, the jury completed interrogatories indicating that it found that the defendant had breached its contract with the plaintiff. ... Yet those completed interrogatories also demonstrate that the jury never determined the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of that breach. Rather, after finding that the plaintiff had waived her breach of contract claim, the jury proceeded to enter a verdict in favor of the defendant. In light of that procedural history, this court explained that, [i]n finding in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim, the jury essentially has determined liability in her favor against [the defendant] and the remaining determination is damages resulting from that breach .... Put simply, the plaintiff's damages in this case never were determined by the jury.
"Because the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of contract count was wholly separable from the jury's improper verdict on the special defense of waiver, the court concluded that limiting the remand to a hearing in damages on the breach of contract verdict does not work injustice in this case. ... The court thus remanded the case for a hearing in damages on the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 312–14, 199 A.3d 604.
This court went on to state: "Following a hearing at which the plaintiff was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence relevant to the issues at hand, the [trial] court ... found that she had not met her burden in demonstrating that the defendant's conduct, in failing to furnish invoices on a biweekly basis and written change orders, caused the diminution of her marital estate as alleged in the operative complaint. ... The court, therefore, properly declined to award the actual damages claimed by the plaintiff.
"It nevertheless remains that the jury found that the defendant had breached its contract with the plaintiff ... thereby establishing the liability of the defendant. ... When a plaintiff can demonstrate a technical breach of contract, but no pecuniary damages resulting therefrom, the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages ... under its breach of contract claim. ... Because the defendant's liability was established by the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of contract count, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of nominal damages despite her failure to establish actual damages at the hearing in damages. ... The trial court, therefore, erroneously directed judgment to enter in favor of the defendant in this case ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 316–17, 199 A.3d 604. This court nonetheless concluded that the failure of the trial court to award nominal damages and to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract count did not constitute reversible error and, accordingly, affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant. Id., at 319, 199 A.3d 604. On March 27, 2019, our Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of this court; Bruno v. Whipple , 331 Conn....
