Brunson v. Wall

• Decision Date: 24 July 1989
• Citation: 405 Mass. 446,541 N.E.2d 338
• Parties: , 65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 99, 54 Ed. Law Rep. 1320 Ethel BRUNSON v. Richard WALL et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 338

541 N.E.2d 338

405 Mass. 446, 65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 99,

54 Ed. Law Rep. 1320

Ethel BRUNSON v.Richard WALL et al.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Hampshire.

Argued May 4, 1989.

Decided July 24, 1989.

Winston Kendall, for plaintiff.

William L. Pardee, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from the entry of summary judgment on her complaint which alleged, inter alia, violations of G.L. c 151B, § 4 (1986 ed.)²(employment discrimination), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983 (1982)(racial discrimination action for deprivation of rights), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1982)(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)(employment discrimination).Prior to instituting the present action, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination(MCAD), alleging that her employer, the Belchertown State School(school), committed a prohibited practice, as defined in G.L. c. 151B, § 4, in that it discriminated against her in the terms and conditions of her employment based on her race and color.A hearing commissioner of the MCAD conducted a full adjudicatory hearing, issued findings and rulings, and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiff was not the victim of racial discrimination.The plaintiff did not seek judicial review of the MCAD's decision.Instead, the plaintiff filed the present action in the Superior Court seeking to litigate her allegations of discrimination de novo.In granting the defendants' motion which sought either summary judgment or dismissal, the judge concluded that relitigation of all the plaintiff's claims, except her Title VII claim, were precluded by the MCAD decision.The judge also dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII claim, concluding that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since such a claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts.³We transferred the matter here on our own motion and affirm the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants.

1.Standard for summary judgment.Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 824(1974), provides that a judge shall grant a party's motion for summary judgment if (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c).SeeAttorney General v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 370-371, 436 N.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 301, 74 L.Ed.2d 282(1982);Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554, 340 N.E.2d 877(1976).The material facts pertinent to determining the correctness of the entry of summary judgment are not disputed.The plaintiff acknowledges that the MCAD rendered a final decision on her complaint charging racial discrimination, and that she chose not to appeal that decision under G.L. c. 151B, § 6, as amended bySt.1987, c. 465, § 38.⁴Thus, the issue before us is whether the judge correctly concluded that the MCAD decision precluded the plaintiff from relitigating her claims de novo in the Superior Court.

2.Issue preclusion.The plaintiff contends that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment ⁵ because Federal law does not give preclusive effect to unreviewed State administrative agency decisions.The plaintiff also argues that G.L. c. 151B (1986 ed.) grants alternative remedies to parties aggrieved by an MCAD decision: judicial review under § 6 and a de novo trial under § 9.We reject each of the plaintiff's arguments.

In University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 790, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3221, 92 L.Ed.2d 635(1986), the Supreme Court had to decide whether an unreviewed State administrative decision was entitled to preclusive effect in Federal court where a party filed discrimination claims under both the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes and Title VII.There, the Court held that "the language and legislative history of Title VII" indicate that "Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims."Id. at 796, 106 S.Ct. at 3225.However, with respect to the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes, the Court held that, "when a State agency'acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,' ... federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts"(citation omitted).Id. at 799, 106 S.Ct. at 3226.Thus, the plaintiff's claims under §§ 1981and1983 are precluded by the MCAD decision if that decision would be accorded preclusive effect under the law of the Commonwealth.⁶

We have held that the "judicial doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, provides that '[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, ... the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.' "Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61, 514 N.E.2d 663(1987), quotingFireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 395 Mass. 366, 372, 479 N.E.2d 1386(1982).Ordinarily to preclude relitigation of an issue there must exist "identity of cause of action and issues, the same parties, and judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction."⁷Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 226, 229, 418 N.E.2d 602(1981), quotingFranklin v. North Weymouth Coop. Bank, 283 Mass. 275, 280, 186 N.E. 641(1933).SeeMartin v. Ring, supra401 Mass. at 61, 514 N.E.2d 663.Cf.Harker v. Holyoke, 390 Mass. 555, 560-561, 457 N.E.2d 1115(1983).However, "[i]n certain circumstances, mutuality of parties is not required."Martin v. Ring, supra, 401 Mass. at 61, 514 N.E.2d 663.Applying these requirements, the motion judge correctly concluded that the MCAD decision should be given preclusive effect.

First, the MCAD qualifies as a "court of competent jurisdiction" because it is "a tribunal recognized by law as possessing the right to adjudicate the controversy."Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra383 Mass. at 230, 418 N.E.2d 602.SeeMartin v. Ring, supra401 Mass. at 61, 514 N.E.2d 663.General Laws c. 151B, § 3(6) and (7), clearly indicate that the Legislature gave the MCAD the authority to adjudicate discrimination claims.⁸SeeEast Chop Tennis Club. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 446-447, 305 N.E.2d 507(1973).

Second, the findings set forth in the MCAD decision describe, in detail, the substance of the plaintiff's claim that she was the victim of racial discrimination.These findings demonstrate that the MCAD decided the underlying allegations of racial discrimination raised by the plaintiff's complaint in this action.⁹The decision indicates that the actions of both the plaintiff's supervisors and those she supervised, as well as the plaintiff herself during the relevant time period, were considered by the hearing officer.Thus, there was no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the defendants established the necessary element of identity of issues.Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra383 Mass. at 229, 418 N.E.2d 602.

Lastly, although the complaint before the MCAD was directed only at the plaintiff's employer, the Belchertown State School, the individual defendants named in this action nevertheless are entitled to raise as a defense the MCAD decision."The standard generally applied to determine whether to preclude a party from relitigating an issue with a person not a party in the earlier action is whether the party'lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.' "Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 541, 476 N.E.2d 595(1985), quotingRestatement (Second) of Judgments§ 29(1982).SeeMartin v. Ring, supra401 Mass. at 61, 514 N.E.2d 663, and cases cited.While the individual defendants were not named parties in the MCAD proceeding, their conduct was at issue.The MCAD's decision indicates that the commission concluded that the actions of the individual defendants were not based on the plaintiff's race or color.In these circumstances, the motion judge did not err in concluding that the plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the issue against the individual defendants.

The fact that the plaintiff chose not to seek judicial review of the MCAD decision pursuant to § 6 does not change our view.General Laws c. 151B does not give parties aggrieved by an MCAD decision an election between judicial review pursuant to § 6 and a de novo hearing pursuant to § 9.On the contrary, the statutory scheme indicates that "[t]here are two largely independent avenues for redress of violations of the anti-discrimination laws of the Commonwealth, one through the MCAD (G.L. c. 151B, §§ 5-6), and the other in the courts(G.L. c. 151B, § 9)."Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass. 815, 817, 525 N.E.2d 643(1988).SeeCarter v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 684 F.2d 187, 190-191(1st Cir.1982).

General Laws c. 151B, § 9, provides that a party may file an action in court ninety days after the filing of a complaint with the MCAD, ¹⁰ and that, if a party chooses to do so, the complaint before the MCAD will be dismissed "and the [party] shall be barred from subsequently bringing a complaint on the same matter before the Commission."SeeChristo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., supra.Section 6 vests the Superior Court with power to review and enforce an MCAD decision issued pursuant to § 5.By providing for judicial review of MCAD decisions, and by foreclosing agency action once a party has sought a judicial remedy pursuant to § 9, the Legislature signaled its intent that the...