Brunswick and Balke Co. v. Hoover

• Decision Date: 08 November 1880
• Citation: 95 Pa. 508
• Parties: The Brunswick and Balke Company <I>versus</I> Hoover et al.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 508

95 Pa. 508

The Brunswick and Balke Company versus Hoover et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 21, 1880.

November 8, 1880.

October 21st 1880.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Venango county: Of October and November Term 1880, No. 180.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Wm. McNair, for plaintiffs in error.—The paper of January 28th 1878, provides that the title to the property shall remain with the plaintiffs until the notes and lease are executed by Russell, and under no circumstances shall any claim be made as owner until the settlement is completed, the settlement to be made at the express office, Oil City. The settlement was made at Oil City, the terms of the lease fixed and executed by Russell, and it was the final act of the parties, and the other then became functus officio. The word "lease" in the original paper had, unquestionably, a well-understood meaning in the trade, and shows that a bailment for use was contemplated, and that no title was to pass, and that the lease and terms were to be fixed before delivery of possession to Russell. No title to the property of any kind passed, and if lost in transitu it would have been plaintiff's loss. It is not a sale either absolute or conditional.

The agreements in the following cases were held to be bailments: Henry v. Patterson, 7 P. F. Smith 351; Enlow v. Klein, 29 Id. 488; Becker v. Smith, 9 Id. 470; and we cannot comprehend why a different construction should be put upon the agreements in this case. There is no analogy between this case and Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214, which was a conditional sale simply and purely, and our case does not come within the definition of a conditional sale as given in Rose v. Story, 1 Barr 190; but said case supports the plaintiffs' theory.

Dodd & Lee, for defendants in error.—The whole question is one of intention to be deduced from written contracts. The parties stated their intention too clearly for mistake when they contracted for a sale of the goods with a lease as security, and carried that contract into execution. The case comes clearly within the principle laid down by ROGERS, J., in Rose v. Story, 1 Barr 190, and affirmed in Euwer v. Van Giesen, 6 W. N. C. 363. If the vendor and vendee agree that the possession shall pass to the vendee, but the property remain in the vendor until the purchase-money is paid, such agreement, as respects creditors and the sheriff, is fraudulent. The lease, standing by itself, does not constitute a bailment. It differs from the lease in the case of Rowe v. Sharp, in that no provision is made for the return of the property at the end of the term. The obligation to return the property is an essential quality to the bailment. "A delivery of chattels upon a sale made on condition that the title shall pass on the payment of the purchase-money at a future day, is something more than a bailment; it gives the buyer a conditional title:" Krause v. Commonwealth, 12 Norris 418.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, November 8th 1880.

In the recent case of Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 11 Norris 53, we endeavored to point out with some care the distinction between a conditional sale and a bailment, and the line of cases commencing with Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, and ending with Enlow v. Klein, 29 P. F. Smith 488, was considered and commented upon. We need not repeat what was there said.

...