Brush Electric Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1894
• Citation: 64 F. 775
• Parties: BRUSH ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. ELECTRIC STORAGE BATTERY CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

64 F. 775

BRUSH ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. ELECTRIC STORAGE BATTERY CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, D. New Jersey.

August 27, 1894

Witter & Kenyon, for complainants.

John R Bennett, for defendants.

GREEN District Judge.

Two reasons conjointly compel a denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction made by the complainants. The validity of the letters patent in question is beyond dispute. They have been sustained by all the courts before which they have been the subject of litigation. The only question to be considered upon this motion, under the circumstances, is that of infringement. While it is well settled that a preliminary injunction will issue almost as a matter of course in any given case wherein the defendants are shown to be guilty of infringement, after an adjudication establishing the validity of the letters patent involved in the litigation, yet it is equally well settled that to warrant and justify the exercise of this extraordinary power the proof of the alleged infringement must be clear and decisive. Equity peremptorily insists that such action, so drastic in its effects, shall be taken only in those cases wherein a clear, unclouded equitable right to the interference of the court is shown. In all other cases the demand is to be met by refusal, otherwise unfair prejudgment may result. In the case at bar the proof of infringement fails to attain to this standard. It is quite true that on the part of the complainants certain gentlemen most eminent in their profession, and whose opinions as experts are entitled to great weight, have not hesitated, in their affidavits presented to the court upon this motion, to assert quite positively that not only the storage battery manufactured by the defendants, but as well the process used in the manufacture, do without doubt infringe some, if not almost all, of the claims of the letters patent under consideration; and they laboriously strove to justify the opinions so expressed, first by giving to the letters patent and the various claims an exceedingly broad construction, and, secondly, by basing such broad construction upon a yet broader construction of the legal conclusions of the learned judges who have in past litigations defined and characterized the inventions of Faure and Brush. Giving full weight to the opinions of these witnesses, elucidated and most eloquently enforced upon the attention of the court in the exceedingly able argument of counsel, it still remains to be said that the defendants have, in opposition thereto, presented opinions of other scientists, equally as learned, and of equal standing and repute in the scientific world, which are directly antagonistic thereto, and by which they most distinctly and positively declare that in their judgment neither the process pursued by the defendants nor the completely manufactured battery impinges in the slightest particular upon those secured to the complainants by their letters patent. And so upon the one side are found the concurring opinions of Prof. Morton and Prof. Chandler, Prof. Houston and Dr. Barker; upon the other, those of Prof. Brackett, Prof. Cross, Prof. Thomson, and Mr. Van Size. These are gentlemen of unquestioned veracity, thoroughly understanding the subject-matter under consideration, stating opinions with confidence which they believe to be well formed; and yet they arrive at conclusions which are irreconcilably and diametrically opposed. It must be apparent that affidavits of this character, ex parte as they are, can only be productive of doubt. When the statements so made and the opinions so expressed come to be tested by a severe and thorough cross-examination, beyond question those which show themselves securely founded upon reason and fact will be immediately accepted and concurred in. But until then the existence of a doubt, well founded and reasonable, as to the right of the complainants to the remedy they ask, cannot be overlooked. The existence of such doubt must now, at least, control the action of the court. It is fatal to a motion for a preliminary injunction. To justify the interference of a court of equity pendente lite by way of an injunction, the actual or threatened infringement of a right must appear as clear as the noonday sun.

There is another reason why this motion must be denied. Equity demands of a complainant that he should display great diligence in the assertion and vindication of his rights. Inexcusable delay on his part, though it may not amount to conclusive proof of acquiescence, nevertheless may be, and often is, sufficient cause to disentitle him to the summary interference of the court on his behalf by way of interlocutory injunction. Whatever may be the original equities of the case as between the parties, if the complainant stands quietly by, without seeking to enforce his rights, while the defendant expends time and labor and money upon the enterprise sought to be enjoined, upon faith that no actual or effective objection thereto will be made, he will be shorn of any right to appeal to the court of equity for assistance. Huffman v. Hummer, 17 N.J.Eq. 263; Whitney v. Union Ry. Co., 11 Gray, 359; Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N.J.Eq. 599. In other words, the principle has been thus stated: No one can have relief if his own conduct has led to that state of...