Brustein v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.

Decision Date06 January 1931
Citation255 N.Y. 137,174 N.E. 304
PartiesBRUSTEIN v. NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY CO.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by Samuel Brustein against the New Amsterdam Casualty Company. From judgment of the Appellate Division (230 App. Div. 716, 243 N. Y. S. 770) affirming a judgment of the Trial Term (135 Misc. Rep. 352, 238 N. Y. S. 313), defendant appeals.

Reversed, and complaint dismissed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second department.

Frederick Mellor, of New York City, for appellant.

Thomas A. Shaw, Jay S. Jones, and Edward J. Fanning, all of Brooklyn, for respondent.

Hamilton Ward, Atty. Gen. (C. T. Dawes, of Albany, and Charles P. Butler, of Syracuse, of counsel), for intervener State Superintendent of Insurance.

POUND, J.

Section 109 of the Insurance Law (Consol. Laws, c. 28) is entitled: ‘Standard provisions for liability policies.’ It contains certain provisions which must be included in a liability policy covering loss or damage caused by motor vehicles. The first provision is the familiar standard bankruptcy clause which gives the injured person a cause of action against the insurance carrier if the insured is bankrupt or insolvent, ‘under the terms of the policy for the amount of the judgment * * * not exceeding the amount of the policy.’ The next provision relates to notice. Then comes the provision in question in this case, which reads as follows:

‘No such policy shall be issued or delivered in this state on or after July first, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, to the owner of a motor vehicle, by any corporation or other insure(r) authorized to do business in this state, unless there shall be contained within such policy a provision insuring such owner against liability for damages for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.’

The section concludes as follows: ‘A policy issued in violation of this section shall, nevertheless, be held valid but be deemed to include the provisions required by this section, and when any provision in such policy or rider is in conflict with the provisions required to be contained by this section, the rights, duties and obligations of the insurer, the policyholder and the injured person shall be governed by the provisions of this section.’

The action is brought by the husband of Bessie Brustein to recover $2,634, the amount of a judgment for the loss of services resulting from injuries to his wife recovered by him against Sol Pion. Previously the wife had recovered a judgment for $8,145 against Pion for personal injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident. Pion was insured with defendant against such liability and was insolvent. The company paid her $5,000 and costs, which it claims fully discharges its liability under the policy. The policy insured against loss in respect to bodily injuries or death’ only. The liability was limited to $5,000 for one person injured or killed and to a total liability of $10,000 on account of any one accident resulting in bodily injuries or death to more than one person.

In Psota v. Long Island R. Co., 246 N. Y. 388, 396, 159 N. E. 180, 62 A. L. R. 1163, it was held that the words ‘injuries to the person,’ as used in section 282-b of the Highway Law (Consol. Laws, c. 25), included the husband's loss of services of the wife. In Price v. National Surety Co., 221 App. Div. 56, 222 N. Y. S. 437, reversed on dissenting opinion of Proskauer, J., 246 N. Y. 586, 159 N. E. 662, it was held that no distinctionin this regard can be drawn between the words ‘injury to person’ and ‘personal injury.’ The policy in suit covers accidents resulting in bodily injuries or death.’ The language limits the coverage to such injuries only and does not include all injuries to person or personal injuries as the term is defined by General Construction Law (Consol. Laws, ch. 22) § 37-a. Obviously the husband receives no ‘bodily injury’ from the loss of his wife's services; nor is his wife his property so that an injury to her person is an injury to his property.

The courts below have held that the policy is inconsistent with the requirements of section 109 above quoted, and that it must be deemed by operation of law to include a provision insuring the owner against liability for death or injuries to person or property, without limitation or qualification and so to cover plaintiff's cause of action for injuries to person as above defined. We find no warrant in the statute or in its history for such a conclusion. While the courts hesitate to depart from the letter of a statute, a construction may be adopted in harmony with what is thought to be the spirit and purpose of the act in order to give effect to the evident legislative intent. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226. In this case the unreasonableness of the construction contended for is so gross as to shock the general common sense. Crooks v. Harrelson (Nov. 24, 1930) 51 S. Ct. 49, 75 L. Ed.156. Only when policies are capable with equal reason of more than one interpretation are they construed against the insurer. The fair and reasonable reading...

To continue reading

Request your trial
46 cases
  • Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 6
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1984
    ...Co., 32 So.2d 633 (La.Ct.App.1947); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939); Brustein v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 255 N.Y. 137, 174 N.E. 304 (1931), as if the reference to death were needed because of the limited meaning of "injury." Other policies reflected in ......
  • U.S. v. Streidel, 21
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1992
    ...Co., 32 So.2d 633 (La.Ct.App.1947); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939); Brustein v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 255 N.Y. 137, 174 N.E. 304 (1931), as if the reference to death were needed because of the limited meaning of 'injury.' Other policies reflected in ......
  • Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co. v. Scott
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York
    • 31 Marzo 2020
    ...do not qualify as bodily injury or property damage under the Policy. Id. ¶¶ 45–55. The Court agrees.In Brustein v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 255 N.Y. 137, 174 N.E. 304 (1931), the Court of Appeals found that insurance policies which contain limitations of liability to "bodily injuries" or "pr......
  • Lumber Mens Mut. Cas. Co v. Indem. Ins. Co. Of North Am.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • 21 Abril 1947
    ...mind in order to grasp the full significance of the New York decisions construing either or both. The action in Brustein v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co, 255 N.Y. 137, 174 N.E. 304, 305, was to recover from an insurance company damages for the loss of services of plaintiff's wife, who was injured ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT