Bruton v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

• Decision Date: 31 October 1947
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10228.
• Citation: 9 T.C. 882
• Parties: JOHN C. BRUTON, PETITIONER, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
• Court: U.S. Tax Court

9 T.C. 882

JOHN C. BRUTON, PETITIONER,

v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

Docket No. 10228.

Tax Court of the United States.

Promulgated October 31, 1947.

Petitioner, a practicing lawyer, suffered a partial paralysis, as a result of which he required transportation between his residence and office. He engaged taxicab service, which was the least expensive form of practicable transportation. Held, the amounts paid for taxicab fares between petitioner's residence and office are not deductible as business expenses. Edward H. Schlaudt, Esq., for the petitioner.

Scott A. Dahlquist, Esq., for the respondent.

OPINION.

ARNOLD, Judge:

This proceeding involves personal income tax for the calendar year 1943 in the amount of $174.89. The sole matter in dispute is the deductibility, as ordinary and necessary expenses paid in carrying on petitioner's trade or business, that of a practicing lawyer, of amounts paid by him in 1942 and 1943 for taxicab fares exclusively for transportation between his place of residence and law office.

As the taxable year involved is 1943, it automatically includes adjustments in income tax liability for the calendar year 1942.

We find the facts as stipulated by the parties in a stipulation filed at the hearing as follows:

1. Petitioner is an individual with offices at 48 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y. Federal income tax returns, prepared on the cash basis, for the calendar years 1942 and 1943 here involved were filed by petitioner with the Collector of Internal Revenue for the Second District of New York, Custom House, New York.

2. Prior to December 1940, petitioner was a practicing lawyer, associated with the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, 48 Wall Street, New York, N.Y., having been admitted to the New York State Bar in the year 1933.

3. In December of 1940 petitioner underwent a surgical operation performed by Dr. Tracy J. Putnam, Head of the Neurological Institute, Presbyterian Hospital, New York, N.Y., for the removal of a cerebral cyst from his brain.

4. During the aforesaid operation, there occurred the destruction of nerve tissue in the cerebral area of petitioner's brain.

5. As a result of the aforesaid destruction of brain tissue, petitioner suffered partial paralysis of the entire right side of his body, a partial loss of muscular coordination throughout his entire body and an impairment of his ability to maintain equilibrium; however, his reason was unimpaired.

6. From December 1940 until late in the year 1941, petitioner was completely invalided, received continuous medical treatment and required the constant attendance of a male nurse.

7. Late in the year 1941, petitioner's condition began to improve slowly and by the end of the year, petitioner was able to walk four of five steps while supported and guided by another individual. By the end of January 1942, petitioner was able to take one or two steps without assistance other than a cane; however, he still required continual therapeutic treatment and the constant attendance of a nurse.

8. In late January of 1942, petitioner determined to return to the practice of law with the aforesaid firm of Sullivan & Cromwell and inquired of Dr. Putnam as to what arrangements might be made to render this possible. Dr. Putnam referred the case to Dr. William B. Snow, Head of the Physiotherapy Department of the Neurological Institute of the Presbyterian Hospital. Dr. Snow consented to petitioner's return to work only on condition that petitioner continue to receive physiotherapy treatments, live in a building equipped with a swimming pool in which petitioner could take daily therapeutic exercise, and arrange for assistance and special transportation to and from his office.

9. In the early summer of 1942, petitioner established residence at The London Terrace, 470 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y., which is located more closely to his office than any available, adequate living quarters equipped with a swimming pool in the Borough of Manhattan.

10. Thereafter, petitioner arranged for taxicab service to transport him to and from his residence and his office.

11. Petitioner's above described condition of partial paralysis and lack of equilibrium and muscular coordination, although gradually improved by the slow and partial regrowth of the destroyed tissue, continued throughout the entire calendar years 1942 and 1943 to such an extent that petitioner could not drive a car or walk farther than twenty feet without the support and guidance of another individual. Throughout any attempt to walk unaided, regardless of the distance, petitioner's progress was violently spasmodic and subject to abrupt termination at any time by a complete loss of either balance, direction or muscular control in which event petitioner collapsed, helpless and unable to regain any upright position without assistance from another individual.

12. Petitioner's physical condition throughout 1942 and 1943 precluded use of public conveyances in going to and from his office.

13. During the calendar years 1942 and 1943, petitioner earned taxable gross income from the practice of law in the amount of $8,000 per annum. In each of such years, the practice of law was petitioner's sole source of taxable income. Daily attendance at his office was necessary to enable petitioner to practice law and to earn said gross income. Petitioner did not leave his office for lunch because of the extreme physical difficulty of doing so except on rare occasions when other accompanied him.

14. During the calendar years 1942 and 1943, petitioner expended $539 and $528, respectively, in taxicab fares exclusively for transportation between his residence and his place of business. Such expenditures represented the most inexpensive means of individual transportation to and from his office available to petitioner. Petitioner claimed the aforesaid amounts as deductions in his income tax returns for such years and they were disallowed by the respondent.

The only question for our determination is whether the amounts paid by petitioner in 1942 and 1943 exclusively for transportation in traveling to and from his place of residence and office are, under the facts and circumstances, deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses paid during the taxable years in carrying on petitioner's trade or business, that of a practicing lawyer, within the intent and meaning of section 23(a)(1)(A), Internal Revenue Code. Respondent disallowed the deductions.

Petitioner contends that as his daily attendance at is office was required and, as he could neither drive, walk, nor travel by public conveyance, the use of a taxicab was necessary, without which he could not have practiced law or produced any income whatever; that on account of his physical condition the necessity of the expenditure is absolute and, while not usual, it is ordinary...