De Bruyn Produce Co. v. Romero, Docket No. 138771

Decision Date18 October 1993
Docket NumberDocket No. 138771
Citation202 Mich.App. 92,508 N.W.2d 150
Parties, 127 Lab.Cas. P 33,041 De BRUYN PRODUCE CO., a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pablo ROMERO, Gustavo Romero, Jorge Resendez and Gerardo Montes, Defendants-Appellants, and International Union, UAW; Union De Trabajadores Agricolas De Michigan, Migrant Legal Action Program; United Community Housing Coalition; Michigan Legal Services; Michigan Farmworker Ministry Coalition; Catholic Pastoral Alliance and Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Archdiocese of Detroit, Amici Curiae.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Richard M. Van Orden, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.

Michigan Migrant Legal Assistance Project, Inc. by Gary N. Gershon, Grand Rapids, for defendants-appellants.

Richard W. McHugh and Jordan Rossen, Detroit, amicus curiae, for Intern. Union, UAW.

Richard Kessler, Grand Rapids, amicus curiae, for Union de Trabajadores Agricolas de Michigan.

James Strothman, Washington, DC, amicus curiae, for Migrant Legal Action Program.

Marilyn Mullane, Detroit, amicus curiae, for United Community Housing Coalition and Michigan Legal Services.

David Shaltz, Lansing, amicus curiae, for Michigan Housing Coalition.

James J. Sheehan, Detroit, amicus curiae, for Catholic Pastoral Alliance and Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton.

Suzanne Sattler, Detroit, amicus curiae, for Michigan Farmworker Ministry Coalition.

Before McDONALD, P.J., and REILLY and FITZGERALD, JJ.

REILLY, Judge.

Defendants appeal as of right from a declaratory judgment. We affirm.

De Bruyn Produce Company is involved in the growing, harvesting, packing, and shipping of vegetables. It has operations in different areas of the country, including Michigan. Defendants are migrant workers from Texas who worked for plaintiff in Ionia, Michigan, during the 1987 season. Defendants were recruited in Texas. Before defendants came to Michigan, the parties executed a number of documents that described the conditions of employment, including housing. Defendants were paid $3.35 an hour and lived in mobile homes provided by plaintiff. Plaintiff required a deposit of $150 for each housing unit to cover the cost of any damage to the unit. Five dollars was to be deducted from each paycheck to cover the deposit.

Defendants Pablo Romero and Gustavo Romero, together with Gustavo's wife and child, lived in a mobile home that was set aside for a family. Single men, including defendant Jorge Resendez, were housed in separate mobile homes.

After Gustavo's wife and child moved out, Pablo and Gustavo were asked by a representative of plaintiff to move to another mobile home occupied by single men. Another family was expected to arrive and was to be housed in the mobile home formerly occupied by the Romero family. Rather than move to another mobile home, Pablo and Gustavo left the farm and ceased working for plaintiff. Resendez also apparently left because of housing conditions. Gerardo Montes' employment was terminated by plaintiff.

Defendants sought legal counsel, and when the parties could not agree regarding the nature of defendants' rights with respect to the housing provided on the farm, plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment in circuit court. 1 Plaintiff sought a declaration of the nature of the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendants with respect to defendants' occupancy of the housing provided by plaintiff and the applicability of the summary proceedings act, M.C.L. § 600.5701 et seq.; M.S.A. § 27A.5701 et seq. Additionally, plaintiff asked the court to determine whether the deposit on the mobile home was a security deposit within the meaning of the landlord-tenant relationship act, M.C.L. § 554.601 et seq.; M.S.A. § 26.1138(1) et seq. Lastly, plaintiff sought a declaration regarding the applicability of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, M.C.L. § 445.901 et seq.; M.S.A. § 19.418(1) et seq. and the Truth in Renting Act, M.C.L. § 554.631 et seq.; M.S.A. § 26.1138(31) et seq.

The trial court, in its modified opinion, held that the relationship between plaintiff and defendants was regulated by the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. 2 On the basis of the language of the documents executed by the parties, the testimony of the parties, "the controlling federal statute provisions and purposes," and Michigan law, the trial court determined that a landlord-tenant relationship had not existed and that the only legal relationship between the parties was one of employer-employee. The court ruled that because defendants were not tenants, they had no estate-at-will requiring termination by statutory notice and, therefore, the notice provisions of the summary proceedings act did not apply. In that regard the court also determined that the notice requirement should not be imposed because it would conflict with the purposes of the AWPA, which was intended to benefit employers as well as employees. Finally, the trial court held that the landlord-tenant relationship act, the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, and the Truth in Renting Act were all inapplicable to the employer-employee relationship between plaintiff and defendants. In its declaratory judgment the trial court ruled that the relationship between the parties was that of employer and employee, not landlord and tenant, that the security deposit act, the Truth in Renting Act and the Consumer Protection Act were inapplicable to the parties' relationship, and that it was not mandatory that termination of the defendants' occupancy of plaintiff's licensed employee housing be had pursuant to the summary proceedings act.

I

We first address the applicability of the AWPA to the issues to be resolved in this case. Defendants assert that the trial court misconstrued and misapplied the provisions of the AWPA. The trial court, in finding that the summary proceedings act did not apply in this case, noted that requiring agricultural employers to provide workers with notice to quit would conflict with the purpose underlying the AWPA. The court found that the AWPA was designed to protect agricultural employers as well as migrant workers. Defendants assert that the trial court's interpretation is "a perversion of the statute."

The stated purpose of the AWPA is

to remove the restraints on commerce caused by activities detrimental to migrant and seasonal agricultural workers; to require farm labor contractors to register under this chapter; and to assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, agricultural associations, and agricultural employers. [29 U.S.C. 1801.]

The AWPA regulates the relationship between migrant workers and agricultural employers and imposes specific duties upon employers. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 1821-1823. It is clear that the overriding concern of the legislation is to protect migrant workers from exploitation. Although the AWPA serves to regulate the relationship between migrant workers and their employers, it does not occupy the entire field of regulation so as to preempt state regulation. Rather, it "is intended to supplement State law, and compliance with [the statute] shall not excuse any person from compliance with appropriate State law and regulation." 29 U.S.C. 1871. Therefore, although we agree with the trial court that the thirty-day notice requirement of § 5714(1)(c)(iii) of the summary proceedings act is not applicable to these parties, for reasons stated below we disagree with the trial court's alternative reasoning that the requirement is inapplicable because it conflicts with the purpose of the AWPA. The issues presented in this case can only be resolved after consideration of appropriate state common and statutory law, as well as the AWPA.

II

The underlying issue to be resolved is the nature of the relationship between plaintiff and defendants with regard to the housing provided by plaintiff. Defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that the relationship was solely one of employer and employee. They assert that the documents in the employment packet, when read together, constitute a lease. We disagree.

This Court's review of declaratory relief is de novo on the record. However, we will not reverse a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Kramer v. Dearborn Heights, 197 Mich.App. 723, 727, 496 N.W.2d 301 (1993).

A lease is a conveyance by the owner of an estate of a portion of the interest therein to another for a term less than his own for a valuable consideration. Minnis v. Newbro-Gallogly Co., 174 Mich. 635, 639, 140 N.W. 980 (1913). See also Dep't of Natural Resources v. Westminster Church, 114 Mich.App. 99, 104, 318 N.W.2d 830 (1982). A lease gives the tenant the possession of the property leased and exclusive use or occupation of it for all purposes not prohibited by the terms of the lease. Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Overgaard, 173 Mich.App. 250, 253, 433 N.W.2d 813 (1988). In order for an agreement to be a valid lease, it must contain the names of the parties, an adequate description of the leased premises, the length of the lease term, and the amount of the rent. Id. Consideration for a lease may be in services as well as in money. Westminster Church, supra. We conclude that the documents relied on by defendants do not constitute a lease or create a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.

The document entitled "Worker Information Sheet" was provided to defendants in an effort to comply with the disclosure provisions of the AWPA, 29 U.S.C. 1821(a). 3 It included a section that stated:

HOUSING: (For migrant workers who will be housed, the kind of housing available and cost, if any) Type: Mobile Home Charges: Deposit Other: Available only to those offered housing agreements and are currently employed by De Bruyn Produce Co. Tenantcy ...

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