Bryan v. Austin

Decision Date22 January 1957
Docket NumberCiv. A. 5792.
Citation148 F. Supp. 563
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesOla L. BRYAN, Essie M. David, Charles E. Davis, Rosa D. Davis, Vivian V. Floyd, Bee A. Fogan, Hattie M. Fulton, Rutha M. Ingram, Mary E. Jackson, Frazier H. Keitt, Luther Lucas, James B. Mays, Laura Pickett, Howard W. Shefton, Betty Smith, Leila M. Summers and Clarence V. Tobin, Plaintiffs, v. M. G. AUSTIN, Jr., as Superintendent of School District No. 7, of Orangeburg County, the State of South Carolina, and W. B. Bookhardt, Harold Felder, T. T. McEachern, Elmo Shuler and Ulmer Weeks, as the Board of Trustees of School District No. 7, of Orangeburg County, the State of South Carolina, Defendants.

Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Columbia, S. C., and Thurgood Marshal, Jack Greenburg, New York City, for plaintiffs.

A. J. Hydrick, Jr., and Marshall Williams, Orangeburg, S. C., Robert McC. Figg, Jr., Charleston, S. C., P. H. McEachin, Florence, S. C., D. W. Robinson, Columbia, S. C., T. C. Callison, Atty. Gen. of South Carolina and Daniel R. McLeod and James S. Verner, Asst. Attys. Gen., of South Carolina, for defendants.

Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and TIMMERMAN and WILLIAMS, District Judges.

WILLIAMS, District Judge.

This is an action by Negro school teachers against the School Superintendent and the Board of Trustees of a school district in South Carolina. Its purpose is to obtain a declaratory judgment that the South Carolina statute making unlawful the employment by the state, or by a school district of the state, of any member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is unconstitutional and void and to enjoin the enforcement of the statute in violation of their constitutional rights. As the defendants are engaged in the enforcement of a statute of state wide application and injunction is asked against them, a court of three judges is appropriate for the hearing of the case. City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 65 S.Ct. 280, 89 L.Ed. 274. Such a court has accordingly been convened, the parties have been heard, the Attorney General of the State has been heard orally and by brief, and the parties after the hearing have been allowed to file additional briefs, which have been received and considered.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiffs are seventeen Negro school teachers, who had been employed in Elloree Training School of School District No. 7 of Orangeburg County, South Carolina, prior to June 1956 for varying periods of time, one for as long as ten years. There is evidence to the effect that they were competent teachers and there is no evidence that their service was unsatisfactory in any way. In March 1956 the Legislature of South Carolina passed the act here complained of, 49 St. at Large, p. 1747, one of the provisions of which authorized the board of trustees of any school to demand of any teacher that he submit a statement under oath as to whether or not he was a member of the National Association for Advancement of Colored People, and provided that anyone refusing to submit such statement should be summarily dismissed. Other sections of the act made it unlawful for any member of that association to be employed by any school district and imposed a fine of $100 for employing any individual contrary to the provisions of the Act. When plaintiffs in May of 1956 were given blank applications by the School Superintendent to be filled out and sworn to, which contained questions as to their membership in the Association and their views as to the desirability of segregation in the schools, they declined to answer these questions. Only one of the plaintiffs, however, was a member of the Association. Upon being told that they would have to fill in the answers or tender their resignations, they chose the latter course and were not elected as teachers for the ensuing year. Three questions are presented by the case: (1) Is the statute unconstitutional as plaintiffs contend? (2) Are plaintiffs in position to raise the question as to its unconstitutionality? And (3) Can the court grant plaintiffs any relief in view of the fact that plaintiffs have resigned as teachers and others have been elected to their places?

We think we should use our discretion in refusing to pass on the issues in this controversy at this time. It does not appear that the statute in question has been interpreted by a state court, and it is not proper to pass upon the controversy presented herein until a South Carolina court has first heard the case and passed upon the constitutionality of the Act in question.

In 1941 the United States Supreme Court had before it the case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 645, 85 L.Ed. 971. This case involved a regulation by a state commission authorized by statute, and it was contended that the regulation was in violation of the Equal Protection, the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court had the following statement to make with reference to the three-judge District Court's decision which enjoined the enforcement of the regulation:

"* * * But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, and therefore the last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas. In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 54 S.Ct. 138, 78 L.Ed. 252; Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 54 S.Ct. 727, 78 L.Ed. 1337. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication."
* * * * * *

In the case of American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873, the Court held that the bill had equity, but the trial court erred in adjudicating the merits of the controversy, saying:

"* * * The crux of the matter is the allegation that there is an imminent threat to an entire system of collective bargaining, a threat which, if carried through, will have such repercussions on the relationship between capital and labor as to cause irreparable damage. We conclude for that reason that the bill states a cause of action in equity.
"As we have said, the District Court passed on the merits of the controversy. In doing so at this stage of the litigation, we think it did not follow the proper course. The merits involve substantial constitutional issues concerning the meaning of a new provision of the Florida constitution which, so far as we are advised, has never been construed by the Florida courts. Those courts have the final say as to its meaning. When authoritatively construed, it may or may not have the meaning or force which appellees now assume that it has. In absence of an authoritative interpretation, it is impossible to know with certainty what constitutional issues will finally emerge. What would now be written on the constitutional questions might therefore turn out to be an academic and needless dissertation." 327 U.S. at pages 595-596, 66 S.Ct. at page 767.
* * * * * *

Plaintiffs in this case claim that the act in question is so clear that it should be construed by us and that we should decide all of the issues. In the case of Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600, 602, 97 L.Ed. 983, the issues were equally clear and free from ambiguity. The appellants challenged the definitions in the act as being void for vagueness. Mr. Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion said:

"* * * There are no ambiguities involving these appellants. The constitutional questions do not turn on any niceties in the interpretation of the Michigan law. The case is therefore unlike Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666, and its forebears where the nature of the constitutional issue would depend on the manner in which uncertain and ambiguous state statutes were construed. See especially A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 598, 66 S.Ct. 761, 768, 90 L.Ed. 873. Here there are but two questions:
"(1) Can Michigan require the Communist Party of Michigan and its Executive Secretary to register?
"(2) Can Michigan forbid the name of any Communist or of any nominee of the Communist Party to be printed on the ballot in any primary or general election in the state?"

However, the opinion of the Court in this case states:

"We deem it appropriate in this case that the state courts construe this statute before the District Court further considers the action. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 1947, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 1946, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873; and Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 1944, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101.
"The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with directions to vacate the restraining order it issued and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state courts either in pending litigation or other litigation which may be instituted."

The case of Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 354, affirmed in a per curiam decision without opinion, 347 U.S. 901, 74 S.Ct. 429, 98 L.Ed. 1061, is even stronger than the Albertson case supra. This case involved a statute prohibiting state...

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3 cases
  • NATIONAL ASS'N FOR ADVANCE. OF COLORED PEOPLE v. Patty, Civ. A. No. 2435
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
    • January 21, 1958
    ...cases of this sort if the state statutes at issue are free of doubt or ambiguity. See the opinion of Judge Parker in Bryan v. Austin, D.C.E.D.S.C., 148 F. Supp. 563, 567-568, where it was "I recognize, of course, that, in the application of the rule of comity, a federal court should stay ac......
  • Shelton v. McKinley, Civ. No. 3708.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Eastern District of Arkansas
    • June 8, 1959
    ...as the defendants desire. Cf. NAACP v. Patty, D.C. Va., 159 F.Supp. 503; see also dissenting opinion of Judge Parker in Bryan v. Austin, D.C.S.C., 148 F.Supp. 563, 567. Moreover, this is contract time with the school districts in Arkansas. Both teachers and directors of those districts need......
  • Moorer v. State of South Carolina
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
    • April 13, 1965
    ...a citizen against impairment of state governmental power. The door of the Federal Court is never closed to such showing. See Bryan v. Austin, D. C., 148 F.Supp. 563. Petitioner has sought remand to the State Court. Accordingly this Court has remanded, The Stay of Execution heretofore ordere......
1 books & journal articles
  • The South Counterattacks: the Anti-Naacp Laws
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly No. 12-2, June 1959
    • June 1, 1959
    ...out the names of the persons to be 40 1956 Session Laws of South Carolina, Act No. 741; 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 751.41 Bryan v. Austin, 148 F. Supp. 563 (1957). The Supreme Court noted the case had moot and remanded it to the district court where the Negroes could amend their plead-ings to incl......

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