Bryan v. Bryan

• Citation: 220 S.C. 164,66 S.E.2d 609
• Decision Date: 29 August 1951
• Docket Number: No. 16539,16539
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: BRYAN v. BRYAN et al.

Page 609

66 S.E.2d 609

220 S.C. 164

BRYAN v. BRYAN et al.

No. 16539.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 29, 1951.

Connor & Connor, Kingstree, for appellants.

Shuler & Harrell, E. W. Cantwell, Kingstree, Henry Davis, Florence, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

This is a suit in equity to set aside a judgment at law on the ground that it was obtained through fraud. It is here on an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint.

In June, 1948, Elizabeth J. Bryan, Harry O. Lifrage and Vivian B. Lifrage brought an action against J. G. Bryan for the recovery of damages on account of the loss of their tenants and sharecroppers. It was alleged that the defendant threatened the colored tenants and sharecroppers on plaintiffs' farms with violence if they continued to use certain roads which were the sole means of ingress and egress to and from said property, and that as a direct consequence thereof, they became intimidated and left and plaintiffs were unable to obtain other tenants or sharecroppers. The defendant conceded that the plaintiffs and their tenants had the right to use said roads but denied making the alleged threats or doing any other act causing damage to the plaintiffs. The above action was tried in November, 1948, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $3,000 actual damages and $2,000 punitive damages. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was refused. From the judgment entered on said verdict, defendant appealed and in an opinion filed on September 12, 1950, said judgment was affirmed. Bryan v. Bryan, 217 S.C. 555, 61 S.E.2d 177.

On October 20, 1950, the action now before us was brought by J. G. Bryan, the defendant in the action above mentioned, against Elizabeth J. Bryan, Vivian B. Lifrage and H. O. Lifrage, plaintiffs in that action, for the purpose of vacating and setting aside the judgment recovered against him upon the ground that it was obtained by false and perjured testimony. An injunction against the enforcement of said judgment was also sought and for this reason the Sheriff of Williamsburg County was added as a party defendant in the instant case.

It is alleged in the complaint that on the trial of the action against J. G. Bryan, one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, I. M. Boyd, falsely testified that he sold $4,800 worth of tobacco grown in 1948 on plaintiffs' lands when in fact no tobacco whatsoever was planted on said farms during that year; that Harry O. Lifrage, one of the plaintiffs in said action, falsely testified that in 1947 he sold from the lands of plaintiffs $4,510.22 worth of tobacco and $2,551.75 worth of cotton when in fact he did not sell either that much tobacco or cotton; and that Ida Holliday, another witness for the plaintiffs, falsely testified that in several conversations with J. G. Bryan, he forbade her to use the roads in controversy and threatened her and her husband with violence if they did so, but since the trial the said Ida Holliday has admitted under oath that said testimony was false. It is further stated that Robert McCrea gave certain material testimony in favor of the plaintiffs and that it has been recently discovered that said witness was at the time of the trial and is now mentally incompetent.

J. G. Bryan further alleged in the instant action that said perjured testimony was wholly unknown to him at the time of the trial and could not have been discovered by the use of due diligence; that he did not know what testimony the plaintiffs would offer at said trial and had no reason to anticipate false and perjured testimony; that he had only recently discovered that 'practically all of the material testimony introduced against him in the trial of the aforesaid case was false, perjured, fabricated and fraudulent'; and that except for such false testimony, the plaintiffs would never have obtained a verdict against him.

The defendants in the instant action interposed a demurrer to the foregoing complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled by an order dated December 28, 1950, from which the defendants have appealed.

Does an action in equity lie to set aside the judgment upon the grounds stated in the complaint?

There is no doubt that a court of equity has inherent power to grant relief from a judgment on the ground of fraud. However, not every fraud is sufficient to move a court of equity to grant relief from a judgment. Generally speaking, in order to secure equitable relief, it must appear that the fraud was extrinsic or collateral to the question examined and determined in the action in which the judgment was rendered; intrinsic fraud is not sufficient for equitable relief. In 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, Section 655, page 232, it is stated: 'Equitable relief from a judgment is denied in cases of intrinsic fraud, on the theory that an issue which has been tried and passed upon in the original action should not be retried in an action for equitable relief against the judgment, and that otherwise litigation would be interminable; relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that by reason of the fraud preventing a party from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there never has been a real contest before the court of the subject matter of the action.'

There is considerable diversity of opinion as to whether false testimony alone constitutes a sufficient ground for equitable relief against a judgment resulting from it. 'Although some cases sustain the doctrine that equity may grant relief against a judgment obtained by means of false testimony, provided it was procured, concocted, and intentionally produced by the successful party, the weight of authority is to the effect that ordinarily there is no ground for equitable interference with a judgment in the fact that perjury or false swearing was committed by such party...