Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel
Decision Date | 17 April 2001 |
Docket Number | (AC 19615) |
Citation | 774 A.2d 1009,62 Conn. App. 733 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | BENITA BRYAN v. SHERATON-HARTFORD HOTEL ET AL. |
Landau, Schaller and Callahan, Js Diane D. Duhamel, for the appellants (defendants).
James P. Connolly, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendants, the Sheraton-Hartford Hotel and the Insurance Company of North America, appeal from the decision of the compensation review board (board) affirming an award by the workers' compensation commissioner for the first district (commissioner) to the plaintiff, Benita Bryan, which attributed a 10 percent permanent impairment of her left shoulder to an injury incurred while she was working for the defendant Sheraton-Hartford Hotel. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's decision because the record lacks evidence supporting the award and (2) the commissioner and, in turn, the board, violated the defendants' due process rights to be heard and to present evidence. We agree with the defendants and reverse the decision of the board.1
The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal.2 On or about December 23, 1989, while employed by the defendant Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, the plaintiff fell at work and suffered compensable lower back injuries.3 As a result, from 1989 through 1991, she received various temporary total and partial disability benefits. Subsequently, the parties entered into a voluntary agreement regarding the plaintiffs work-related injury, which the commissioner approved on February 18, 1992. The voluntary agreement stipulated that the plaintiffs December 23, 1989 fall resulted in a 7.25 percent permanent partial disability to her lower back. There was no reference to any disability of her left shoulder in the stipulation.
After the parties entered into the voluntary agreement, the plaintiff allegedly began to suffer from additional medical problems, including pain in her left shoulder. Claiming that those additional infirmities resulted from her December 23, 1989 fall at work, and thus should be accounted for in the amount of her disability benefits, the plaintiff sought a formal hearing before the commissioner. A hearing addressing the plaintiffs claims was held on June 21, 1995. At the hearing, one of her treating physicians testified that certain gynecological and gastrointestinal disorders alleged by the plaintiff were unrelated to her fall at work. Further, the defendants submitted several medical reports from the plaintiffs treating orthopedist, Steven E. Selden. Selden's several reports, which were dated as late as April, 1994, stated that the plaintiffs left shoulder injury was not a result of her fall at work on December 23, 1989. Rather, it was his opinion that her left shoulder injury was attributable to a fall that had occurred in December, 1993, or to two separate automobile accidents in which she was involved, those having occurred in March, 1989, and September, 1991.
The commissioner dismissed the plaintiffs case on March 28, 1996, finding that her gynecological, gastrointestinal problems and her left shoulder injury were unrelated to her December 23, 1989 work-related fall. The commissioner specifically concluded that the plaintiff had failed to "sustain her burden of proof that her shoulder complaints are related to the December 23, 1989 work-related injury...."
On December 16, 1996, the plaintiff appealed to the board from the commissioner's decision and filed a motion to submit additional evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to submit a medical report from Selden, dated April 12, 1996, and a report dated November 25, 1996, from another physician, Susan Levine, who had treated the plaintiff for chronic fatigue syndrome. Selden's medical report of April 12, 1996 stated: On March 12, 1997, the board denied the plaintiffs motion as to Levine's report,4 but permitted her to submit Selden's report because it contradicted the commissioner's previous finding concerning the plaintiffs left shoulder. In granting, in part, the plaintiffs motion, the board stated: "We, therefore, grant the [plaintiff's] motion to submit additional evidence limited to the report from Dr. Selden dated April 12, 1996, and remand this matter to the trial commissioner."
At the hearing on the remand, the defendants introduced an additional report from Selden, dated April 11, 1997, to rebut his report of April 12, 1996. In his 1997 report, Selden rescinded the opinion expressed in his 1996 report. His April 11, 1997 report stated:
On November 13, 1997, the commissioner nevertheless entered a finding and award in favor of the plaintiff and concluded that "the [plaintiff] ... injured her left shoulder in a December, 1989, accident which ... arose out of and in the course of her employment at the [defendant] Sheraton-Hartford Hotel ... [and consequently] sustained ... a 10 percent permanent partial disability to the left shoulder." The commissioner ordered the defendants to pay to the plaintiff 29.1 weeks of compensation at her basic compensation rate representing 10 percent permanency to the left nonmaster shoulder. Declining to consider Selden's April 11, 1997 report, the commissioner stated that
The defendants appealed to the board from the commissioner's finding and award pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-301 (a).5 On May 7, 1999, the board affirmed the commissioner's finding and award, and concluded that the commissioner properly considered the 1996 report from Selden in light of all of the prior evidence in the record. The board further concluded that the commissioner appropriately had refused to consider Selden's 1997 report because the report was only cumulative of evidence already on the record. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's findings because the commissioner's decision lacks sufficient evidence to support its conclusion. Further, the defendants claim that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's decision because the commissioner's refusal to consider Selden's 1997 report, which was offered to rebut the plaintiffs evidence, violated the defendants' due process rights to be heard and to present evidence. We agree. Our standard of review for workers' compensation decisions is well established. The commissioner is the sole trier of fact and "[t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hebert v. RWA, Inc., 48 Conn. App. 449, 452, 709 A.2d 1149, cert. denied, 246 Conn. 901, 717 A.2d 239 (1998), quoting Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441, 449, 562 A.2d 1086 (1989). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., 48 Conn. App. 774, 776, 712 A.2d 436 (1998), quoting Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). On appeal, the board must determine whether there is any evidence in the record to support the commissioner's findings and award. Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., supra, 777. " " Knapp v. New London, 44 Conn. App. 465, 468, 691 A.2d 11 (1997), quoting Borent v. State, 33 Conn. App. 495, 499, 636 A.2d 392 (1994).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the board's affirmation of the commissioner's decision is incorrect in law and improperly includes facts found without evidence. Our conclusion that the board improperly upheld the commissioner's decision is based primarily on our disposition of the defendants' due process claim. We therefore address that claim first. Administrative hearings, including those held before workers' compensation commissioners, are informal and governed without necessarily adhering to the rules of evidence or procedure. LaPia v. Stratford, 47 Conn. App. 391, 400, 706 A.2d 11 (1997). Nonetheless,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Burton v. Conn. Siting Council
...and the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (Citations omitted.) Bryan v. Sheraton–Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn.App. 733, 740, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001) ; see also Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 536, 525 A.2d 940 (1987) (administrat......
-
Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy
...are informal and are not bound by the common-law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure. Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn.App. 733, 740, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001); see General Statutes § 31-298.... Nonetheless, procedural due process is a requirement of adjudicative administrative......
-
Testone v. C.R. Gibson Co., No. 28918.
...are informal and are not bound by the common-law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure. Bryan v. Sheraton-Hartford Hotel, 62 Conn.App. 733, 740, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001); see General Statutes § 31-298. Instead, "the commissioner ... shall make inquiry in a manner that is best calculated ......
-
Graham v. Olson Wood Assocs., Inc.
...114 Conn.App. 210, 217, 969 A.2d 179, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 914, 973 A.2d 663 (2009) ; see also, e.g., Bryan v. Sheraton–Hartford Hotel , 62 Conn.App. 733, 741, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001) (in proceedings before commission, "[a]n integral premise of due process is that a matter cannot be properl......
-
2001 Connecticut Appellate Review
...act, section 46a-60, did not apply. 107 65 Conn. App. 738, 783 A.2d 1085, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 938, 786 A.2d 425 (2001). 108 62 Conn. App. 733, 774 A.2d 1009 (2001). 109 Id. 110 66 Conn. App. 16, 783 A.2d 1157 (2001). 111 65 Conn. App. 145, 782 A.2d 209, cert. granted, 258 Conn. 932, 785......