Bryan v. Utah Intern., 13773
| Decision Date | 24 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 13773,13773 |
| Citation | 533 P.2d 892 |
| Parties | Stanley R. BRYAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH INTERNATIONAL, a corporation, and Howard Savage, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for plaintiff-appellant.
Keith E. Taylor and LeRoy S. Axland, of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, for defendants-respondents.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing, with prejudice, the complaint of plaintiff and appellant, Stanley R. Bryan, against defendants and respondents, Utah International, a corporation, and Howard Savage. Hereafter appellant will be referred to as Bryan, and respondents individually, as Utah International, and Savage.
Bryan's complaint alleges that he was an employee of Utah International, and worked as a shovel operator under the supervision of Savage who was his supervisor. Savage was also an employee of Utah International. The shovel Bryan operated was powered by electricity, delivered to it through a large cable. When the shovel changed locations it became necessary to move the cable also. Owing to the size of the cable it was necessary to employ the use of a pickup truck in aid of the work. Savage was the operator of the truck. Bryan, in the normal course of his employment, attached a connecting device to the cable, which, in turn, was used to connect the cable to the truck. Bryan alleged that, at this point, Savage, intentionally, 'and with malice aforethought,' started his pickup intending to jerk the cable against the body of Bryan. It is alleged that Savage's intention was realized, and in the process Bryan was injured. Further allegations are that intentional misconduct of this sort had been going on for considerable time; such was known by various supervisors of Utah International; and that Savage attempted to keep the matter hidden by not making an accident report until four days after the occurrence.
Given the facts as set forth in Bryan's complaint, does Bryan have a right of action outside the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act? Our statute 35--1--60, U.C.A.1953, as amended, is as follows:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Workmen's compensation is based on a social theory having as its enlightened objective the prevention of destitution and want, of certain defined employees suffering work-connected injury. It provides an efficient, dignified, and the most certain method of receiving compensation for such injuries.
Workmen's compensation legislation became a necessity, because of the inevitable increase in industrial accidents born of the industrial revolution, which produced the factory system; and the accompanying decrease in an employee's common law remedies, by which one might recover for work-connected accidents.
While England and the United States were busily engaged in developing judicially pronounced defenses against claims of injured employees, Prussia, in 1838, began the development of the social theory of compensation for industrial accidents, which culminated in a compulsory industrial insurance plan in 1887. It is interesting to know that by 1884 Germany had adopted the first modern compensation system, and this was 13 years before England, 25 years before the first American jurisdiction, and 65 years before the last American jurisdiction, adopted workmen's compensation plans.
The American system, unlike a pure social insurance, places the cost upon the consumers of the product of the particular industry engaged in the insured activity. The whole thrust of the development of this social theory was to provide a remedy for the employee, injured in an industrial accident, while at the same time protecting the employer from disruptive or vexatious lawsuits, because of the employer's alleged negligence. This latter observation is well stated in Smith v. Alfred Brown Company, 1 a case cited in respondent's brief.
This capsule reference to the history of workmen's compensation serves to direct attention to the reason for such legislation. Its primary objective has been to remove industrial negligence, in all its forms, from the concept of the law of tort. Because of the conditions of 'factory life' great numbers of situations arose, which required compensatory action, and the common law of tort ceased to be socially beneficial and became detrimental to the society in these situations. For an excellent treatment of the subject see 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 1, et seq.
As are all workmen's compensation statutes, our act is a remedial one, and in its desire to implement the social policy the legislature has reached out to include persons not in the common employment, and has said that personal injury, by accident, will include injury caused by the willful act of a third person. 2 The legislature has also provided that an employee may recover increased compensation if the injury results from a willful failure of the employer to comply with the law. 3 The word 'willful' has been defined by this court when it addressed itself to 35--1--12, in the case of Park Utah Mining Company v. Industrial Commission. 4 It was there stated that willful implies something in addition to mere negligence.
There is also a provision for an action for damages, on the part of the injured employee, when the injury arises from the 'wrongful act or neglect' of another person not in the same employment, 5 while, at the same time, allowing recovery of compensation. This same provision provides for disbursement of any recovery, and directs that the one liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed, and that, after other deductions therein allowed, the remainder shall be turned over to the injured employee, or heirs.
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