Bryant & Mathers v. M. Levy & Sons
| Decision Date | 01 June 1900 |
| Docket Number | 13,057 |
| Parties | BRYANT & MATHERS v. M. LEVY & SONS |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing refused.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. -- Ellis, J.
E. W Huntington, Rouse & Grant and Bernard McCloskey, for Plaintiffs, Appellants.
Farrar Jonas and Kruttschnitt, Saunders and Miller, Saunders and Gurley, and Lazarus and Luce, for Defendants, Appellees.
James J. MsLaughlin and Solomon Wolff, for the Arbitrators and Umpire on the Question of their Compensation, Plaintiffs in Rule and Appellants.
Plaintiff sues to recover of the defendants, the sum of fifteen thousand, two hundred and eighty-eight and 37-100 dollars ($ 15,288.37), with interest, for the storage and drayage of cotton, labor on rejected cotton, extra labor, and use of cotton press yard for account of defendants, at the Louisiana Press, owned and managed by the petitioners. A detailed statement of the claim is of record.
With their pleadings, plaintiffs filed a contract entered into with the defendants for the storage and drayage of defendants' cotton from the 1st of September, 1890, to the 31st of August, 1891.
Defendants, on the other hand, plead the general denial, and, in addition, aver that this written contract was signed by them under duress; that they, being cotton factors and commission merchants, had always, for many years prior to 1890, stored their cotton with plaintiffs at the following rates: Twenty-five cents per bale for drayage, storage and labor for twelve months, or any part thereof; fifteen cents per bale for rejections, out and back (no charges for extra storage); fifty cents per bale for compressing, and fifteen cents per bale for out drayage. Defendants allege, that plaintiffs, for the years 1890 and 1891, came to an agreement with them (the defendants), whereby they bound themselves to store their (defendants') cotton, for seventeen and a half cents a bale, and to render other services for an amount acceptable to them, and which they agreed to pay; that early in the month of September, 1890, the information came to them that all of the cotton presses in the city were about to enter into a combination in order to increase the charges for drayage, storage and compressing; that plaintiffs had agreed, in order to guard against this, to become the lessees of the Crescent City Press for their general business and to turn over their (plaintiffs') Louisiana Press to them (defendants); that they (plaintiffs) in this, as well as in other respects, failed to carry out their agreement.
Defendants further aver that on September 11th, 1898, they informed one of the plaintiffs, Mathers, that two of the compresses, the New Orleans and Commercial, would not enter the alleged combine which they had heard had been formed, and that, as some of the other presses were charging buyers the rates charged the year previous for compressing and out drayage, they, the defendants, would be losers, if buyers from their firm were compelled to pay higher for that service; that they, plaintiffs, had not rented the Crescent Press, as was agreed, in order not to be compelled to pay more than in previous years; that, upon this, Mathers assured them, the defendants, that he would comply with his contract; that he had failed to get control of the Crescent City Press, but that he would rent some other press. Yet, for reasons defendants aver are shown by the evidence, plaintiffs refused to write and sign their agreement, and when the defendants urged upon them that they should carry out their agreement, plaintiff refused.
Defendants charge that plaintiffs, instead of carrying out, in good faith, their agreement as mentioned above, entered into an agreement with the labor organizations and pressmen which could only result in overcharging them. Plaintiffs, in turn, informed the defendants that they could place their business wherever they chose. This, defendants aver, they did, and placed their business with another press at a storage charge of seventeen and a half cents per bale. They also aver, that, afterwards, plaintiffs, by force of their combinations with different associations, connected with the sale and handling of cotton, compelled them, defendants, to leave the press with which they had contracted. Defendants aver that the following is the rate of charges agreed upon with the International Press, with which the defendants had entered into a contract to store and compress their cotton:
Defendants prayed for a reduction of plaintiffs' demand to $ 4148.81, and for judgment in reconvention for the sum of fifteen thousand, two hundred and forty-nine 69-100 dollars.
On these pleadings the parties went to trial, and, after some progress had been made in the trial, plaintiffs and defendants entered into an agreement to submit all questions between them, except the question of the validity of the contract and the rate of charges, to arbitrators, who were to have all the power of amicable compounders. With this consent of the plaintiffs and defendants, the court appointed a board of judicial arbitrators. After this board had been organized, they heard the evidence which had been presented to them by plaintiffs and defendants. After having devoted several months to the hearing of evidence, they agreed upon an award which was returned to the court. The homologation of this award was opposed upon different grounds. These grounds are, substantially, as follows: That the Board of Arbitrators refused to permit counsel for the plaintiffs to appear before them; that they refused to have the witnesses sworn; that the umpire took part in the proceedings and controlled them; that the Board of Arbitration took testimony of witnesses without previously notifying the defendants; that it, the Board, excluded the plaintiffs from the room while they were examining the witnesses; that the arbitrator, appointed by the court at the instance of the defendants, and the umpire, took testimony on matters submitted to them in the absence of the other arbitrator; and that one of the arbitrators appointed by the court declared himself as being the representative of the defendants. A rule was filed by the defendants to have the award of the arbitrators homologated. It was in answer to this rule that the just recited grounds of exception or opposition were filed by plaintiffs. The court heard the application on the rule, also the exception and opposition of the plaintiffs to the rule, and approved the award of the Board of Arbitrators.
The facts connected with the actions and deliberations of the Board of Arbitration are that the witnesses were not sworn; that one of the arbitrators, while excitedly engaged in a discussion, said that he represented the defendants; that the attorneys of both sides were excluded, the arbitrators thinking that the issues being of fact no arguments of counsel would be needed; that if questions of law arose they would send for the attorneys and hear them; that on one point they were sent for and the point was argued; that the parties were excluded from the immediate presence of the Board, for the reason that disturbance arose between them, but their clerks remained and the parties themselves were heard. It also appears that, plaintiffs, after settling with the defendants some point of difference in their business, after all the asserted grounds of complaint had taken place, submitted them to the Board and authorized them to embody the settlement in their return. The plaintiffs also consented to extend the time within which the Board should continue its session, and this some time after all the irregularities complained of had taken place.
The foregoing statement of the salient facts, arising from the irregularities which took place during the early part of the Board's proceeding, is complete enough to enable us to decide the question presented regarding the Board's action.
This brings us to a review of the facts on the merits of the case.
Differences between the parties arose after the agreement for storing the cotton for 1890 and 1891 had been made. They began when the pressmen, owners of the compresses, agreed among themselves to rent a number of cotton presses in addition to those they already controlled, and, in that manner, brought about an increase in the old tariff of charges. It appears that the labor organizations make regulations from time to time, for their government, and they notified the pressmen of their charges. They had agreed, for the year 1890, not to handle any cotton from one press to another, that is, not to permit "cannonading." We are informed that cannonading cotton is the removal of it by the factor, after it has been stored in one press, to another press for compressing. This "cannonading," it is said, is injurious to the labor organizations, and the pressmen are also interested in its prevention. The laborers are employed at each press by the year, but they are paid by the bale, and the object, as relates to the laborer, is to enable him to get remuneration when they make the contract for the year. This involves the necessity, it seems of preventing cotton from being removed from one press to another, or from being removed at all, thereby depriving, as is testified, the...
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