Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., Docket No. 84919

Decision Date04 August 1986
Docket NumberDocket No. 84919
Citation390 N.W.2d 732,151 Mich.App. 424
PartiesAlicia BRYANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, INC., Defendant-Appellee. 151 Mich.App. 424, 390 N.W.2d 732, 45 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 276
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[151 MICHAPP 425] Law Offices of Philip Green by Philip Green, Ann Arbor, for plaintiff-appellant.

Schlussel, Lifton, Simon, Rands, Kaufman, Galvin & Jackier by Daniel D. Swanson and Michael C. Curhan, Southfield, for defendant-appellee.

[151 MICHAPP 426] Before R.B. BURNS, P.J., and BRONSON and TIMMS, * JJ.

BRONSON, Judge.

Plaintiff filed suit in Washtenaw County Circuit Court alleging employment discrimination against the defendant under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(101) et seq. The circuit court determined that plaintiff's complaint asserting employment discrimination, based on her involvement in an interracial marriage, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. MCR 2.116(C)(8). Plaintiff now appeals as of right.

The facts of this case are straightforward. Plaintiff is a white woman married to a black man. On January 17, 1983, she began working for the defendant as a temporary secretary as a substitute for a permanent secretary who was on a leave of absence. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that shortly after the defendant learned of her interracial marriage she was informed that she would be replaced by the person who had formerly held the permanent position, but that she would be given the opportunity to interview for other job openings. The plaintiff interviewed for 14 positions from June 3, 1983, through July 1, 1983, but was not offered a job. Plaintiff claims that while she was employed by the defendant she performed competently and was the best-qualified applicant for many of the positions for which she interviewed.

The substance of plaintiff's claim of discrimination is set forth in paragraphs 12 and 13 of her complaint which state:

"12. That the Defendant in refusing to offer any [151 MICHAPP 427] of the said positions to your Plaintiff and in refusing to maintain an employment relationship with your Plaintiff, having thereafter released her from employment with Defendant, did discriminate against Plaintiff because of the race or color of her spouse contrary to her rights as guaranteed under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

"13. That Defendant engages in a pattern or practice of discriminating against black persons in hiring, tenure, terms and conditions of employment and that said pattern and practice did serve to deny your Plaintiff her rights to equal employment opportunities free from discrimination as proscribed under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act."

In response to plaintiff's complaint, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition. Defendant argued in the court below, as it does on appeal, that the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim of marital-status discrimination and that such a claim must fail because it is based on the identity of plaintiff's spouse. The trial court agreed with defendant and dismissed plaintiff's action based on our Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355; 362 N.W.2d 650 (1984).

The first and most difficult issue that we must decide is whether a plaintiff can state a claim of discrimination under the civil rights act based on the plaintiff's involvement in an interracial marriage. This is an issue of first impression in Michigan.

As relevant to this case, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2202; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(202), provides:

"(1) An employer shall not:

"(a) Fail or refuse to hire, or recruit, or discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a [151 MICHAPP 428] term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status."

Under Sec. 202, a plaintiff asserting a claim of racial discrimination must show that race was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to discriminate, but need not show that race was the exclusive causes. Jenkins v. Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich.App. 785, 794; 369 N.W.2d 223 (1985). It has been recognized that there are at least two approaches for establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination: the disparate treatment theory or the intentional discrimination theory. See Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 617; 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).

In the present case, however, defendant asserts that plaintiff's claim of race discrimination based on her interracial marriage is grounded on the identity of the plaintiff's spouse and is therefore outside the protection of the civil rights act. According to the defendant, the gravaman of plaintiff's complaint is that her marital status caused the defendant to discriminate against her and thus she failed to state a claim. Defendant relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp, supra, in support of its position.

In Miller, the Court held that antinepotism policies did not constitute discrimination based on marital status under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Miller, supra, 420 Mich. pp. 362-364, 362 N.W.2d 650. The Supreme Court refused to interpret the term "marital status" as this Court did to include "the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse". Id., p. 362, 362 N.W.2d 650. Instead, the Court reasoned that by including marital status as a protected class, the Legislature merely intended to prohibit discrimination based on whether a person is married.

[151 MICHAPP 429] We believe that defendant's reading of Miller as applicable to plaintiff's cause of action in the present case is over-broad and unwarranted. Miller had nothing to do with class or racial discrimination, but was limited to interpreting the term marital status. We cannot agree with defendant's assertion that plaintiff's complaint is simply one for marital status discrimination. In our opinion, plaintiff attempts to state a cause of action for racial discrimination based on her involvement in an interracial marriage, and the relevant consideration is whether Sec. 202 authorizes such a claim. Therefore, we find that Miller is distinguishable and does not control the outcome of this case.

Plaintiff relies on federal cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1), in support of her claim that she was discriminated against because of the race of her spouse. While federal civil rights cases can be persuasive authority in determining the proper interpretation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, they are not controlling. Dep't of Civil Rights ex rel Jones v. Dep't of Civil Service, 101 Mich.App. 295, 303; 301 N.W.2d 12 (1980), lv. den. 411 Mich. 1034 (1981) (interpretation of Title VII need not control where state law dictates a contrary result).

We note that the federal courts are split on the issue of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on interracial...

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11 cases
  • Bradley v. Stump
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • March 28, 1997
    ...425 Mich. 527, 390 N.W.2d 625 (1986).(applying reasoning in Miller to uphold anti-nepotism policy); Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing, 151 Mich.App. 424, 390 N.W.2d 732 (1986)(interpreting Plaintiff contends that "There is no lawful anti-nepotism policy that precludes spouses from working......
  • Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • December 3, 2004
    ...than controlling authority in determining the proper interpretation of the Elliott-Larsen Act. Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 151 Mich.App. 424, 390 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1986). However, the parties have not identified any relevant substantive differences between Title VII and the El......
  • Harrison v. Olde Financial Corp., Docket No. 183996
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • October 3, 1997
    ...the "discharge" element. See Laitinen v. Saginaw, 213 Mich.App. 130, 132, 539 N.W.2d 515 (1995); Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 151 Mich.App. 424, 426, 390 N.W.2d 732 (1986). With respect to the "predisposition to discriminate" element, because we are obligated to construe the e......
  • Chen v. County of Orange, G027307.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 15, 2002
    ...in which the animus is not unlawful. The classic fact pattern involving unlawful animus may be found in Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing (1986) 151 Mich.App. 424, 390 N.W.2d 732, where a white woman married to a black man was denied a permanent position as a secretary for a corporation b......
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